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Abstract 
This dissertation presents three studies on German accounting history, on the internal sphere 
of private accounting standard setting of the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), and on the state of the art of financial accounting and reporting research on family 
firms. 
After a brief introduction in chapter 1, chapter 2 explores the impact of accounting in-
ternationalisation on the contracting-oriented German accounting system. Accounting plays a 
distinct role in a firm’s governance system and has evolved in a specific institutional setting 
over time to meet the contractual demands of various stakeholders. Against this backdrop, we 
argue that accounting internationalisation affects the contracting system when formal rules 
from other settings are introduced. To support our argument and to substantiate the interplay 
of accounting as a contractual device and country-specific institutions, we provide an in-depth 
case study of one European code-law country, Germany. Here, we place the recent phenome-
non of accounting internationalisation into historical-institutional perspective and illustrate 
how accounting internationalisation has triggered a balancing act between a path-dependent 
preservation of the traditional contracting role and a moderate move towards valuation-based 
international benchmarks. 
Chapter 3 provides evidence on the little-researched internal sphere of private IASB 
standard setting, more specifically, on the dynamics of board discussions and the respective 
impact of individual board and staff members, the array of arguments evoked in IASB debates 
and board-staff relations. We conduct a content analysis of audio recordings of 14 IASB 
meetings on the amendment of IAS 19 Employee Benefits (2011) between November 2008 
and February 2010. We identify a framework of 205 categories that is arranged by four main 
categories: project elements, arguments, references and governance. Our main findings are 
that IASB members, in particular, engaged heterogeneously in the meetings and differed in 
their individual impact on (tentative) decisions. Arguments that were brought forth were 
largely conceptual and revolved around focal project elements (disclosure, presentation and 
recognition). Agenda papers (conveying staff proposals) were the dominant source of infor-
mation for the board. Moreover, technical staff members played a key role in structuring 
board discussions and acted as intermediaries between constituents and board. 
To outline the current state of knowledge and to provide some suggestions for future re-
search, chapter 4 reviews 36 studies that explore financial accounting and reporting issues in a 
family firm context with respect to subject, method, empirical models, setting, family firm 
iv 
definition, theory, and main findings. I find that prior research has largely focused on earnings 
management, earnings properties and disclosures of listed family firms from an agency per-
spective. Evidence on earnings management and disclosures of family firms is mixed, where-
as family firms generally seem to report higher quality earnings than non-family firms. Final-
ly, several suggestions for future research that encourage a broader inclusion of subjects, set-
tings, definitions, theoretical perspectives, and methods are provided. 
Chapter 5 provides several concluding remarks. 
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1 Introductory Summary 
 
 Chapter 1: Introductory Summary 
2 
In his personal blog Musings on Accounting Research, Steven Salterio, Professor of Business 
at the Canadian Queen’s School of Business and former editor-in-chief of Contemporary Ac-
counting Research, raises a call for the pluralism of subjects, methods, and methodologies in 
accounting research under the banner of a, as he calls it, Manifesto for the Radical Centre in 
Accounting Research0F0F1. On what constitutes the radical centre, his blog entry reads: 
“It is an appreciation that accounting research can cover numerous subject matters, em-
ploying a wide variety of methods and underlying social science disciplines. It is an ap-
preciation that one can search for ‘truth’ while at the same time recognizing that many 
institutions, including accounting, are ‘socially constructed’ by implicit norms that are 
‘understood’ by all those who ‘matter’. Further, it values the rigor of the research NOT 
[sic] its conclusions or premises. It takes a simple yet difficult position – that all re-
search is created equal if the scientific community (as a whole) has reached a level of 
consensus about its utility.” 
Salterio explains that the position of the radical centre is “radical” in the sense that it seems so 
rarely embraced in the accounting community and “centrist” because it particularly appreci-
ates topical and methodical pluralism. Moreover, he emphasises that accounting research is “a 
true social science endeavor from anthropology to sociology, from economics to psychology, 
from history to philosophy”. In the ideal conception of the radical centre, all underlying social 
science disciplines would be treated by the community without prejudice, accounting journals 
be reflective of the multifaceted nature accounting research, and methods be accepted in terms 
of rigor instead of “some ‘one right way’”. With regard to the latter, Salterio’s postulate ech-
oes the general tenor of other (yet rare) claims for methodical pluralism in accounting as well 
as other disciplines (Fülbier & Weller, 2008 with references). Although worded cautiously, 
the Manifesto, along with its illustrative examples, can be understood as a critique of the posi-
tivist, quantitative-empirical “mainstream” in accounting research (Chua, 1986; further evi-
dence by Oler et al., 2010 and, similarly, Fülbier et al., 2014) and, with particular glance at 
the US, the dominance and self-contained arena of the respective top tier accounting journals. 
In this spirit, the Manifesto concludes with a pointed “call to arms”: “Accounting researchers 
of the world unite – you have nothing to lose but the chains of the ONE RIGHT WAY [sic] to 
do accounting research!” 
Evidently, accounting research is a social science discipline with many facets. It offers a 
broad range of subjects from various fields (e.g., financial accounting, managerial accounting, 
auditing, taxation, accounting education, or accounting history) and related issues (e.g., corpo-
rate governance, accounting standard setting), all of which may be addressed through a varie-
                                                 
1 Salterio, S. E. Manifesto for the Radical Centre in Accounting Research. https://morebysteve.wordpress.com/ 
manifesto-for-the-radical-centre-in-accounting-research/. Accessed 10.09.2015 All direct quotes in this para-
graph are taken from the Manifesto blog post. 
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ty of research methods. The latter involve quantitative approaches (e.g., empirical-archival 
econometric studies, analytical models), qualitative methods (e.g., case studies, surveys, in-
terviews, experiments, content analyses, discourse analyses), or combinations of both. In ap-
preciation of the multifaceted nature of accounting research, the dissertation follows the plu-
ralistic view. It presents three (“non-mainstream”) studies on German accounting history 
(chapter 2), on private accounting standard setting of the International Accounting Standards 
Board (chapter 3), and on the current state of art of financial accounting research on family 
firms (chapter 4) which are premised on a qualitative case study along with a historical-
institutional narrative, a content analysis of IASB meeting audio recordings, and a descrip-
tive-analytical literature review, respectively. The remainder of this doctoral thesis is organ-
ised as follows. 
Chapter 2 explores the impact of accounting internationalisation over the last 20 years—
in particular, the rise of the valuation-based International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS)—on the contracting-oriented German accounting system from a historical-institutional 
perspective. It is joint work with my doctoral supervisor Rolf Uwe Fülbier and has been pub-
lished as Fülbier & Klein (2015). The second chapter is premised on the notion that account-
ing has historically evolved to fulfil the information requirements of different contractual 
partners and, accordingly, interrelates with environmental and institutional conditions. 
Against this backdrop, we argue that ongoing accounting internationalisation impacts the 
evolved interplay of financial accounting and the institutional setting. This phenomenon may 
particularly apply to the rise of the valuation-oriented IFRS, which have been introduced rela-
tively quickly in heterogeneous (and not fully harmonised) national environments. In this re-
gard, prior research suggests that IFRS adoption is accompanied not only by intended but also 
by unintended economic consequences that primarily relate to respective contractual out-
comes (Brüggemann et al., 2013). 
We substantiate the impact of accounting internationalisation on domestic accounting in 
the historical setting of Germany. In this regard, we first illustrate that German accounting has 
evolved in the code-law tradition and accentuate the respective predominance of contracting 
purposes. Our historical inquiry spans from the early roots of the German accounting tradition 
in the 14th century into the first phase of European accounting harmonisation in the 1980s. We 
further outline how the (contractible) German accounting system (constituted in the “Han-
delsgesetzbuch”, HGB) has been shaped by four major characteristics of German business. 
Whereas accounting regulation and the institutional setting had remained relatively stable 
over several decades, institutional changes in the 1990s promoted the rise of valuation-
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oriented accounting that set off more radical changes in the German accounting system. In 
this regard, the “Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz” (1998) was a cautious attempt to bal-
ance the valuation demand of (a few) German listed companies against the dominant contract-
ing role of German HGB accounting through a deregulation of public firms’ group account-
ing. HGB legal entity financial statements—the basis for contracting purposes—have re-
mained unaffected. Subsequent regulations, however, differed in scope and impact. The Euro-
pean Regulation 1606/2002 has stipulated group accounting in accordance with the Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for all public firms and, thus, also for the sub-
stantial majority of German listed companies that had not adopted IFRS or US GAAP before. 
As before, German legislation safeguarded the contracting role of German accounting through 
a restriction of the Member State option for single financial statements. The core area of con-
tracting, however, was considerably influenced by the “Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz” 
(2009) which brought valuation-based accounting elements to legal entity financial statements 
and, thus, to all German companies. The reform can be understood as another, but more diffi-
cult, balancing act between strengthening the valuation capabilities of German accounting 
while protecting its contracting-based accounting tradition from being replaced by IFRS. In 
this regard, we outline several contracting implications—that we dare to say are unintended—
from these regulatory balancing endeavours. 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the internal sphere of private accounting standard setting of the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). A paper version of this chapter is available 
as Klein & Fülbier (2015). The third chapter provides evidence on several board-internal as-
pects of private accounting standard setting that have received little attention in prior research 
so far. In particular, we address the subtleties of IASB debates that are not evident from pub-
licly available summary documents, the respective role of arguments in these debates, and the 
individual contribution of board and staff members. For this purpose, we conduct a content 
analysis of audio recordings of 14 IASB meetings on the amendment of IAS 19 Employee 
Benefits (2011), as debated between November 2008 and February 2010, i.e., after the release 
of the discussion paper up to the publication of the exposure draft. We identify a set of 205 
categories that we arrange into four main categories: 1) project elements—to classify project 
characteristics, standard elements and proposals discussed in the IASB meetings, 2) argu-
ments—to reflect reasons that were brought forth in discussing and justifying project ele-
ments, 3) references—to link statements to sources if explicitly revealed, and 4) govern-
ance—to identify organisational aspects of the board meetings. 
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At the project element level, we first expose the chronology of IASB discussions and 
tentative decisions. We then highlight how individual participants, in particular, the “leading” 
IASB members David Tweedie, James Leisenring and Stephen Cooper, impacted board de-
bates and respective decisions. Focussing on meeting-internal argumentation, we find that 
conceptual arguments played a relatively greater role than specialised or consistency argu-
ments. In this regard, we outline how individual arguments related to prominent project ele-
ments and reconstruct respective IASB decisions on disclosures and presentation of pension 
cost components. Findings from the reference main category indicate that agenda papers, in-
volving staff summaries and recommendations, were a dominant source of information for 
board members. In addition, IASB members occasionally argued from the perspectives of 
particular constituents or examples but only scarcely referred to their personal or professional 
background, whereas staff members were inclined to reaffirm their proposals by reciting (se-
lected) comment letters. Finally, we elaborate on the prominent role of the chairman in lead-
ing the IASB meetings, on the intermediary role of technical staff, and on general observa-
tions regarding board-staff relations, language proficiency, and the board meetings’ discus-
sion culture. 
Chapter 4 reviews the research literature on financial accounting and reporting of family 
firms. In contrast to management, organisational, and finance research, accounting has, 
somewhat surprisingly, only recently begun to address family firms as distinct objects of re-
search. I presume that accounting research has been, first and foremost, facing the challenge 
of taking account of established conceptions of the idiosyncrasies of family business, strate-
gies on the (empirical) identification of family firms, and family firm-specific theoretical 
frameworks from the, in this regard, more “mature” disciplines. To outline how (financial) 
accounting research has met this challenge, to elaborate on respective findings, and to provide 
several suggestions for future research, the fourth chapter reviews 33 journal publications and 
three working papers that deal with financial accounting and reporting issues of family firms. 
In contrast to related reviews, I exclude the fields of managerial accounting and auditing for 
the benefit of a more in-depth review of the prevailing financial accounting literature. Here, I 
provide a refined view on subject, method, empirical models (if applicable), setting, family 
firm-definition, theory, and the studies’ main findings. 
The review suggests that prior research on financial accounting of family firms has been 
dominated by quantitative-empirical studies with a limited range of subjects (in particular, 
earnings management, earnings properties, and disclosures). Moreover, the vast majority of 
the reviewed literature has explored listed family firms, mostly in comparison to non-family 
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firms, in single country settings. The identification of family firms is commonly premised on 
definitional elements that can be subsumed under the components-of-involvement approach, 
more precisely, (a minimum threshold of) family ownership and/or the presence of one or 
more family member(s) on the management or supervisory board. Notably, the reviewed liter-
ature shows remarkable heterogeneity in the interpretation of these elements. Regarding fami-
ly firm-specific theorisation, I observe that four of five studies ground in agency theory, 
whereas alternative frameworks such as stewardship theory or socioemotional wealth theory 
have only played a subordinate role so far. I contend that the dominant “type” of financial 
accounting study (quantitative-empirical, family involvement-oriented, and agency theory-
based) stems from a relatively stable “interlocking” of theory, method, and operational defini-
tion of family firms. 
Regarding the studies’ main subjects, I illustrate that empirical evidence on the genuine 
earnings management activities is mixed, although a slight majority of studies suggest that 
family firms are less likely to manage earnings than non-family firms. Family control, howev-
er, seems to mitigate the effectiveness of certain corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., au-
dit committees) in constraining earnings management. Similarly, findings on (voluntary) dis-
closures of family firms are heterogeneous and do not convey a clear picture due to different 
focal points and settings. By contrast, evidence on earnings properties indicates that family 
firms exhibit higher earnings quality than non-family business. Finally, I outline several non-
exhaustive suggestions for future research which mainly encourage the broader inclusion of 
subjects, settings, definitions, theoretical perspectives (involving theorisation from related 
disciplines), and methods. 
The fifth chapter provides several concluding remarks. 
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2 Balancing Past and Present: The Impact of 
Accounting Internationalisation on German 
Accounting Regulations 1F1F† 
 
                                                 
†  Chapter 2 has been published as Fülbier, R. U., & Klein, M. (2015). Balancing past and present: The impact 
of accounting internationalisation on German accounting regulations. Accounting History, 20(3), 342–374. 
DOI: 10.1177/1032373215595300. SAGE Publications Ltd, all rights reserved. © The authors.  
 We gratefully acknowledge valuable comments from two anonymous reviewers, Yuri Biondi, Joachim Gas-
sen, Krysta Heathcote, Torsten Kühlmann, Christoph Pelger, Thorsten Sellhorn and delegates at the 2013 
EAA annual congress in Paris, France, and at the 7th Accounting History International Conference in Seville, 
Spain. We also thank Nadine Gehrke, Steffen Höhl, Markus Kuger, Anna-Magdalena Mollat and Hendrik 
Rupertus for their assistance. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The process of accounting internationalisation has always been attended by one crucial ques-
tion: How much uniformity in financial reporting is required in globalised (capital) markets 
and how much diversity is still necessary to satisfy diverse contractual and regulatory settings 
at the firm- and country levels? Accounting plays a distinct role in a firm’s governance system 
and has evolved over time to fulfil the information requirements of different contractual part-
ners. Accordingly, accounting interrelates with environmental and institutional conditions and 
accounting information ensures coordination within a firm’s nexus of contractual relation-
ships (e.g., Biondi, 2007; Coase, 1990). To control the efficient use of firm resources, outside 
contractual partners (principals) have incentives to monitor management (agents) actions, to 
link contractual claims directly or indirectly to financial accounting information and to assess 
a firm’s compliance with its contractual obligations (e.g., Bushman & Smith, 2003). A con-
tracting orientation, often associated in the literature with stewardship, can be separated from 
valuation-based accounting, which focuses exclusively on timely firm valuation to derive the 
value of individual ownership claims for investment purposes (Gjesdal, 1981; Lennard, 2007). 
The role of accounting in a firm’s institutional environment has at least one material 
consequence. Country-specific regulatory settings and other institutions foster cross-country 
heterogeneity in accounting. From an evolutionary perspective, national systems represent the 
outcome of a historical process in which accounting regulation has aligned with the specific 
institutional environment. This alignment may include the adaption of foreign accounting 
elements that have either proven compatible with the domestic setting or have triggered an 
evolutionary adjustment. 
Against this backdrop, we argue that ongoing internationalisation in accounting rules 
has an impact on the evolved interplay of financial accounting and the institutional setting. 
This phenomenon is particularly applicable in the context of the rise of the capital market- and 
valuation-oriented International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which have been in-
troduced relatively quickly in heterogeneous—and therefore not fully harmonised—national 
environments. Prior research suggests that IFRS adoption is accompanied not only by intend-
ed but also by unintended economic consequences (Brüggemann et al., 2013). The latter in-
clude effects that are unrelated to the stated objectives of either the standard setter (the Inter-
national Accounting Standards Board (IASB)) or other regulators that have introduced IFRS 
in national and supranational jurisdictions. The distinction between intended and unintended 
consequences points to the polarity of contracting and valuation: Whereas stated objectives 
focus almost exclusively on valuation, accounting internationalisation and, in particular, IFRS 
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adoption, has “the potential to materially affect contractual outcomes” (Brüggemann et al., 
2013: 1). Accordingly, any regulator who aims to increase benefits from valuation must also 
consider contracting implications. However, whether unintended consequences can be rigor-
ously anticipated remains to be seen. 
To illustrate the impact of accounting internationalisation on domestic accounting, we 
provide a qualitative in-depth case study on the regulatory history of a single country: Germa-
ny. We deem Germany worth investigating for two primary reasons. First, Germany is a con-
tinental European code-law country (Ball et al., 2000; d’Arcy, 2001; Nobes, 1992, 1998, 
2004) with a historical contracting-based accounting tradition. In that regard, German ac-
counting regulation has historically evolved within a unique institutional setting to fulfil the 
contractual demands of different stakeholders and has attached major contractual consequenc-
es to legal entities’ financial statements2F2F2. This framework has been confronted with a relative-
ly short period of accounting internationalisation, beginning with European harmonisation in 
the 1980s, followed by the accounting deregulation stemming from the rise of valuation-based 
accounting since the 1990s. Second, with IFRS being mandated for group reporting, interna-
tional accounting is limited to a rather small number of German firms. International account-
ing, however, has affected the domestic contracting-based accounting system. In this regard, 
we identify the balancing act involved in preserving the traditional contracting orientation 
while moving towards a stronger valuation focus. 
Methodologically, our paper combines a literature-based narrative with a more explana-
tory, interpretative historical inquiry that links past developments (the historical state) to the 
current situation in German accounting (the present state) (Previts, 1984; Previts et al., 1990). 
In line with historical institutionalism (e.g., Steinmo, 2008; Steinmo et al., 1992) and the as-
sociated theory of institutional change (North, 1990, 1994), we show that specific continental 
European and German institutions and institutional changes have shaped the development of 
Germany’s accounting regulations. The distinction between formal and informal institutions 
(e.g., Henisz & Williamson, 1999; Williamson, 1985) or similarly, formal rules and informal 
constraints (e.g., North, 1991), helps us to illustrate how accounting internationalisation in 
Germany has partially changed formal institutions over a short period of time, whereas other 
formal rules and institutions, such as insolvency, tax and corporation law, the dominance of 
debt markets and the prevalence of the family-owned small and medium-sized entity (SME) 
sector, have remained largely unchanged. In addition, informal institutions, such as contract-
ing behaviour in general, stronger stakeholder orientation (especially towards employees) or 
                                                 
2 Throughout the chapter we use the terms “legal entity financial statements” and “single financial statements” 
synonymously. 
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culture have been even less affected by accounting internationalisation. Overall, this may 
point to efficiency effects from changing transaction costs of firm contracting (Williamson, 
1979, 1985). Economies that adopt other economies’ formal rules are likely to exhibit differ-
ent performance characteristics because of different informal and formal norms (North, 1994: 
366). This may also explain the “powerful influence of the past on the present and future” 
(North, 1994: 364) and the path-dependent nature of recent German accounting changes. 
Our study adds to the existing literature in several respects. First, we put the recent phe-
nomenon of accounting internationalisation into historical-institutional perspective. In con-
trast to prior studies on Germany’s accounting tradition and regulatory history (e.g., Baetge et 
al., 1995; Ballwieser, 2010; Busse von Colbe, 1992, 1996; Busse von Colbe & Fülbier, 2013; 
Eierle, 2005; Forrester, 1977; Haller & Eierle, 2004; Heidhues & Patel, 2012; Hellmann et al., 
2013; Hoffmann & Detzen, 2013; Küpper & Mattessich, 2005; Schneider, 2001; Sellhorn & 
Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006), we accentuate the impact of formal and informal institutions on 
the development of Germany’s contracting-oriented accounting system. Grounded in this his-
torical elaboration, we identify recent balancing attempts manifested in preserving the tradi-
tional contracting role while moving to international benchmarks. In this regard, we add to 
other code-law country case studies from the perspective of historical institutionalism, for 
example, the recent study by Caria & Rodrigues (2014) on Portuguese accounting. Moreover, 
we contribute to the accounting history literature on the development of accounting principles 
and systems in the area of the European code law (e.g., Richard, 2005; Vogeler, 2005). Final-
ly, we add to the literature on the economic consequences of accounting harmonisation and 
IFRS adoption in particular regions or countries (e.g., Boross et al., 1995; Callao et al., 2009; 
Ernstberger & Vogler, 2008; Kikuya, 2001; Laínez et al., 1999; Márquez-Ramos, 2011; 
Qingliang, 1994). Our findings are useful to understand the German regulatory and contractu-
al challenges in which unintended economic consequences of accounting internationalisation 
might occur (Brüggemann et al., 2013). 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section describes the 
theoretical underpinnings for understanding the approach of this chapter. In section 2.3, we 
first provide a conceptual outline of the contracting role of accounting and then illustrate how 
prior to the late 20th century, German accounting evolved into a contracting-based system. In 
section 2.4, we elaborate on pivotal institutional characteristics that facilitated this develop-
ment. Section 2.5 illustrates the last 20 years of accounting internationalisation and exposes 
the German legislature’s balancing acts. The final section of chapter 2 provides our conclu-
sions. 
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2.2 Methodology: Historical institutionalism and an interpretational case 
study approach 
Historical institutionalism is a social-science approach associated with political science, soci-
ology and economics. It centres on the institutional setting over time and aims to explain how 
the formation of, existence of and changes in institutions affect historical developments 
(Steinmo, 2008; Steinmo et al., 1992; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). Even though there is no clear 
definition of institutions, in a broad sense, they are commonly understood as mechanisms of 
social interaction (Henning, 2007). This understanding involves rules, but often also includes 
other norms and organisations as institutional arrangements (Henning, 2007; Steinmo, 2008; 
Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). We follow (North, 1990, 1991) and the new institutional econom-
ics in conceiving institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, econom-
ic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, cus-
toms, traditions and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” 
(North, 1991: 97). Moreover, the past experiences of a society—which are embodied not only 
in culture and belief but also in language and religion—are also subsumed under informal 
institutions (Henisz & Williamson, 1999; North, 1990, 1994). In the accounting context, for-
mal institutions include, for example, the constitutional political and economic system, legis-
lation, accounting and auditing standards, along with professional bodies, such as standard 
setters or enforcement organisations. In contrast, best practices or conventions in accounting 
or the cultural disposition of accounting professionals are supposed to be informal. 
Historical institutionalism also commonly notes that institutions tend to be enduring, 
which leads to a self-reinforcing persistence of patterns over time (Immergut, 1992; Mahoney, 
2000). Unlike approaches that focus on radical breaks and institutional breakdowns (e.g., 
punctuated equilibria, Krasner, 1984), historical institutionalism rests upon the idea of contin-
uously evolving processes and thus is tied to the concept of path dependence (Vitols, 2006: 
51). Whereas the latter is commonly used in the social sciences, it still lacks a clear interpreta-
tion (Page, 2006; Pierson, 2000). However, the bottom line is that “history matters” (e.g., Ma-
honey, 2000: 507; North, 1990: 100; Pierson, 2000: 252) and that “current and future states, 
actions, or decisions depend on the path of previous states, actions, or decisions” (Page, 2006: 
88). Originally applied in the context of technology—David (1985) uses path dependence to 
explain the persistence of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard over time (also Arthur, 1989)—
the concept has been applied, for example, to the formation of language and law (Hathaway, 
2001), the location of cities (Arthur, 1994; Page, 1999) and the evolution of government poli-
cies (Hacker, 2002). We refer to path dependence in the institutional context, an area that has 
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been particularly investigated by North (1990; 1994) with respect to the impact of institutional 
evolution on economic developments within countries and in cross-country settings. North 
investigates the path dependency of historical economic processes, driven by the idea that 
some but not all formal institutions can change in a short time, whereas “informal norms usu-
ally change only gradually”. Thus, “revolutionary change is never as revolutionary as its sup-
porters desire, and performance will be different than anticipated” (North, 1994: 366). North 
focuses on the pervasive influence of formal and (especially) informal institutions on econo-
mies’ long-run character and economic performance (efficiency). In this regard, North and 
others (esp., Arthur, 1989, 1994; David, 1985) do not claim that path-dependent developments 
necessarily increase efficiency—sometimes quite the contrary (potential path inefficiency, 
Arthur, 1994; Pierson, 2000). Here, we concur when we assume in our analysis that account-
ing internationalisation causes efficiency effects.  
Our understanding of accounting internationalisation in Germany is that of a path-
dependent process characterised by changes in some, but not all, formal (e.g., changes in ac-
counting legislation, standard setting and enforcement) and informal institutions (e.g., chang-
es in managers’ financing decisions, investment behaviour and capital markets). Our analysis, 
however, abstains from the question of whether the strict or bounded individual rationality 
assumption of rational choice institutionalism can be applied, along with the question of 
whether institutions or institutional changes themselves are always meant to be efficient (re-
ducing transaction costs), intentionally created solutions (Thelen, 1999; Thelen & Steinmo, 
1992).  
In enquiring about recent accounting internationalisation in Germany, we employ a 
qualitative case study approach—a common method in historical institutionalism (e.g., Ma-
honey, 2000; Steinmo, 2008; Thelen, 1999). Accordingly, we identify patterns and develop 
insights “in the course of interpreting the empirical material itself” (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 
12) to illustrate the path-dependent process of accounting internationalisation in Germany and 
to indicate some of the efficiency effects due to a partially changing and persistent “institu-
tional matrix” (North, 1991: 109). To understand the contingent nature of a complex process, 
interpretational history provides, in the manner of a social science, both explanations and pos-
sible causal relations. It goes beyond mere storytelling, even though narrative history is a le-
gitimate and widely used approach in accounting history (Previts et al., 1990). Interpretational 
history requires process tracing, which is the analysis of historical processes over a substantial 
stretch of years, decades or even centuries (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002) to search for patterns 
and to better understand the institution-driven, path-dependent development and the specific 
 Chapter 2: Balancing Past and Present 
13 
character of German accounting regulations on the one hand and (at least) some international-
isation effects on the other hand. In line with historical institutionalism, our case study focus-
es on the process over time (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002; Thelen, 1999). We accept, however, 
that our collection may be incomplete and our interpretation may be subjective, as is always 
the case in historical research (Previts et al., 1990; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). 
2.3 The rise of contracting-based German accounting 
2.3.1 The contracting role of accounting 
From the contractual perspective, accounting information contributes to the coordination of 
contractual relationships within a firm, which is regarded as a nexus of contracts (Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972; Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1991). Individual parties 
(stakeholders) negotiate with the firm on a set of rights and obligations. On the one hand, ac-
counting mitigates respective principal-agent conflicts by reducing information asymmetry. 
On the other hand, accounting-based proxies, such as earnings or equity, serve as contractible 
signals to govern and enforce contractual claims and consequences (Biondi, 2007; Bushman 
& Smith, 2003; Christensen & Demski, 2003; Christensen et al., 2005; Coase, 1990). The 
contracting role of accounting involves, in particular, the accounting-based determination of 
both financial payouts and payout restrictions with regard to stakeholders, such as investors, 
creditors, employees and tax authorities. Because they typically occur in social contracts be-
tween taxpayers and the state (e.g., Musgrave, 1992), accounting-based statutory tax regula-
tions are also subsumed under the contracting role. In Germany, this also applies to other ac-
counting-based contracting areas, such as capital maintenance, profit distribution and the 
identification of financial distress and insolvency in company law and bankruptcy law, re-
spectively. 
Although accounting research has analytically separated the objectives of contracting 
and valuation (Gjesdal, 1981), it has not been able to precisely differentiate the related conse-
quences for recognition and measurement (Botosan et al., 2006). Theoretical findings, howev-
er, suggest that information for contracting purposes is not optimal for valuation and vice-
versa (e.g., Biondi, 2013; Christensen & Demski, 2003; Christensen et al., 2005; Gjesdal, 
1981; Littleton, 1961). Contracting-based accounting, often associated with a stewardship 
purpose, tends to yield more complete, reliable and hard data that are “difficult for people to 
disagree” (Ijiri, 1975: 36) with to ensure the efficient enforcement of contracts (Biondi, 2007; 
Bushman & Smith, 2003; Christensen, 2010; Gjesdal, 1981; Lennard, 2007; Leuz, 1996). The 
more verifiable, recurring and standardised the information, the more appropriate it is for con-
 Chapter 2: Balancing Past and Present 
14 
tracting purposes (Cascino et al., 2014; Demerjian, 2011; Leuz, 1998). Accordingly, contract-
ing-based accounting emphasises past transactions and therefore breeds more historical in-
formation. In contrast, valuation-based information that is useful for decisions should enable 
shareholders to forecast a firm’s future cash flows and therefore has a more prospective focus 
(Lennard, 2007). In that respect, empirical findings support the notion of contracting and val-
uation as conflicting objectives of financial accounting (Gassen, 2008; Li, 2010)3F3F3. 
From a historical perspective, the development of accounting was closely connected to 
major contracting areas, such as debt contracting, taxation and the separation of management 
and ownership (e.g., Leuz, 1996, 1998; Littleton, 1966; Schneider, 2001). Although account-
ing information has long been tied to contracting, today’s accounting systems have been 
shaped differently due to the different patterns and evolution of institutional settings in differ-
ent countries. This structure is reflected in various accounting system classifications with 
more or less complex dimensioning (e.g., Nobes, 1992). Even the frequently used dichotomy 
of code- (macro) and common-law (micro) accounting system (Nobes, 1983) is suitable to 
explain major accounting differences, because legal system-variables and major accounting 
characteristics are highly correlated (Doupnik & Salter, 1995; Nobes, 1998). Our case study 
of the code-law country of Germany shows that the regulator of the German Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) system has explicitly stipulated the contractual purpose 
and its priority in the conceptual guideline—which is important in a principles-based system 
for the deduction of new rules and the interpretation of existing ones. We also illustrate that 
material contractual consequences are legally connected to accounting information in Germa-
ny, representing a collective contract approach (e.g., Brüggemann et al., 2013). Without deny-
ing that accounting information is also used for contracting purposes in the common-law 
world, we find related accounting systems to exclusively focus on valuation and capital pro-
viders in organised capital markets, respectively. Accordingly, such accounting systems do 
not generate information for contracting purposes and therefore, private and individual con-
tract adjustments or alternative systems, such as separate tax systems, are necessary to fulfil 
contracting demands. In contrast to the German code-law system, the contracting demand in 
common-law countries is therefore most likely met outside the valuation-based accounting 
system on a more individual (firm) level, assuming that typical common-law attributes, such 
as stronger organised capital markets and a focus on equity investors, apply. 
                                                 
3 We note that accounting research continues to experience difficulty providing consistent empirical evidence 
on different accounting objectives, such as contracting and valuation, leading to different accounting out-
comes (Banker et al., 2009; Bushman et al., 2006; Drymiotes & Hemmer, 2013; O'Connell, 2006). 
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2.3.2 Pre-1900 developments  
In this section, we show that German accounting has evolved in the code-law tradition, which 
was substantially influenced by Italy and France beginning during the Renaissance. To identi-
fy the predominance of contracting purposes, we highlight the institutional motives and 
changes underlying major milestones in German accounting regulation. 
In terms of mercantile bookkeeping, the German accounting tradition can be traced back 
at least to the early 14th century. Contemporary recordings, however, merely contain fragmen-
tary entries on lending transactions and more closely resemble notebooks than systematically 
kept accounts (Brown, 1968; Mollwo, 1901; Penndorf, 1913, 1916; Sombart, 1919). In the 
early 16th century, accounting practice advanced with the dissemination of bookkeeping tech-
niques along the lines of Pacioli’s double-entry method (Kellenbenz, 1971; Oldroyd & Dobie, 
2009; Ricker, 1967), and the first German manuscripts on bookkeeping emerged (e.g., Inoue, 
1978; Jeßing, 2009; Weitenauer, 1931; Yamey, 1967). By this time, the first formal rules on 
debt contracting arose when several municipal laws in southern German towns (e.g., Freiburg, 
Nuremberg, and Augsburg) began to require the preparation of trading and debt books, which 
had probative value in court (Penndorf, 1913). 
The initial Italian influence was followed by a strong and formative French impact on 
the German legal system in general and German accounting in particular. The first compre-
hensive legal accounting requirements arose with the enactment of Louis XIV’s “Ordonnance 
de Commerce” in 1673, accompanied by Jacques Savary’s commentary on good merchant 
behaviour, “Le Parfait Negociant”, in 1675 (Savary, 1675). The Ordonnance, also referred to 
as “Code Savary”, legally obliged merchants to keep orderly journals and to biennially pre-
pare inventories of their commercial assets, receivables and debts (Title III, Art. 8) to be dis-
closed in the event of bankruptcy. If merchants did not comply, they could be accused of 
fraud and sentenced to death (Title XI, Art. 11 and 12). Savary annotates that financial state-
ments are intended for self-information about net assets, receivables, and a period’s profit or 
loss; they may also serve as legal evidence in case of insolvency (Klein-Blenkers, 2010; Rich-
ard, 2005; Savary, 1675). The Ordonnance influenced commercial legislation across Europe. 
It was not only incorporated into the French Code de Commerce of 1807, which spread 
throughout the Napoleonic Empire at the beginning of the 19th century (Walton, 1993), but 
also affected the institutional setting for economic activities in Prussia. Accordingly, the Or-
donnance was a model for the General Law for Prussian States (“Allgemeines Landrecht für 
Preussische Staaten”) of 1794 (Ballwieser, 2010; Barth, 1953; Schneider, 2001; Schröer, 
1993). Like the Ordonnance, the Prussian Law mandated orderly bookkeeping (Part II, Ti-
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tle 8, §§ 566–607), especially for owner-manager self-information and debt-contracting pur-
poses; with respect to the latter, the Prussian Law required the submission of a balance sheet 
in the event of bankruptcy (Part II, Title 20, § 1468). Moreover, it established the lower of 
cost or market-principle for the valuation of current assets and the strict depreciation of fixed 
assets (Part II, Title 8, §§ 642–646). Accounting regulation further progressed with Europe’s 
political restoration after the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15. Following the formation of the 
German Union in 1815 and the German Customs Union in 1833, the German National As-
sembly called for the draft of a unitary commercial law. Consequently, the General German 
Commercial Code (“Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch”, or ADHGB) was enacted in 
1861 and remained effective after the foundation of the German Empire in 1871. 
Even though the long-term focus on debt contracting and owner-manager self-
information continued, German (accounting) regulations in the 1870s, also triggered by capi-
tal inflow from reparations in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, developed additional 
elements to mitigate shareholder-manager conflicts. Comprehensive regulations for stock cor-
porations and limited joint-stock partnerships emerged (1870), not only with further elements 
of debt (e.g., capital maintenance requirements) but also of equity contracting (e.g., the intro-
duction of separate supervisory boards). In particular, the new equity perspective stimulated 
the introduction of an accounting measurement principle later on, which had parallels to the 
current concept of fair value (Richard, 2005). In contrast to prior Prussian laws, Art. 31 of the 
ADHGB required all assets to be measured at their current value to prevent arbitrary valuation 
(Barth, 1953). However, the misuse of this principle—for example, through strong earnings 
management and unrealised profit payouts—led to the downfall of numerous German stock 
corporations between 1870 and 1873 (“Gründerkrise”). Consequently, the Supreme Court of 
Commerce clarified in 1873 that current values were to be based on objective, observable 
market prices as of the balance sheet date. In a later response to the Gründerkrise, the reform 
of the Stock Corporation Law of 1884 abandoned this form of fair value measurement (Barth, 
1953; Hoffmann & Detzen, 2013; Richard, 2005; Schröer, 1993). The revision in 1884 was 
primarily driven by the debt-contracting role of accounting. To prevent the distribution of 
unrealised profits and to strengthen stock corporations’ capital funds, a strict commitment to 
conservative valuation (Art. 185a ADHGB 1884), based on acquisition or production costs as 
the highest attributable asset value and the depreciation of all noncurrent assets, and a capital 
reserve (Art. 185b ADHGB 1884), were introduced. However, valuation at cost was not yet 
required for other legal forms such as private limited companies. In 1897, the ADHGB was 
superseded with only minor changes by the new German Code of Commercial Law (“Han-
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delsgesetzbuch”, HGB), which became effective along with a revised Civil Law on 1 January 
1900. For the first time, the HGB referred to the term “Grundsätze ordnungsmäßiger Buch-
führung” (GoB, or generally accepted principles on proper bookkeeping), a set of formal, cod-
ified rules, along with informal norms based on interpretations and best practices. Moreover, 
from 1874 on, several federal states of the newly founded German Empire had legal book-tax 
conformity (Pfaff & Schröer, 1996; Schneider, 2001), which tied the determination of taxable 
income to financial statements (the authoritativeness principle). 
2.3.3 Major regulatory steps during the 20th century 
In the 20th century, German accounting regulation was substantially impacted by legislative 
reactions to the Great Depression. The emergency decree on the Stock Corporation Law of 
1931 (“Aktienrechtsnotverordnung”) stipulated a specific layout for balance sheet and income 
statements along with stricter disclosure requirements to provide a clear and reliable view of 
financial position and performance (§ 260b HGB 1931). Moreover, in response to several 
cases of accounting fraud in large German companies, the Law demanded stock corporations’ 
annual accounts henceforth to be audited (§ 262a HGB 1931) (Busse von Colbe, 1996). In 
1937, the Stock Corporation Law (“Aktiengesetz”, AktG) was comprehensively amended and 
due to its increased complexity, it was separated from the HGB, which retained general re-
quirements such as orderly bookkeeping and the preparation of inventories and financial 
statements. For the sake of creditor protection, the new Aktiengesetz particularly emphasised 
the need for financial capital maintenance, thus leading accounting regulation in an even more 
conservative direction. Accordingly, the Aktiengesetz required fixed assets to be strictly val-
ued at amortised cost and current assets through the lower of either cost or market. It also 
prohibited the capitalisation of start-up costs and internally generated goodwill (§ 133 AktG 
1937). To strengthen capital maintenance, further payout (dividend) restrictions were imple-
mented (§ 130 AktG 1937). Rules on the layout of balance sheets and income statements 
(§§ 131, 132 AktG 1937) were largely inherited from the emergency decree but were accom-
panied by stricter disclosure requirements. 
The Stock Corporation Law was marginally amended in 1959 but substantially re-
formed six years later. The new Aktiengesetz of 1965 (AktG 1965) brought two innovations. 
First, it introduced a fixed value principle regulating the valuation of assets below historical 
costs (§§ 154–156 AktG 1965) to limit the buildup of hidden reserves (Busse von Colbe, 
1996). Second (and for the first time), preparation of consolidated financial statements was 
required (§§ 329–338 AktG 1965), albeit only for domestic subsidiaries (§ 329 AktG 1965). 
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In this regard, the legislature followed an earlier rule (imposed by the Allied forces in 1950), 
which required mining and metallurgy firms to prepare consolidated accounts; that rule was 
also adopted by other industries (Busse von Colbe et al., 2010). The legal birth of group ac-
counting led to a formal segregation of accounting objectives. Because legal consequences 
have been tied to legal entity financial statements since that time, the newly established group 
accounting facilitated a greater emphasis on the so-far less-pronounced valuation role (e.g., 
Sellhorn & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006). As outlined below, consolidated financial statements 
have been the primary gateway to the accounting internationalisation that began in the 1980s 
and 1990s. However, group accounting has also extended the scope of contractible accounting 
proxies for private arrangements beyond the level of the single financial statement. 
In 1969, the obligation to publicly disclose financial statements was extended to legal 
forms other than stock corporations or joint-stock partnerships in the Disclosure Law (“Pub-
lizitätsgesetz” 1969). This was motivated by the crisis of the Krupp Group, a large, unincor-
porated steel parent firm with subsidiaries that suffered severe losses in 1966 (Busse von Col-
be, 1996). Until that time, even large non-incorporated companies had been required to pre-
pare—but not to disclose—financial statements. The Krupp crisis revealed that restricted dis-
closure disadvantages contractual partners that do not have the power to claim information 
bilaterally (e.g., customers or suppliers). Further requirements for the financial and insurance 
sector followed. However, legal accounting requirements remained scattered across commer-
cial and corporate law. 
2.3.4 European accounting harmonisation: The early period of accounting international-
isation  
Because of the European Commission’s endeavours for accounting harmonisation throughout 
the European Economic Community (EEC; later European Union, EU), the face of German 
accounting regulation changed substantially. In December 1985, the Accounting Directives 
Act (“Bilanzrichtliniengesetz”) transformed the EEC’s fourth (78/669/EEC, Accounting Di-
rective, 1978), seventh (83/349/EEC, Directive on Consolidated Accounts, 1983) and eighth 
directives (84/253/EEC, Audit Directive, 1984) into federal law. Most importantly, account-
ing rules that had been scattered across commercial and corporate law were now unified and 
condensed in the Third Book of the Commercial Code (§§ 238–339 HGB). Because the fourth 
directive applied to all incorporated firms, domestic accounting rules were extended to limited 
liability companies and, beyond that, even to unincorporated firms. The reform embedded 
several innovations, such as the adoption of the concept of the true and fair view (§§ 238, 264, 
297 HGB), the requirement to prepare a management report (§§ 289, 315 HGB) and the 
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recognition of new pension obligations (Art. 28 EGHGB). The adoption of the true and fair 
view concept exemplifies how German regulators struggled with contracting and valuation. 
The original meaning of true and fair view, a valuation-based concept from the UK, was di-
luted in the process of transformation by omitting the overriding property of the UK concept 
and by adding a GoB compliance requirement. The HGB version suggests that the true and 
fair view essentially bears on the notes, whereas balance sheets and income statements exclu-
sively refer to the traditional, contracting-based German GoB (Alexander, 1993; Ordelheide, 
1993). Furthermore, the GoB principles themselves (e.g., conservatism in measurement and 
the strict realisation principle) have become more important through their wider codification 
in the HGB (§ 252 HGB). Accordingly, the character of previously uncodified principles (in-
formal institutions) was changed to one of formal rules. 
The seventh directive also opened the German Commercial Code to Anglo-American 
elements of group accounting. Most importantly, it mandated the preparation of consolidated 
statements with geographically unrestricted consolidation (§ 294 (1) HGB), the purchase 
method (§§ 300, 301 HGB), the valuation of investments in associates at equity (§§ 311, 312 
HGB) and the proportionate consolidation of joint ventures (§ 310 HGB). Thus, the interna-
tionalisation impact of European harmonisation on HGB was clearly visible in the consolidat-
ed financial statements, which leaned towards more valuation (Baetge et al., 1995). However, 
recognition and measurement rules were, and remain, differentiated between single and con-
solidated financial statements. Eventually, legal entity financial statements, the sole base for 
contractual consequences such as dividend distribution (e.g., § 58 (2) AktG), payout re-
strictions and capital maintenance (e.g., § 150 AktG), taxation (§ 5 (1) EStG) or the identifica-
tion of insolvency (§§ 17–19 InsO), remained largely unaffected. Moreover, the path depend-
ence of German contracting-based accounting prevailed during times of European harmonisa-
tion. Whereas the fourth directive implied approximately 40 Member State options, the Ger-
man legislature adopted only a few to preserve traditional accounting features with respect to 
profit determination in single financial statements. In general, the extensive Member State 
options in the directives enabled other Member States to maintain their national accounting 
traditions, which led to a formal “harmonization without comparability” (Haller, 2002: 154). 
Despite material changes on the group accounting level and with respect to additional infor-
mation requirements, legal entity financial statements remained unaffected. 
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2.4 Institutional setting: Major German business characteristics 
This section illustrates how the emergence of contractible German GAAP has depended on 
the institutional setting. We describe four major characteristics of German business that quali-
fy as formal and informal institutions and that have materially shaped the German accounting 
system. These involve the persistence of debt financing, the prevalence of small and medium-
sized companies, book-tax conformity and strong stakeholder orientation, especially towards 
employees. All institutions have been stable for decades and have remained unchanged, par-
ticularly after the Second World War. 
2.4.1 The dominance of debt financing 
Germany is classified as a typical bank-based economy. (Nobes, 1998) and (Zysman, 1983) 
suggest that Germany has a credit-based financing system with insider ownership that typical-
ly correlates to its code-law origin (Nobes, 1998; Nobes & Parker, 2012). In contrast to gov-
ernmental, credit-based code-law countries such as Japan, banks and other financial institu-
tions have been dominant in Germany (Nobes, 1998; Zysman, 1983) and have contributed to 
economic growth since the era of industrialisation. At the end of the 20th century, bank loans 
represented the largest single source of external finance, two-thirds of which were long-term 
loans (Cable, 1985; Samuels & McMahon, 1978; Vitols, 2001). The latter fits in with the no-
tion of a German “coordinated” capitalist economy in historical institutionalism that relies 
heavily on “patient capital”, contrasting liberal market economies, such as in the US or the 
UK, that are characterised by short-term financing arrangements (Hall & Soskice, 2001; The-
len, 2004). Furthermore, German banks have been the key contact and contract partners to 
access other external funds and have played a major role—in addition to family owners and 
other companies—as insider shareholders who enjoy close, long-term relationships with their 
investees (Cable, 1985; Leuz & Wüstemann, 2004; Nobes, 1998).  
Intriguingly, during the early 20th century, the German equity capital market was one of 
the most highly developed in the world (Nowak, 2001), but it did not regain its earlier im-
portance because Germany’s restoration after the Second World War was primarily grounded 
on debt and internal financing (Büschgen, 1979). The minor role of the organised equity capi-
tal markets has persisted. Between 1991 and 2010, the average market capitalisation of listed 
German stock corporations amounted to not more than 40.7 % of the German gross domestic 
product (US: 117.9 %, UK: 132.0 %; data from the World Bank). In the same period, German 
companies raised more funds through bank loans than through shares or other securities 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2012: 20). In particular, small and medium-sized German companies 
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tend to bond with one bank (relationship lending) on a long-term basis (e.g., Harhoff & 
Körting, 1998).  
In line with Nobes (1998) and others (e.g., Ball et al., 2000; Leuz & Wüstemann, 2004; 
Sellhorn & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006), we argue that credit-insider governance systems 
coincide with accounting rules that cater to the needs of both creditors and tax authorities. 
This occurs because insider-shareholders can obtain valuation-oriented information through 
other means. Thus, debt contracting was one major stimulus in the evolution of German ac-
counting regulation. In that regard, creditor protection, the determination of distributable prof-
its and objectivity for the sake of reliable and verifiable accounting have emerged as core ac-
counting principles (e.g., Baetge et al., 1995; Leffson, 1987; Moxter, 2003, 2007). Historical-
ly, prudence and conservatism have substantially shaped the understanding of fair business 
behaviour throughout Continental Europe. This focus on debt contracting has motivated con-
tinuous efforts in German (accounting) regulation to strengthen capital maintenance through 
conservative accounting rules and to mitigate debt-related agency conflicts through payout 
restrictions (e.g., Leuz, 1998). Thus, German debt contracts lack covenants that restrict divi-
dends or modify accounting figures, because they can simply rely on HGB statements. In con-
trast, US counterparts usually include payout restrictions based on US GAAP figures adjusted 
to creditor demands (Leuz & Wüstemann, 2004).  
The dominant role of creditors in German accounting is also visible in the HGB struc-
ture. Two sections of the third book address accounting rules (§§ 238-335 HGB) separate 
from specific requirements for cooperatives and financial institutions. The first section, which 
contains technical and basic recognition and measurement rules for all merchants (§§ 238-263 
HGB), is followed by a larger section that applies to limited liability companies. The latter 
includes stricter and more comprehensive accounting rules and in particular, a more detailed 
financial statement display format, further disclosure requirements and the obligation to pre-
pare consolidated financial statements. Additional information is exclusively justified as cor-
relative to limited liability (Buschmeyer, 1993). Therefore, creditor protection is based on two 
major foundations: the calculation of conservative profits, restricted profit distribution and 
capital maintenance, on the one hand, and further information, on the other hand.  
2.4.2 The prevalence of small and medium-sized entities 
As of 2010, 99.3 % of Germany’s approximately 3.6 million businesses are small and medi-
um-sized entities. Even for incorporated firms (approximately 632,000), the ratio still 
amounts to 98.8 %. During that same year, German SMEs employed 54.7 % of all German 
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employees and generated 35.9 % of total sales in Germany (Institut für Mittelstandsforschung 
(IfM), 2015) 4F4F4. Although the economic relevance of the SME sector also applies to other 
economies, German SMEs seem unique. Above all, they are perceived as a German phenom-
enon (even in English, the term “German Mittelstand” is well known) and often are associated 
with highly innovative, family-owned and owner-managed firms, largely in the manufacturing 
industries, specialising in niches, with relatively strong positions in foreign markets, with 
strong ties to their regions of origin and with a long-term, stakeholder-oriented business poli-
cy (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, 2012).  
The prevalence of German SMEs is an institutional feature with further impact on Ger-
man accounting regulation. SMEs are usually unlisted, on average smaller and thus consid-
ered less resourceful. Accordingly, accounting regulation for SMEs is expected to comply 
with preparers’ cost restraints and cost-benefit considerations, whereas the information de-
mands of capital market investors are irrelevant. For that reason, HGB accounting and audit-
ing rules have been regulated to be less comprehensive for smaller firms (e.g., §§ 276, 293, 
316 HGB). Beyond Germany’s GAAP, for example, the cost-benefit rationale, along with the 
perception of a convenient domestic system, has fostered German SMEs’ reluctance with re-
spect to the IFRS for SMEs (e.g., Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V. (BDI) & Ernst 
& Young AG, 2005; Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag (DIHK) & Pricewater-
houseCoopers AG (PWC), 2005; Haller & Eierle, 2007; Keitz et al., 2007; Quagli & Paoloni, 
2012; Sian & Roberts, 2006, 2008). In addition, SMEs have a closer relationship, if not an 
absolute identity, of ownership and management, which mitigates owner-manager agency 
conflicts (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Taken 
together, closer owner-manager alignment, less-diverse ownership structures and missing cap-
ital market-related reporting incentives of unlisted, economically significant, cost-sensitive 
SMEs suggest that debt- and tax contracting rather than valuation demands impact German 
accounting regulations. For the reason that most German SMEs are family owned and con-
trolled (Klein, 2000) and financed by “patient” capital (Thelen, 2004), their lack of short-term 
reporting incentives is likely to support a demand for more conservative accounting. 
2.4.3 Book-tax conformity 
The debt focus of German accounting is traditionally complemented by its tax orientation 
(Haller, 1992), which also correlates with its code-law origin (Nobes, 1998; Nobes & Parker, 
                                                 
4 These numbers are based on the Federal Statistical Office of Germany’s definition of SMEs, which is in line 
with the EU’s definition. Accordingly, SMEs are companies with less than 250 employees and less than 50 
million euros in annual sales. 
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2012). Ever since the introduction of legal book-tax conformity in Saxony (1874), Bremen 
(1874) and Prussia (1891) (Schneider, 2001), accounting has been regulated and applied with 
tax consequences in mind. This orientation might also be driven by the prevalence of the 
German SME sector and the cost-efficiency of preparing financial statements that comply 
with both tax and commercial law requirements (“Einheitsbilanz”). Tax incentives correspond 
to the debt-related contracting role of accounting in determining a conservative and distribut-
able profit figure. (Nobes, 1998: 171) states as follows: “The calculation of legally distributa-
ble profit is a different purpose from the calculation of taxable profit but it is not 'competing' 
in the sense of requiring a different set of rules because both calculations benefit from preci-
sion in the rules and from the minimization of the use of judgement, which is not the case for 
the estimation of cash flows”. To prevent legal disputes with the tax authorities, tax contract-
ing further strengthens the demand for reliable accounting information. 
After the Second World War, book-tax conformity led to the idea that German commer-
cial law accounting can and will be interpreted with reference to the German Federal Tax 
Court of Appeals (“Bundesfinanzhof”, BFH). Following the normative, economically driven 
accounting theories of the pre-war era by Schmalenbach, Schmidt and others (e.g., Busse von 
Colbe & Fülbier, 2013; Küpper & Mattessich, 2005), accounting scholars focused on the in-
terpretation of indefinite aspects in the principles-based German accounting system. One 
group seized upon the accounting-related decisions of the Federal Tax Court to form a more 
descriptive-positive accounting theory, the legal doctrine of accounting (“Bilanz im 
Rechtssinne”; Beisse, 1978/1979; Döllerer, 1959; Moxter, 1974, 1982). This influential tax-
driven doctrine and subsequent tax court perspective have been widely used in the interpreta-
tion and advancement of German accounting. Accordingly, this doctrine and perspective have 
strengthened the predominance of contracting purposes by defining the determination of dis-
tributable profit as a core accounting objective, considering both creditor protection and in 
particular, tax consequences (Baetge et al., 1995; Busse von Colbe & Fülbier, 2013; Hommel 
& Schmitz, 2013; Leuz & Wüstemann, 2004; Moxter, 1974, 1982). 
2.4.4 Strong stakeholder orientation and labour-management cooperation 
The above-mentioned institutional factors are complemented by a strong stakeholder orienta-
tion, especially regarding employees. Labour-management cooperation is a major feature of 
the German coordinated capitalist economy (Thelen, 2001, 2004). Explanatory approaches are 
based on various aspects of the German institutional matrix and involve, for example, the 
German origin and the influential political tradition of socialism and social democracy since 
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the 19th century (e.g., Berghahn, 2006), the governance of labour markets by collective bar-
gaining institutions along with flexible plant-level strategies (Thelen, 2001) and, perhaps most 
notably in historical institutionalism, Germany’s supposedly cooperative and coordinative 
attitude based on long-term consensual relations among labour, capital and the state (Abel-
shauser, 2003; Berghahn, 2006; Heidhues & Patel, 2011). The latter is occasionally linked to 
the notion of “rhenish capitalism” (Albert, 1993; Albert & Gonenc, 1996), which refers to the 
specific German version of a post-/non-liberal coordinated economy. The cooperative attitude 
also suggests that even culture, an informal institution, contributes to the explanation of Ger-
many’s economy, remembering that cultural variables are difficult to measure and should be 
interpreted with care (e.g., Baskerville, 2003, 2005; Bhimani, 1999; Gernon & Wallace, 1995; 
Harrison & McKinnon, 1999; McSweeney, 2002; Nobes, 1998). Although collectivism scores 
are usually lower in highly developed Western societies (e.g., Brodbeck & Frese, 2007; Hof-
stede, 1994), Germany and the Germanic European business culture rank clearly ahead of 
their individualistic Anglo-American counterparts in seminal cross-country culture studies, 
according to Hofstede (esp. 1980, 1986, 1994) and Global Leadership and Organizational 
Behavior Effectiveness Research (GLOBE) scholars (Brodbeck & Frese, 2007; House et al., 
2004). The result is even more pronounced with respect to the dimension of institutional col-
lectivism that is used by the GLOBE researchers. Accordingly, the German score exceeds the 
median of the “should be” category, which relates to the normative ideal of a collective 
(“Gemeinschaft”) in Germany (Brodbeck & Frese, 2007: 164). We find further support for 
Germany’s strong stakeholder orientation and labour-management cooperation not only at the 
level of employment protection (Germany has one of the highest levels of employment pro-
tection of all the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
(Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), 2013) but also in the comprehensive social welfare laws introduced in the 19th cen-
tury. This further adds to the view of cooperative and consensual relations among labour, cap-
ital and the state in Germany (Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
German accounting reflects the country’s pronounced stakeholder orientation in two 
ways. First, unlike valuation-based systems, German GAAP do not refer to a primary user but 
instead include employees and labour unions as typical addressees of accounting information 
(e.g., Kern, 1975). In that regard, employees’ information requirements resemble those of 
creditors, because they are likewise interested in a reliable and conservative determination of 
distributable profits to ascertain their security of employment and remuneration. Because la-
bour agents must be legally represented on supervisory boards and have the right to have fi-
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nancial statements explained to them5F5F5, employees are firm insiders. Ball et al. (2000: 3) note 
that in a code-law, credit-insider system, such as Germany, “current-period accounting in-
come then tends to be viewed as the pie to be divided among groups” as interest, dividends, 
taxes, salaries and wages. Second, the stakeholder perspective even includes the (interested) 
public as an addressee. The perception that larger companies are of greater interest and re-
quire stricter accounting requirements is found in the Disclosure Law (1969) or the HGB 
structure, for example. Taken together, the conservative orientation of German accounting 
and its focus on profit distribution are in line with the stakeholders’ perspective.  
It is noteworthy that accounting conservatism can also be justified by another cultural 
value dimension of Hofstede and the GLOBE researchers: uncertainty avoidance, which is 
highly pronounced in Germany (Brodbeck & Frese, 2007; Hofstede, 1980, 1986) and helps to 
further explain the country’s strongly conservative approach, especially in contrast to the US 
and the UK (Gray, 1988: 19). This approach may also add to Germany’s preference for well-
organised systems with legally binding accounting rules and institutionalised procedures to 
better cope with uncertainty (Brodbeck & Frese, 2007). 
In this section, we conclude that German accounting’s contracting orientation has been 
shaped by four formal and informal features of the institutional setting. Although equilibria do 
not fit in with the conception of long-ranging, continuously evolving historical processes 
(e.g., Thelen, 1999; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992), we find something similar to have occurred in 
Germany. Until the 1980s, both the institutional setting and accounting regulations remained 
relatively stable over several decades. In the next section, however, we illustrate how institu-
tional change that began in the 1990s led to the rise of valuation-based accounting and a pro-
cess of adjustments that accompanied more radical changes in German accounting. 
2.5 The challenge of internationalisation: A balancing act 
2.5.1 The rise of valuation-based accounting in the 1990s 
Driven by globalisation and inherent institutional change (Crouch et al., 2007) in the after-
math of the Cold War and German reunification, some of Germany’s largest firms decided to 
access important and more liquid foreign equity capital markets through cross-border listings. 
                                                 
5 The representation of employees on German companies’ supervisory boards dates back to several acts, par-
ticularly the 1951 Act on Co-determination in the Coal and Steel Industry (“Montan-Mitbestimmungs-
gesetz”), the 1972 Works Constitution Act (“Betriebsverfassungsgesetz”, BetrVG), the 1976 Co-
determination Act (“Mitbestimmungsgesetz”) and the 2004 One-third Participation Act (“Drit-
telbeteiligungsgesetz”). Companies with more than 100 employees are required to have an economic commit-
tee that is informed about the company’s economic situation on a regular basis (§ 106 BetrVG). In that re-
gard, the committee has the right to have the annual financial statements explained to it by management 
(§ 108 (5) BetrVG). 
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This step led to the rise of a valuation-based, capital market-oriented accounting philosophy 
in Germany in the early 1990s. In other words, companies from a credit-insider economy, 
interested in equity-outsider markets, voluntarily adopted accounting systems from the Anglo-
American hemisphere (Nobes, 1998). The first German company that was admitted for listing 
by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was Daimler Benz in 1993. Accordingly, Daimler 
was required to reconcile its consolidated equity and net income figures from HGB to US 
GAAP. To reduce that burden, Daimler moved its HGB consolidated—but not single—
financial statements closer to US GAAP by taking advantage of accounting options and dis-
cretion (Bruns, 1998). Other German global players followed, for example, Deutsche Tele-
kom in 1996, E.On (formerly VEBA) in 1997, SAP in 1998, Allianz in 2000, BASF in 2000, 
Deutsche Bank in 2001, Siemens in 2001 and Bayer in 2002. Despite a 2002 peak of 22 com-
panies (Pellens et al., 2004), the absolute number of cross-listings remained low. Other Ger-
man firms, for example, Puma in 1993 and Bayer, Heidelberg Cement and Schering in 1994, 
voluntarily adopted the International Accounting Standards (IAS), the predecessor of IFRS, in 
their consolidated financial statements. These firms committed to greater transparency in fi-
nancial reporting and a shareholder value orientation, but did not consider a US listing. 
The adoption of US GAAP and IAS by prominent (but few) German companies shows 
that these firms were able to balance their accounting demands by providing valuation-
oriented information in their consolidated accounts while retaining contractible information in 
their HGB legal entity financial statements. Eventually, the moderate rise of valuation-based 
accounting did not affect contracting consequences. The requirement to prepare HGB consol-
idated financial statements, however, was increasingly called into question. In response to 
political pressure by large public firms (e.g., Pellens et al., 2014; Sellhorn & Gornik-
Tomaszewski, 2006), the German legislature codified two seminal acts: the German Capital 
Raising Facilitation Act (“Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz”, KapAEG) and the Corpo-
rate Sector Supervision and Transparency Act (“Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im 
Unternehmensbereich”, KonTraG). The KonTraG strengthened the valuation-role of public 
firms’ HGB group accounting by adding requirements from valuation-based systems (i.e., 
cash flow statements, statements of changes in equity and segment reports). Further reforms 
extended these requirements to all firms and geared consolidated financial reporting further 
towards valuation, for example, by excluding tax-driven elements (Haller, 2002; Haller & 
Eierle, 2004). Moreover, the KonTraG implemented a German private standard setting body, 
the German Accounting Standards Board (GASB), primarily to provide guidance on the 
aforementioned accounting novelties. Second, the KapAEG introduced the (desired) option 
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for listed companies to prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with 
either IAS or US GAAP instead of HGB. Interestingly, since 1997 the German stock ex-
change has required preparation of IAS or US GAAP figures on a quarterly basis from com-
panies listed in the newly established new-market segment (d’Arcy & Leuz, 2000). With the 
de facto deregulation of group accounting, the number of IAS and US GAAP adopters in-
creased in the following years. As of 2001, of the approximately 550 German companies 
listed in the Prime Standard, approximately one-third followed IAS and US GAAP, respec-
tively (Weißenberger et al., 2004: 175; Zwirner, 2010: 530). 
Despite the relatively low number of adopters and the restriction to consolidated state-
ments of cross-listed public firms, the moderate rise of IAS and US GAAP raised awareness 
of non-domestic accounting standards with a stronger investor orientation and valuation role. 
For the first time, German accounting practice involved the parallel application of multiple 
accounting systems. Accordingly, the longstanding link between country and accounting sys-
tem eroded and the prior distinction among countries shifted towards a polarity between the 
traditional German HGB and the valuation-based systems—either within a single country or 
even within a single reporting entity (Sellhorn & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006). That notwith-
standing, survey research shows that in the early 1990s, German managers were sceptical 
about US GAAP accounting because it was perceived to promote short-term thinking and to 
lead to the neglect of long-term investments. Moreover, the US GAAP were not considered 
superior to German accounting (Glaum & Mandler, 1996), even in terms of valuation. Early 
empirical results were not able to disprove that notion (e.g., Harris et al., 1994). In addition, 
the vast majority of German companies were not affected by international reporting demands 
and continued to prepare both legal entity and consolidated financial statements in accordance 
with the HGB. The German regulator preserved the HGB commercial law accounting tradi-
tion on the single financial statement level (Haller & Eierle, 2004), which means that all Ger-
man firms, including adopters of international standards, were able to satisfy their contractual 
demands (and legal contracting consequences) with accounting data from single financial 
statements. Over time, however, managers of large listed companies acknowledged that Ger-
man accounting might indeed reduce share attractiveness on foreign markets and thus were 
increasingly willing to accept the adoption of international accounting rules for the benefit of 
information value (Förschle et al., 1998; Glaum, 2000) and lower cost of capital (Pellens & 
Tomaszewski, 1999). Related empirical research shows economic benefits, i.e., lower infor-
mation asymmetry, for German firms that voluntarily commit to increased levels of disclosure 
under international reporting strategies (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). 
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2.5.2 The implementation of EU Directive 1606/2002 
The orientation of European listed companies towards international, valuation-oriented ac-
counting has bred heterogeneous regulatory solutions in various EU Member States (e.g., Hal-
ler, 2002). This situation, unsatisfying from the perspective of the EU regulator with a prefer-
ence for harmonisation, resulted in further political attempts to obtain the additional harmoni-
sation of European accounting rules. Based on the formal decision to cooperate with the In-
ternational Accounting Standards Committee (IASC, the predecessor of the IASB) and to 
converge European accounting regulation with IAS/IFRS in 1995 and in further initiatives 
(e.g., Haller, 2002), European Regulation 1606/2002 was codified in 2002. To standardise 
group accounting of public firms at an EU level, all publicly traded companies governed by 
the law of an EU Member State have been required to prepare their consolidated financial 
statements in conformity with IFRS for each fiscal year since 2005 (Art. 4). Moreover, the 
regulation includes Member State options for the consolidated accounts of unlisted companies 
and single financial statements to permit or require the use of IFRS (Art. 5). 
Prior historical research on IASC development until 2000 does not reveal any active 
role of German groups either in IASC activities or in the development of the EU regulation 
(Camfferman & Zeff, 2007) The latter was instead driven by the Commission’s attempt to 
provide a single set of accounting standards for public firms (i.e., to align the fragmented and 
temporary Member State regulations) and in this regard, by the clear political will to exclude 
US GAAP. Resistance from the German government, auditors and companies did not de-
crease until the 1990s, with the adoption of US GAAP and IAS by a few German global com-
panies. Even the KapAEG initiated by these firms can be perceived as “a limited period of 
experimentation”, because it was intentionally restricted until 2004 in the expectation of a 
follow-up regulation at the European level regarding the application of international account-
ing standards (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007; Zeff, 2012).  
Whereas the EU regulation has a direct binding effect, the Member State options re-
quired legal implementation. In Germany, the 2004 Accounting Law Reform Act 
(“Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz”, BilReG) transformed all these regulations into options for com-
panies, but with restrictions at the single financial statement level. German companies, regard-
less of their listing status, may prepare IFRS single financial statements, but only to provide 
an additional set of accounts for disclosure (§ 325 (2a) HGB). Accordingly, all companies are 
still required to prepare German GAAP legal entity financial statements for contracting pur-
poses. Unlisted parent companies can use either HGB or IFRS in their consolidated financial 
accounts. 
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As before, we find that the German legislature safeguarded legal entity financial state-
ments, the basis for contracting purposes, on the one hand, while further permitting valuation-
oriented group accounting on the other hand (e.g., Haller & Eierle, 2004; Sellhorn & Gornik-
Tomaszewski, 2006). The scope of the EU regulation, however, left far less room for balanc-
ing. In contrast to the more cautious approach of the KapAEG in 1998, which had allowed 
companies to meet their valuation demands voluntarily, IFRS have now been imposed on all 
public firms, including those that had not previously adopted US GAAP or IFRS (approxi-
mately 50 %). Moreover, the transformation of Member States’ options into company options 
opened the application of IFRS to consolidated financial statements of unlisted German com-
panies and promoted, at least hypothetically, thoughts about IFRS’s future role in legal entity 
financial statements. 
Overall, we find that institutional change stemming from more integrated financial mar-
kets since the 1990s increased German companies’ demand for valuation-oriented accounting 
rules. Although the EU regulation was initially attended by the more gradual balancing at-
tempts of domestic regulators, it provided a much more distinct change in the formal rules. 
Even though some companies benefit from increased efficiency (capital market contracting), 
unintended economic consequences are also likely to occur (Brüggemann et al., 2013; Zeff, 
1978). Because both intended and unintended consequences around IFRS adoption are com-
plex and partially opposing, we are unable to precisely assess the overall impact of IFRS 
adoption on German companies’ contracting efficiency. However, we describe several impli-
cations for debt, tax and other contracting purposes as follows: 
1) Debt contracting: As required by § 18 KWG, German banks may grant corporate loans 
exceeding € 750,000 only prior to a credit analysis of borrowers’ financial statements. In 
that regard, survey research as of 2006 showed that the majority of German banks did not 
differentiate between HGB and IFRS in their credit scoring. Consequently, IFRS had a di-
rect impact on debt contracting, at least until the adaption of rating systems (Oehler, 2006: 
117). Another example relates to capital maintenance. Even though capital maintenance 
rules (i.e., the determination and restriction of payouts) are based on HGB legal entity fig-
ures, there is a risk of spill-over effects. A survey of large German public firms suggests 
that these companies tend to determine dividend payouts from consolidated profit figures, 
whereas the legal payout rule (§ 58 AktG) is only a side condition (Pellens et al., 2003; 
similar, Leuz & Wüstemann, 2004). More volatile, partly unrealised IFRS earnings on a 
consolidated level might point to covenant violations and other frictions by diluted capital 
funds, particularly when there is no compensating adjustment of debt covenants (Brügge-
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mann et al., 2013; Sellhorn & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006). The lean version of German 
debt covenants, which usually lack accounting adjustments (Leuz & Wüstemann, 2004), 
might reach its limits here. Moreover, the Member State option for IFRS on the single fi-
nancial statement level has stimulated a debate in Germany and the EU about replacing 
the accounting-related capital maintenance system with the US company-law-inspired 
concept of a prospective, liquidity-based solvency test (High Level Group, 2002; Lutter, 
2006; Rickford, 2004). 
2) Tax contracting: Early in the debate about adopting IFRS in the EU, the German Federal 
Ministry of Finance (FMF) commissioned a research report to determine the effect of ap-
plying IFRS to single financial statements on national tax revenue (Oestreicher & Spen-
gel, 1999a, 1999b). This signal of fiscal interest had no regulatory consequence, presuma-
bly because no material increase in tax revenue was found. However, in 2007, the German 
tax regulator introduced an interest-ceiling rule (“Zinsschranke”, §§ 4h EStG, 8a KStG) 
that limits the tax deductibility of net interest expenses. One exemption contained in that 
rule relates to a group’s consolidated equity ratio, according to IFRS (even for HGB 
adopters). Thus, valuation-based IFRS directly influences tax consequences and vice ver-
sa—tax incentives may also trigger a management of IFRS equity ratios (Brüggemann et 
al., 2013). Another bridge between IFRS and tax accounting was built at the EU level by 
an initiative of the European Commission, which suggested IFRS as a “starting point” for 
a common consolidated tax base of listed companies (European Commission, 2001), again 
without regulatory effect. A noticeable impact on German tax jurisdiction occurred in 
2003, when Hamburg’s regional tax court based an interpretation of the fourth EU di-
rective on recourse to IFRS (Finanzgericht Hamburg, 2003). Because the European Court 
of Justice accepted this recourse (Europäischer Gerichtshof, 2003), spillover effects on 
other contracting areas based on single financial statements may have occurred. However, 
the Hamburg tax court’s decision was reversed by the German Federal Tax Court (Bun-
desfinanzhof, 2005) later, but only with a formal timing argument: At the time of the case, 
the respective IFRS standard had not yet been issued.  
3) Other contracting areas: Some legal forms in Germany—i.e., unincorporated firms and 
cooperatives—have equity positions pursuant to German company law that did not qualify 
as IFRS equity. In particular, puttable financial instruments or instruments that impose an 
obligation to deliver a pro-rata share of net assets on liquidation were classified as finan-
cial liabilities, according to IAS 32 (Financial Instruments: Presentation, rev. 2003). Con-
sequently, consolidated IFRS equity decreased and affected contractual consequences, 
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amongst others, the BASEL II debt-equity relationship for the large German group of 
credit unions (Deutscher Genossenschafts- und Raiffeisenverband e.V. (DGRV) & Bun-
desverband Öffentlicher Banken Deutschlands (BVÖB), 2006). Against this backdrop, in-
tensive pressure at the national and European levels (e.g., Detilleux & Naett, 2005) pro-
voked the revision of IAS 32 in 2008. Further contracting consequences of IFRS consoli-
dated financial statements might relate to management control and incentive systems, in-
cluding compensation, if German firms do not adjust for an accounting system change 
(Brüggemann et al., 2013; Ozkan et al., 2012; Wagenhofer, 2006; Weißenberger, 2006). 
These examples suggest that the impact of IFRS on contracting is most likely to trigger ad-
justment processes in the German institutional setting to counterbalance potential inconsisten-
cies. However, path dependence implies that these adjustments will presumably take a longer 
time. Further research may help us better understand how IFRS affect contracting, their re-
spective impact on contracting efficiency and potential counterbalancing adjustments. 
After the transformation of the EU regulation, German accounting practice has been 
fragmented. A little more than 800 public German parent companies are directly required to 
prepare consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRS. In addition, a much larger 
number of subsidiaries need to provide IFRS accounts for consolidation purposes in line with 
internal group accounting guidelines. Mandatory adopters are complemented by only a few 
unlisted parent companies that voluntarily prepare IFRS group accounts. Bassemir (2012: 35) 
finds that approximately 12 % (387) of a sample of 3,365 German private groups voluntarily 
prepares IFRS consolidated financial statements. Voluntary IFRS adoption is positively relat-
ed to the size, legal form (corporations) and internationality of a firm’s business activities and 
financing (Bassemir, 2012; Eierle & Helduser; Keitz et al., 2007). Accordingly, only very 
large and international private groups use IFRS, whereas the vast majority of SMEs prepare 
consolidated financial statements according to HGB (Eierle & Haller, 2009, 2010). The option 
to provide an additional set of IFRS single financial statements for disclosure purposes has 
little effect, if any, on German accounting practice (Küting et al., 2011; Pellens et al., 2014). 
2.5.3 Accounting Law Modernisation Act of 2009 
Originally aimed at moderately internationalising German GAAP, the Accounting Law Mod-
ernisation Act of 2009 (“Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz”, BilMoG) has marked the most 
fundamental reform of HGB accounting yet. Unlike prior balancing endeavours that had re-
stricted the valuation impact of accounting internationalisation to public firms and consolidat-
ed financial statements, the reform touched, inter alia, the core principles of contracting-based 
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German accounting for the benefit of strengthening its valuation role. TABLE 1 illustrates the 
major changes. 
Scope Regulatory changes by BilMoG 2009 
Intangible assets Change of the strict ban on the capitalisation of self-created intangible assets 
into an option (§ 248 (2) HGB). Self-created intangible assets are to be valued 
at their cost of development (§ 255 (2a) HGB). The general approach, along 
with the distinction of research and development (R&D), was almost literally 
adapted from IAS 38—Intangible Assets. 
Provisions Abolishment of the option to recognise expense provisions (§ 249 HGB), simi-
lar to IAS 37—Provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets. Non-
current provisions must be discounted with a market-based discount rate 
(§ 253 (2) HGB). 
Production costs of goods Valuation of produced goods was expanded through the inclusion of certain 
indirect costs (§ 255 (2) HGB). 
Pension liabilities Implementation of the option to measure pension liabilities in accordance with 
the projected unit credit method, as in IAS 19—Employee Benefits, and intro-
duction of a market-based discount rate (§ 253 (2) HGB). Before BilMoG, 
measurement of pensions usually followed respective tax rules, usually apply-
ing a uniform discount rate of 6 %. 
Deferred taxes Introduction of the temporary concept, as in IAS 12—Income taxes, while 
retaining the option to recognise deferred tax assets, now explicitly including 
deferred taxes on carry forward losses (§ 274 HGB). 
Financial instruments Implementation of the requirement for financial institutions to measure finan-
cial instruments held for trading at their fair value minus a risk discount 
(§ 340e (3) HGB). 
Payout block Introduction of payout restrictions regarding capitalised intangible assets, net 
deferred tax assets and held for trading financial instruments of financial insti-
tutions (§ 268 (8) HGB). 
TABLE 1: Major regulatory changes to German accounting rules by BilMoG 2009 
Initially, the BilMoG was codified to transform two EU directives (2006/43/EC; 2006/46/EC) 
into national law, but it had an ulterior motive. The acceptance of IFRS for legal entity finan-
cial statements in several EU Member States—along with the drafting of the IFRS for 
SMEs—had raised concerns about a potentially wider scope of IASB rules in the near future. 
In this regard, German firms, professional bodies and public authorities lobbied against an 
implementation of the IFRS for SMEs in Europe, which was even stronger than in other Eu-
ropean code-law countries such as France or Italy (European Commission, 2010; Quagli & 
Paoloni, 2012). Germany’s reluctance is understandable because the IFRS for SMEs, which is 
conceptually similar to full IFRS6F6F6, transfers the concept of a valuation-oriented, general-
purpose financial statement to private firm accounting (Bertoni & Rosa, 2010; Fülbier & Gas-
                                                 
6 The IASB believes that concepts and pervasive principles shall not differ between the IFRS for SMEs and the 
full IFRS. According to the IASB, a distinct conceptual approach for SMEs “would be costly and time-
consuming and ultimately futile.” (IFRS for SMEs: BC97). 
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sen, 2010). Even though the IASB refers to contracting (stewardship) in the IFRS for SMEs, it 
clearly plays a subordinate role (IFRS for SMEs: Sec. 2.3.)7F7F7. 
Against this background, the Accounting Law Modernisation Act can be conceived as 
an attempt to strengthen the position of the German HGB (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008: Pre-
amble A; Ernst & Seidler, 2007, 2008). The Act represents another, more difficult, balancing 
act between pushing German GAAP closer to valuation while protecting the contracting-
based German accounting tradition from being replaced by the IFRS or the IFRS for SMEs. 
Intriguingly, the reformed HGB was even considered to potentially serve as a role model for 
modernising the European accounting directive (Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland 
e.V. (IDW), 2010: 11; Lehne, 2009). The notion of balancing is also included in the BilMoG 
preamble, which declares that the “approved and time-tested HGB should be developed fur-
ther to an alternative that shall be durable and adequate relative to international standards, but 
more cost-efficient and more simple, while maintaining the fundamental principles of HGB: 
HGB financial statements shall remain the basis for profit distribution and tax accounting; 
HGB accounting principles shall remain unaffected” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008: Preamble 
A, translated by the authors).  
Prior research indicates that the German private standard setting body, the GASB, 
played an influential role in preparing the first draft and shifting HGB rules towards IFRS 
benchmarks (Froschhammer, 2013). The analysis of comment letters in the legislative proce-
dure reveals a strong resistance, especially from preparers, against major valuation-based 
“symbols” such as fair value accounting or the recognition of self-made intangibles. Also au-
ditors, academics and all other identified groups opposed, with only one exception, the do-
mestic standard setter itself. Unsurprisingly, major arguments were grounded on the contract-
ing-related concepts of conservatism and creditor protection. Additional cost-benefit consid-
erations point to a strong focus on German SMEs (Froschhammer, 2013). The debate in 
comment letters concentrated on the specific accounting rules—several of which increased 
valuation (e.g., self-made intangibles), whereas a few others addressed contracting (e.g., pay-
out blocks). Accordingly, the system-oriented dichotomy of accounting purposes, in which 
valuation is attributed to IFRS and contracting to HGB, was fragmented. The reformed HGB 
illustrates that neither countries (Germany) nor accounting systems (HGB) can be simply at-
tributed to a homogeneous accounting role. 
                                                 
7 The IASB also points to the difference between general purpose and specific accounting demands: “SMEs 
often produce financial statements only for the use of owner-managers or only for the use of tax authorities or 
other governmental authorities. Financial statements produced solely for those purposes are not necessarily 
general purpose financial statements.” (IFRS for SMEs: P12). Accordingly, we understand that general-
purpose financial statements are not tailored to the major contracting purposes that we refer to in this chapter. 
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Similarly, it is ambitious to rigorously assess the overall consequences of this balancing 
endeavour. In line with the previous section, we again provide examples of several contract-
ing implications, all of which the regulator’s preamble seems to indicate were unintended: 
1) Debt contracting: The balancing of contracting and valuation is clearly evident from the 
introduction of legal payout blocks (§ 268 (8) HGB), which aim to compensate income ef-
fects from increased valuation by payout restrictions. However, these involve only three 
major BilMoG elements: deferred tax assets, self-generated intangibles and asset differ-
ences from pension netting. Other changes towards valuation, e.g., the increased volume 
of the production cost of inventories or the fair value measurements of banks’ financial in-
struments held for trading, are not fully blocked and directly affect payouts. Moreover, 
further contracting consequences might stem from changing interpretations of fundamen-
tal accounting principles. Known in international law as the teleological approach, Ger-
man legal commentaries interpret indefinite or unregulated aspects of HGB accounting 
and deduce solutions in light of the legally documented purpose of the entire accounting 
system and related principles (e.g., Leffson, 1987). Because the BilMoG was motivated by 
the increased importance of valuation and codified derogations from traditional principles, 
such as conservatism or historical cost, entire frames of reference might be altered. The 
regulator, however, seemed to be aware of this problem and declared that the purpose and 
core principles of the HGB would remain unaffected by BilMoG (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2008: Preamble A). 
2) Tax contracting: Comparable to payout blocks, several tax accounting proscriptions shall 
prevent consequences for tax contracting. Similarly, these are limited to only a few chang-
es, e.g., the recognition of self-made intangibles (§ 5 (2) EStG). Others are not covered by 
the book-tax conformity or more importantly, have been explicitly transferred into tax ac-
counting rules that cause direct tax base effects. A prominent example is the banks’ fair 
value measurement of held for trading financial instruments (§ 6 (1) 2b) EStG). In that 
situation, unrealised profits (fair value gains) are taxed, whereas tax losses are discrimi-
nated through the lack of full tax loss compensation and restriction on tax loss carry for-
wards. Moreover, to strengthen valuation, the BilMoG abolished the reverse authoritative 
principle that had permitted the use of certain unique tax rules in HGB accounts (e.g., tax-
induced impairment). Empirical findings show that for reasons of cost, many German 
companies, particularly SMEs, tend to prepare single financial statements that comply 
with both the HGB and tax accounting rules (“Einheitsbilanz”; e.g., Haller et al., 2011). 
Consequently, the enlarged gap between the two systems hindered the feasibility of uni-
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form accounting. In addition, the gap fuelled a debate about whether book-tax conformity 
ought to be suspended entirely (e.g., Herzig & Briesemeister, 2009). However, it is un-
clear what type of tax accounting system would be suitable to replace the extant contract-
ing- and principles-based system that evolved over a long period. One may argue that 
book-tax conformity has constrained tax regulators (Hanlon & Shevlin, 2005). 
3) Other contracting areas: Another example relates to contracting in rate-regulated indus-
tries. In Germany, rate-regulated industries such as energy, telecommunications or rail 
transportation grids and networks rely on HGB legal entity accounts to provide a calcula-
tion base for cost compensation via firm-specific revenue caps (e.g., for electricity and gas 
supply regulated in §§ 21, 21a EnWG, § 6 ARegV, Part 2 StromNEV/GasNEV). The 
BilMoG changes in recognition and measurement rules affect the financial statement-
based cost base with a direct impact on price regulation (e.g., Brüggemann et al., 2013). In 
this context, Pierk & Weil (2014) illustrate that regulated German firms are more likely to 
voluntarily adopt BilMoG rules earlier than unregulated firms to achieve higher regulated 
revenues. 
Research on BilMoG accounting choices, including early and first-time adoption, provides 
further insights into the valuation and contracting demand at the single financial statement 
level. With respect to those HGB options that permit (but do not require) approaching IFRS 
benchmarks, related studies show that the vast majority of German companies, including 
listed companies, still use the traditional HGB treatments in their legal entity financial state-
ments. This particularly applies to the options for recognising self-made intangible assets and 
deferred tax-net assets (e.g., Eierle & Wencki, 2014; Froschhammer, 2013; Keitz et al., 2011; 
Philipps, 2012; Theile et al., 2011). The only exception is the measurement of pensions, 
which generally has increased due to the introduction of more comprehensive actuarial meth-
ods and, above all, a lower market-based discount rate (Froschhammer, 2013; Gassen et al., 
2011). In addition, empirical findings on the valuation benefits of BilMoG adoption remain 
inconclusive. Lopatta et al. (2013) find that following BilMoG adoption, German SMEs en-
gage in less earnings management (discretionary accruals) and conclude that the reform has 
led to higher reporting transparency. In contrast, Zicke (2014) shows that BilMoG rules have 
not generally improved the accounting quality of German private firms’ consolidated ac-
counts. These findings suggest that the still unclear benefits of more valuation do not out-
weigh the demand for contracting in legal entity financial statements and the costs of conver-
sion, e.g., by implementing new R&D management control systems. 
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In line with prior reasoning, we suppose that BilMoG’s impact on contracting will trig-
ger changes both in the legal environment and in firms’ private contractual agreements. Ele-
ments that have evolved in different institutional environments, such as the common-law 
world, presumably require an even longer period of time to be integrated properly. Unsurpris-
ingly, empirical cross-country studies document significant differences in the economic con-
sequences of IFRS adoption at the firm- and country levels (e.g., Daske et al., 2008), even 
though valuation is the primary focus. Aside from capital markets and at the single financial 
statement level, the pronounced contractual demand is likely to increase these cross-country 
differences (e.g., Burgstahler et al., 2006; Coppens & Peek, 2005; Fülbier & Gassen, 2010; 
Peek et al., 2010). In addition, Nobes (2006; 2011; 2013) shows that the international ac-
counting system classification persists even under a uniform IFRS regime, very much in line 
with the notion of path dependence.  
2.5.4 The ambiguity of German standard setting 
Whereas accounting rules are set as parliamentary law in the German code-law system, the 
KonTraG (1998) introduced the GASB as a supplementary domestic standard setting body. 
However, unlike its common-law counterparts, the GASB has no distinct standard setting 
competence. Apart from advising the Federal Ministry of Justice (FMJ) in matters of domestic 
accounting regulation and representing German interests on an international level, the GASB 
is limited to developing recommendations for applying principles of consolidated financial 
reporting. Accordingly, during its first years the GASB borrowed from particular IAS/IFRS 
rules to publish several German Accounting Standards (GAS), providing guidance on those 
accounting novelties that had accompanied the KonTraG (e.g., cash-flow statements), sup-
plementing specific HGB-requirements (e.g., management commentary) or later interpreting 
IFRS. These standards, however, are not legally binding and because of their focus on group 
accounts, they are de facto irrelevant to legal entity financial statements. 
Over time, the GASB established itself as an important link between the German ac-
counting community and the IASB, as along with other international accounting bodies. 
However, financial support (which had been almost entirely provided by large German public 
firms) eroded because the board was increasingly perceived to be an extension of the IASB 
and to struggle with representing (heterogeneous) German interests, especially those of SMEs 
(e.g., Deutscher Genossenschafts- und Raiffeisenverband e.V. (DGRV), 2010; Haller, 2010). 
In that regard, the GASB was occasionally criticised for, e.g., supporting the IASB in devel-
oping the IFRS for SMEs (e.g., Deutscher Genossenschafts- und Raiffeisenverband e.V. 
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(DGRV), 2010) 8F8F8. Eventually, the German standard setter resigned at the end of 2010 to allow 
a reorientation. A reformed institution was re-enacted only a year later and included two dis-
tinct bodies: a HGB committee linked to the FMJ to advise on matters of domestic accounting 
regulation and an IFRS committee to interact with the IASB at an international level and the 
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) at the European level (Deutsches 
Rechnungslegungs Standards Committee e.V. (DRSC), 2014). Similarly, the dichotomy of the 
reform points to a balancing of both domestic and international interests within this institu-
tion. Even though both committees are supposed to interact, they may be subject to potential 
conflicts between the represented interests, especially when the IFRS committee represents 
Germany at an international level and interprets or adjusts the IFRS. Nobes (2006), for exam-
ple, suggests that domestic standard setting bodies facilitate the existence of national versions 
of the IFRS and are another outcome of balancing attempts. 
The rise of IFRS, the private nature of the IASB, and the foundation of a domestic coun-
terpart have encouraged further research interests in the effect of lobbying on accounting reg-
ulation. Although lobbyism has been understood in a parliamentary context (e.g., Hoffmann 
& Zülch, 2014; McLeay et al., 2000), the lack of familiarity with private standard setting has 
promoted studies of the legitimacy of the IASB, its due process and the development of 
standards (e.g., Fülbier & Gassen, 2010; Königsgruber, 2010; Schmidt, 2002). Similar interest 
has not only occurred in other code-law countries such as France (e.g., Burlaud & Colasse, 
2011) and Italy (e.g., Chiapello & Medjad, 2009) but also has concerned the European Par-
liament. Initiated by Germany and other code-law parliamentary countries, the EU raised con-
cerns about the governance and accountability of the IASB and criticised both fair value 
measurement and several aspects of the IFRS for SMEs. Moreover, the EU recommends a 
wider stakeholder approach to reflect a more contracting-based understanding of accounting 
(EU Parliament, 2008). Even though the IFRS must be endorsed to be formally accepted by 
the EU, the critical view of private standard setting has persisted. In particular, recurring criti-
cism has taken place in the debate on the IFRS for SMEs, arising out of the question of why 
the IASB, financed by and recruited by the Big Four auditors, large public companies and 
securities regulators (e.g., Brown, 2004; Chiapello & Medjad, 2009), should be qualified to 
develop unbiased and efficient standards for the private-firm sector (Fülbier & Gassen, 2010). 
                                                 
8 This also adds to the more general notion that SMEs feel neglected by the government (Brodbeck & Frese, 
2007). 
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2.6 Conclusion 
Financial accounting plays a distinct role in the firm governance system and has evolved in a 
specific institutional setting to meet the contractual demands of different stakeholders. Alt-
hough a change in institutional patterns has always triggered an evolutionary adjustment of 
accounting practices and regulation, we argue that the ongoing process of accounting interna-
tionalisation represents a more radical change. Driven by the interest in foreign equity-
outsider markets after the Cold War, global players from credit-insider economies voluntarily 
adopted non-local GAAP from the Anglo-American world and triggered multiple regulatory 
responses. These responses have again changed the institutional setting and had an impact on 
the contracting system.  
To support our argument and to substantiate the interplay of accounting as both a con-
tractual device and a country-specific institution, we provide an in-depth case study of a sin-
gle country: Germany. Here, we put the more recent phenomenon of accounting international-
isation into historical-institutional perspective and illustrate how accounting internationalisa-
tion has triggered balancing acts between a path-dependent preservation of the traditional con-
tracting role and a moderate move towards valuation-based benchmarks. We demonstrate that 
German accounting has evolved over centuries in its specific code-law setting, resulting in 
several major contracting consequences that are legally and collectively tied to single finan-
cial statements. We also show how institutional variations and changing firm behaviour since 
the 1980s—and especially since the 1990s—induced regulatory action in Germany and Eu-
rope. The first regulations (in the late 1990s) reflected German regulators’ cautious attempt to 
balance the valuation demand against the dominant contracting role of German HGB account-
ing through a de facto deregulation of public firms’ group accounting. Eventually, the histori-
cal link between a country (Germany) and its accounting system (HGB) and the polarity be-
tween “traditional” German HGB and valuation-based systems (IFRS and US GAAP) have 
eroded, both within one country and even within one reporting entity. In any event, HGB sin-
gle financial statements as a core area of contracting have remained unaffected. However, in 
contrast to the (desired) German exemption rule for a few cross-country-listed global players, 
EU Regulation 1606/2002 and subsequent German developments (especially BilMoG 2009) 
varied in their scope and impact. The EU regulation has stipulated an IFRS group accounting 
requirement for all public firms, including those that had not voluntarily adopted IFRS or US 
GAAP before (approximately 50 %). Beyond that, the BilMoG touched the core area of con-
tracting and brought valuation-based accounting elements to the single financial statement 
level for all German companies. We elaborate on several contracting implications of these 
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steps and presume that the continuing IFRS (valuation) impact will most likely trigger private 
and (perhaps later) legal adjustments in the German institutional setting. These processes will 
take more time because of the persistent institutional characteristics of the German credit-
insider economy. Institutional persistency and the related notion of path-dependent processes 
cast doubt on the idea that accounting systems will globally converge to a uniform accounting 
and contracting system. However, future research is necessary to increase our understanding 
of the impact of IFRS on contracting in the code-law area and related changes and frictions in 
the historically developed institutional setting and evolutionary balancing processes. 
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Chapter 3 
3 Inside the Black Box of IASB Standard Setting: 
Evidence from Board Meeting Audio Playbacks 
on the Amendment of IAS 19 (2011)9F9F‡ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Good morning! Good morning! 
Welcome to another riveting day of standard setting. 
—Sir David Tweedie  
IASB meeting of 18 February 2010 
on the amendment of IAS 19–Employee Benefits 
 
                                                 
‡  A paper version of chapter 3 is available as Klein & Fülbier (2015). Earlier drafts have benefitted from the 
comments of Rachel Baskerville, Marcus Bravidor, Ulf Brüggemann, Joachim Gassen, Christoph Pelger, 
Thorsten Sellhorn, Brian Singleton-Green and delegates at the 2014 10th Workshop on European Financial 
Reporting in Regensburg, Germany, the 76th annual conference of the VHB in Leipzig, Germany, the 37th 
EAA annual congress in Tallinn, Estonia, the 50th BAFA annual conference in London, UK and the 2011 
doctoral workshop Current Topics in Accounting Research in Wuppertal, Germany. We thank Sebastian 
Früh, Benita Kasch and Barbara Palutzki for their assistance. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Private standard setting is a distinct characteristic of major Anglo-American accounting sys-
tems, including UK, US and Australian GAAP and others. Similarly, the globally dominant 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are developed by a private standard set-
ting body, the London-based International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), through a 
formal process of public consultation (due process). Private accounting standard setting is 
generally understood as a political process determined by self-interested parties that aim to 
shape accounting rules to suit their individual demands (Sutton, 1984; Watts, 1977; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978, 1986; Zeff, 2002, 2008). In this regard, a large body of literature has fo-
cused on the politics of accounting rule-making by examining the impact of constituents’ lob-
bying activities through written submissions (e.g., comment letters) on accounting standards. 
Including respective corporate-level determinants, individual incentives for undertaking polit-
ical activities have also been taken into account (e.g., Allen et al., 2014; Kosi & Reither, 
2014). Empirical findings suggest that private accounting standard setters are responsive to 
constituents’ preferences but do not necessarily follow them in all respects (Gipper et al., 
2013; Walker & Robinson, 1993). Dissenting opinions, as disclosed in an IFRS basis for con-
clusions (BC), for instance, further point to contradictory views of IASB members and the 
heterogeneity of the board. The latter may be amplified by the diverse professional and geo-
graphical background of its members. Given the focus of most lobbyism studies, a recent 
strand of the empirical literature has added to our understanding of the standard setting pro-
cess by examining the association between board members’ personal characteristics and prop-
erties of accounting standards (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Günther & Witzky, 2013; Jiang et 
al., 2014). 
Nonetheless, there is little empirical research on the standard setting process from an in-
ternal perspective. Three aspects are of particular interest. First, we know little about the exact 
ways in which exogenous input (e.g., comment letters, input from outreach or research activi-
ties, etc.) affects the board. The complexity of (different) interests and information brought to 
the board suggests that its members must rely on summaries and analyses prepared by tech-
nical staff (Walker & Robinson, 1993). Therefore, as a gatekeeper of exogenous input, staff is 
likely to play a key role in filtering and processing information for decision makers (similarly, 
Botzem, 2012). Having said that, accounting standard setting is most likely subject to an even 
more complex interplay within the organisation, i.e., between board and staff members. Sec-
ond, although publicly available due process documents reasonably explain board proposals 
and decisions, they necessarily fall short of portraying the entire dynamics of the related board 
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decision-making process, which particularly applies to ideas or concepts that arise within 
board discussions but are not pursued further. Moreover, there is scarce empirical evidence on 
the role of arguments in board debates. Given that setting standards implies that board mem-
bers debate possible treatments of an accounting problem, we would expect any observation 
of the internal process to reveal the reasons behind the agreed-upon solution to that problem. 
On a continuum, the justification might be entirely political or conceptual but might also stem 
from the ideological positions or fundamental worldviews of the standard setter (Kalt & 
Zupan, 1984; Laughlin & Puxty, 1983). In addition, argumentation and justification are likely 
to relate to board members’ professional and geographical backgrounds. This notion points to 
the third aspect of interest: little is known about the individual contribution of board members 
to the decision-making process (e.g., Morley, 2014) and, in particular, whether some IASB 
members influence the due process more than others or whether there are fundamental differ-
ences in the way they argue. Insights into board-internal communications and decision mak-
ing contributes to our understanding of accounting standard setting by providing information 
about what was taken into account in board meetings and by whom. 
To shed light on the aforementioned internal aspects of IASB standard setting, we con-
duct a content analysis of one definite area of standard setting activity, i.e., 14 audio record-
ings of board meetings on the drafting of IAS 19 Employee Benefits (2011) with duration of 
16:45:51 (hh:mm:ss). Our sample covers all IASB meetings that took place after the release of 
the discussion paper (DP) entitled Preliminary Views on Amendments to IAS 19 Employee 
Benefits (March 2008) up to the publication of the exposure draft (ED) 2010/3 titled Defined 
Benefit Plans – Proposed amendments to IAS 19 (April 2010). We choose the amendment of 
IAS 19 (2011) for two reasons. First, the project was placed on the active agenda in July 
2006, which corresponds to IASB meeting audio playbacks becoming publicly available from 
the beginning of 2006 onward. We focus on the drafting phase (DP to ED) because we aim to 
observe board-internal discussions and argumentation under consideration of constituents’ 
comment letter feedback. In the prior DP compilation, the board collected possible solutions 
without being selective, whereas after the ED, prior decisions were largely confirmed. Sec-
ond, the abolition of the deferred recognition of actuarial gains or losses, the rearranged allo-
cation of pension cost components to profit or loss (P&L) and other comprehensive income 
(OCI) and the increase in disclosure requirements remarkably changed the preceding account-
ing model and touched on fundamental concepts involving recognition, measurement and 
disclosure. Here, we expect conceptual justification, research findings and, (perhaps contro-
versial) individual experiences or beliefs to have a considerable impact on board discussions. 
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We also assume sufficient political influence due to the significant role of pension accounting 
for numerous companies worldwide. 
We identify a set of 205 categories, including a total of 1,993 codings, which we ar-
range into four main categories: 1) project elements—to denote any project characteristics, 
standard elements and proposals discussed in the sample meetings; 2) arguments—to reflect 
reasons that were brought forth in discussing and justifying project elements; 3) references—
to link statements to information sources if explicitly revealed; and 4) governance—to identi-
fy organisational aspects of the IASB meetings. At the project element level, we first expose 
the chronology of IASB discussions and (tentative) decisions and illustrate the respective im-
pact of individual board members. We further examine the relation between arguments and 
individual project elements to identify the most relevant arguments. These were largely con-
ceptual. Regarding references, we show that agenda papers were the dominant source of board 
information. Findings on governance point to the prominent role of the chairman in leading 
the board meetings and technical staff acting as important intermediaries between constituents 
and the board. Finally, we describe general observations on board-staff relations, language 
and the board’s discussion culture. 
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature. First, we add to the literature 
on the politics of standard setting by providing qualitative evidence on board meeting discus-
sions that form an integral part of the IASB due process. As we, inter alia, address the role of 
arguments in the amendment of IAS 19, we also add to the literature on the properties of ac-
counting standard setting. Finally, we contribute to the understanding of the board meeting 
structure and individual roles in the IASB decision-making process. Accordingly, standard 
setting not only may be subject to exogenous input and internal reasoning but also may be 
shaped by characteristics of the diverse group, its professional members and the embed-
dedness of the board in its organisational structure. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, we review the 
related literature. Section 3.3 briefly illustrates the regulatory background of the 2011 
amendment of IAS 19. Section 3.4 describes data collection, the content analysis design and 
our category set. Section 3.5 contains the main results. The final section of this chapter pro-
vides our conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
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3.2 Literature review 
3.2.1 Private IASB standard setting 
IASB accounting standard setting has been investigated from different perspectives. One 
strand of literature explores the history of the standard setting body. Camfferman & Zeff 
(2007) investigate the evolution of the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC), the predecessor to the IASB, from its foundation in 1973 through 2000 (i.e., when the 
IASC became the IASB). Based on interviews with individuals involved, the authors elabo-
rate on the development and the evolution of the organisation as well as on the political and 
economic forces that have influenced its work. To document the increasing maturity and qual-
ity of IASC standard setting, the historical analysis also involves the evolution of major ac-
counting standards. However, Camfferman & Zeff (2007) do not explicitly expose the board-
internal standard setting process. Moreover, their results may reflect a more Anglo-American 
perspective (Botzem & Quack, 2009). Further historical studies focus on the IASC and the 
IASB (e.g., Botzem, 2012; Zeff, 2002) and emphasise their relationship with national ac-
counting standard setters (e.g., Kirsch, 2012) or the political dimension and legitimacy of 
IFRS standard setting (e.g., Bengtsson, 2011; Burlaud & Colasse, 2011; Danjou & Walton, 
2012; Richardson & Eberlein, 2011; Schmidt, 2002), among other topics. 
A second strand of literature follows the perception of private accounting standard set-
ting as a political process that is subject to constituents’ self-interest (Watts, 1977; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978, 1986). This view of the positive accounting theory and respective cost-
benefit models (Sutton, 1984) is anchored in political economics (Downs, 1957) and the inter-
related economic capture theory (Posner, 1974; Stigler, 1971). Investigating accounting 
standard setting in the US and UK, Sutton (1984) and Gaa (1988) conclude that lobbying pays 
off for (large) preparers and auditors. In contrast to users, the latter are more involved in ac-
counting standard setting, accordingly, whereas academic participation does not play a signif-
icant role (Larson et al., 2011). From a methodological perspective, most studies in the na-
tional context (e.g., McLeay et al., 2000; Ndubizu et al., 1993; Saemann, 1999) assess the 
success of constituents’ lobbying activities by examining the association between written 
submissions and accounting standards. Thus, comment letters regularly serve as a major input 
variable and proxy for overall lobbying (Georgiou, 2004; Gipper et al., 2013; Walker & Robin-
son, 1994; Zeff, 2008). With respect to the IFRS, a large body of research explores constitu-
ents’ participation, activities and success in the IASB due process. Some of these focus on 
single IASB standard setting projects that affect specific constituents and point to their indi-
vidual incentives for lobbying (Giner & Arce, 2012 on IFRS 2; Cortese & Irvine, 2010, Cor-
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tese et al., 2010 on IFRS 6; Dobler & Knospe, 2013 on IAS 19; Kosi & Reither, 2014 on 
IFRS 4), whereas others explore multiple projects or follow a multi-issue/multi-period ap-
proach (Dobler & Knospe, 2014; Georgiou, 2010; Hansen, 2011, Jorissen et al., 2012, 2012; 
Jorissen et al., 2006; Larson & Herz, 2013; Orens et al., 2011; Zeff, 2002). 
Other studies include further determinants, such as the constituents’ financial contribu-
tion to the IFRS Foundation (e.g., Hansen, 2011) or the professional and geographical back-
ground of individual IASB members (e.g., Fülbier & Gassen, 2010). With respect to US 
GAAP, Allen & Ramanna (2013) find that certain political and professional characteristics 
(tenure and auditing or financial services background) of FASB members affect the reliability 
and relevance of proposed standards. Günther & Witzky (2013) provide evidence on the im-
pact of IASB members’ professional and cultural backgrounds on the importance of principles 
orientation and fair value measurement in IFRS. Jiang et al. (2014) examine the determinants 
of FASB members’ dissenting opinions between 1973 and 2007 and suggest that professional 
backgrounds, personality traits and career concerns affect voting decisions. In addition, Brad-
bury & Harrison (2015) find that FASB dissenting opinions are grounded in a series of both 
conceptual and non-conceptual arguments, many that are not contained in the US Conceptual 
Framework. 
Qualitative studies that utilise content analyses of IASB documents, minutes and staff 
papers, or interviews with staff and board members, complement the picture. Pelger (2013), 
Erb & Pelger (2015) and Pelger & Spieß (2014) reflect upon the IASB’s decision processes 
on stewardship, on reliability—both in terms of the Conceptual Framework project—and up-
on the role of the IASB Agenda Consultation 2011/12 in constructing legitimacy. Morley 
(2014) elaborates upon how cultural and structural characteristics of the board affected the 
IASB Liabilities project that was put on hold in 2010. Hjelström (2005) provides a compre-
hensive case study on the revision of IAS 12 Income Taxes as of 1996. 
From the internal perspective, several aspects of private accounting standard setting 
have not yet been explored in great detail. First, little is known about the ways in which exog-
enous input (e.g., comment letters, input from outreach or research activities) affects the opin-
ion and decision making of the board. Walker & Robinson (1993) highlight the pivotal role of 
staff summaries and analyses. Against the backdrop that board members typically rely on staff 
documents to cope with the complexity of (different) interests and information, staff are likely 
to play a gatekeeper role by filtering and processing information for the decision-making 
board (similarly, Botzem, 2012). Analysing the use of verbal frequency quantifiers, Hoffmann 
(2014) finds that staff summaries are highly subjective and may therefore mediate between 
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views of the constituents and of the IASB. Taken together, standard setting is likely to be sub-
ject to an even more complex interplay between board members and staff. Second, although 
publicly available IASB documents reflect board proposals and decisions, they typically fail 
to portray the entire dynamics of the decision-making processes, particularly with regard to 
ideas and concepts that do not survive due process milestones, which also applies to any other 
factors that affect board discussions and decisions. Some studies suggest that standard setters’ 
fundamental beliefs or worldviews exert a substantial influence (Kalt & Zupan, 1984; Laugh-
lin & Puxty, 1983) that might either contrast or complement a purely political or conceptual 
justification. Bradbury & Harrison (2015) show that FASB dissenting opinions are grounded 
in a series of arguments that extend far beyond merely referring to the US Conceptual 
Framework. Third, there is still limited knowledge as to whether and how individual board 
members affect IASB opinion and decision making. This notion also applies to individual 
argumentation and ultimately highlights the question of whether individual behaviour relates 
to a board member’s professional or geographical background. Notably, Hodges & Mellett 
(2010) acknowledge that social interactions within an accounting standard setting body are 
too complex to rigorously assess their impact on accounting rules. Consistent with research 
findings about standard setting in general (David & Greenstein, 1990, with an overview), they 
intentionally model the accounting rule-making process as a “black box” and focus exclusive-
ly on input-output relationships (similarly, Cortese & Irvine, 2010). 
Few studies directly relate to the amendment of IAS 19 Employee Benefits in 2011. 
Demaria et al. (2012) investigate all 227 comment letters on the ED to identify the aspects of 
recognition that were of greatest practical concern. Dobler & Knospe (2013) further include 
comment letters on the DP and conduct a comprehensive lobbying study on constituents’ par-
ticipation, content and success in terms of the framework developed by Sutton (1984). There 
are further lobbying studies on pension accounting in the US GAAP context (Francis, 1987; 
Ndubizu et al., 1993; Saemann, 1995, 1999, 1999). Larson & Street (2011) and Holtzblatt et 
al. (2012) posit that IASB web- and podcasts are useful teaching resources but do not charac-
terise them as potential objects of accounting research. 
3.2.2 Pension accounting and IAS 19 
Prior research on pension accounting has covered technical aspects, the evolution of account-
ing models and respective standards, accounting choices and economic consequences in dif-
ferent institutional settings and jurisdictions (Glaum, 2009 for an overview). Because we use 
the context of IAS 19 (2011) to exemplify internal aspects of IASB standard setting, we ab-
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stain from portraying the entire literature on pension accounting. Instead, we limit our review 
to more recent studies that refer to IAS 19 in light of its previous accounting model (see 3.3) 
and add to an understanding of why it has been revised. 
For unfunded pension plans, Amen (2007) examines the long-term accounting effects of 
actuarial gains and losses be either immediately recognised in equity (the equity approach) or 
deferred in P&L (the corridor approach). He finds that accumulated actuarial gains and losses 
do not offset one another in the long run, on average. In a sample of 265 listed European 
companies, Fasshauer et al. (2008) observe that, as of 2005, the majority applied the corridor 
approach and a large block of UK and Irish companies applied the equity approach, whereas 
only a few presented actuarial gains and losses in P&L. The findings are similar for STOXX 
Europe 600 companies (Morais, 2008). Because of the lack of comparability that arose from 
the different methods of recognition, Fasshauer et al. and, similarly, Amen recommended the 
abolition of the corridor approach. Stadler (2010) explores the determinants of pension ac-
counting choice for 163 German listed firms (1998–2008). He finds that German firms with 
actuarial losses that exceed the corridor are more likely to switch to the option of recognising 
actuarial gains and losses outside P&L (equity approach). The findings suggest that this op-
tion is strategically chosen to avoid the negative effect of the corridor excess on P&L. 
Two studies relate to the 2011 amendment of IAS 19 and its due process. Demaria et al. 
(2012) classify 227 responses to the ED of April 2010 with respect to the core questions on 
recognition. Whereas constituents supported the immediate recognition of remeasurements, 
they largely opposed the proposed net interest approach that had been brought forth by Ste-
phen Cooper in February 2009 (see 3.5.2.2). Based on Sutton (1984), Dobler & Knospe 
(2013) conduct a comprehensive lobbying study and analyse all 377 comment letters on the 
DP and ED in terms of constituents’ participation and content. The authors illustrate that lobby-
ing intensity and the degree of agreement differ across interest groups; however, they also find a 
consistent pattern of opposition to major disclosure requirements. Moreover, the authors docu-
ment lobbying success to be positively related to the level of agreement expressed in comment 
letters but find no clear impact for the intensity of comments. The latter may be interpreted to 
mean that board members are more likely to rely on summary feedbacks of constituents’ views 
rather than individual statements. Accordingly, Dobler & Knospe (2013) suggest that how infor-
mation is conveyed within the standard setting body should be further explored. 
3.2.3 Group decision making and communication 
Group communication, interaction and decisions have been analysed from different research 
perspectives by organisational science, sociology, psychology and communication science; 
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however, there is no integrative theoretical framework (Berdahl & Henry, 2005). Organisa-
tional and social psychology research shows that group decisions are mainly affected by at-
tributes of the group and the context in which it is embedded (e.g., Bales, 1950, 1953; Betten-
hausen, 1991; Davis, 1969; Hare, 1976; Turner, 2001 for an overview). The respective deter-
minants include a group’s size and composition as well as the heterogeneity (also the diversi-
ty) of group members, decision rules and behavioural patterns. The bigger a group is, the less 
that single group members believe that their contribution is material. Thus, the level of indi-
vidual participation is inversely related to group size (Bettenhausen, 1991; Olson, 1971). By 
contrast, group composition and heterogeneity seem to increase the individual motivation to 
participate (Castore & Murnighan, 1978; Collins, 1970; Deutsch, 1968). In the IASB context, 
moreover, heterogeneity may influence individual board member behaviour. Board members 
are selected from different geographical and professional backgrounds to provide a (desired) 
level of heterogeneity (IFRS Foundation, 2013a: 25–27). Although they are required to act 
independently and to serve the public (user) interests—grounded in the Conceptual Frame-
work—they most likely would also represent their region of origin or share their professional 
experiences as auditors, preparers, (national) regulators or academics.  
Participation, group consensus and individual satisfaction also depend on decision rules. 
The more pronounced the majority rule, the more group members endeavour to argue, empa-
thise with and convince others (Castore & Murnighan, 1978; Green & Taber, 1980; Moham-
med & Ringseis, 2001). The IASB has a supermajority rule of ten out 16 members (IFRS 
Foundation, 2013b)10F10F9, which appears to be consistent with precedent. Additional factors, in-
volving social behaviour, may further affect the IASB decision process and may include the 
role of an (informal and, unfortunately, often not observable) pre-discussion agreement 
among group members (concordance), relative goal alignment, cohesion and intragroup con-
flict behaviour (Bettenhausen, 1991; Castore & Murnighan, 1978; Van de Vliert & Janssen, 
2001). Because female and male group members appear to differ in their willingness to lead 
and to expedite group decisions, gender may also be an issue (Bettenhausen, 1991; Ertac & 
Gurdal, 2012). Further determinants stem from the IASB’s international and multicultural 
character. The latter has been found to affect group performance differently. A negative im-
pact on organisational effectiveness, i.e., difficulties involving reaching consensus and devel-
oping group cohesion (Fenelon & Megargee, 1971; Ruhe & Allen, 1977; Ruhe & Eatman, 
1977), has been shown to be accompanied by greater innovation, creativity and higher quality 
solutions (Ruhe & Eatman, 1977; Watson & Kumar, 1992; Watson et al., 1993). 
                                                 
9 In 2009, the IASB had only 14 board members. Accordingly, the supermajority rule at that time was nine out 
of 14 (IASC Foundation, 2006). 
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The group context contributes to our understanding of the IASB decision process. Or-
ganisational studies find that group processes depend on the organisational environment of a 
group (e.g., Keyton, 2011; Raheja, 2005). In particular, a group interacts with its ambient or-
ganisation and respective staff. Thus, IASB group decisions are affected not only by the IFRS 
Foundation—which provides the board’s organisational and financial environment—but also 
by its staff, which provides technical support and professional expertise (e.g., Bradshaw, 
2002; Bradshaw et al., 1992 on board-staff relations in general). Every IASB standard setting 
project is supervised by a technical manager who participates in board meetings, provides 
expertise, documents decisions and acts as a link between board members and technical staff. 
Hence, board members and staff form an extended group in which staff members have no 
formal decision rights but are involved in opinion making with respect to the board. 
Another strand of literature from the communication sciences examines the group 
communication process and its determinants. Group communication is associated with group 
decision making and is therefore closely connected to group attributes and context (Fisher & 
Ellis, 1990; Stasser & Titus, 1985). Notably, group discussions tend to perpetuate rather than 
alter group members' pre-discussion preferences and choices (e.g., Moon et al., 2003; Sawyer 
et al., 2006). Communicative style and command of language may further affect decision pro-
cesses. Diverse groups can experience significant communication problems (e.g., Aritz & 
Walker, 2009; Jehn et al., 1997; Maznevski, 1994). Language barriers for non-native speakers 
may weaken their positions and decrease their motivation to participate in the discussion. 
With respect to international accounting, the perception and interpretation of accounting con-
cepts may differ, even between individuals who speak the same language. These differences 
increase when translation is involved (Baskerville & Evans, 2011; Evans et al., 2012). 
3.3 Regulatory context: Amendment of IAS 19 (2011) 
IAS 19 Employee Benefits constitutes accounting requirements for employee benefits, includ-
ing short- and long-term benefits, post-employment benefits (PEB) and termination benefits. 
The standard was originally issued in February 1998 and has been amended several times 
since then—most recently in November 2013 to clarify accounting for employee contributions 
(effective 1 January 2014). In September 2014, accounting for new pension plan designs was 
put on the IASB research agenda. 
Our paper is dedicated to the historical and the most substantial amendment to IAS 19 
(thus far) that was carried out between 2006 and 2011 to reform the recognition, presentation 
and disclosure of post-employment benefits or, more precisely, defined benefit obligations 
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(DBO). The respective version of the standard, which we refer to as IAS 19 (2011) throughout 
the paper, was issued on 16 June 2011 and became effective beginning on 1 January 2013 
(earlier application permitted).  
When reforming IAS 19 was put on the active IASB agenda in July 2006, the board out-
lined that the need for reframing pension accounting was ultimately motivated by both users’ 
and preparers’ concerns about the lack of transparency and comprehensibility of the existing 
accounting model. Before 2011, IAS 19 constituted three different options to account for ac-
tuarial gains and losses: the immediate recognition in P&L, the deferred recognition of actuar-
ial gains or losses that exceed the greater of 10 % of the pension obligation and 10 % of plan 
assets (corridor approach), and the immediate recognition outside P&L (equity approach; in-
troduced in 2004). In particular, constituents criticised the lack of comparability between 
these options, the misstatement of financial position in case of the deferred recognition of 
actuarial gains and losses, and shortcomings in the definition of benefit promises (DP.IN3). In 
the March 2008 DP, titled Preliminary Views on Amendments to IAS 19 Employee Benefits 
(open for comments until September 2008), the board clarified the definition of post-
employment benefits (DP.PV6–8) and proposed recognising all changes in the fair value of 
plan assets and the DBO in the period in which they occur (DP.PV2–4)—in other words, to 
abolish the corridor approach. By contrast, the presentation of pension costs was brought for-
ward for a general debate. The DP suggested three alternative approaches: one that allowed all 
cost components to be recognised in P&L and two that split components between P&L and 
OCI. Accordingly, disaggregation and presentation of pension costs was heatedly debated in 
the respective IASB meetings. 
The April 2010 ED 2010/3 entitled Defined Benefit Plans – Proposed amendments to 
IAS 19 (open for comments until September 2010) specified pension recognition and presen-
tation. While having retained immediate recognition of actuarial gains and losses, the ED 
commenced the separation of pension costs into a service and finance component, which were 
shown in P&L, and a remeasurement component, which was presented in OCI. Moreover, the 
ED extended the disclosure requirements regarding the characteristics and risks of defined 
benefit plans. Taken together, IAS 19 (2011) incorporated three major changes to pension 
accounting: the abolition of the corridor approach, the disaggregation of pension cost into 
service cost, finance cost and remeasurements (the first two to be presented in P&L and the 
latter in OCI) and more comprehensive disclosure requirements. 
  Chapter 3: Inside the Black Box of IASB Standard Setting 
52 
3.4 Content analysis design 
3.4.1 Data collection and preparation 
Our enquiry into accounting standard setting internals is premised on a content analysis of 
IASB meeting audio playbacks. MP3-audio recordings of board meetings, which are accom-
panied by further content such as Q&A webcasts and podcast summaries,11F11F10 are publicly avail-
able since 2006 from the IFRS Foundation’s website for completed and ongoing standard set-
ting projects. Whereas the latter are prepared to complement written information (e.g., high-
level summaries, comment letter submissions, and press releases), IASB meeting audio play-
backs are unedited recordings of IASB meetings and echo board debates and tentative deci-
sions, accordingly. 
Data were collected in two steps. First, we downloaded the recordings of all 21 IASB 
meetings that took place after the end of the DP comment period (November 2008) until the 
release of the amended standard (June 2011) from the PEB project section of the IFRS web-
site (duration of 29:27:01). As presented in TABLE 2, 14 board meetings relate to the due 
process phase between DP and ED (16:45:51) 12F12F11 and seven meetings to the phase between ED 
and the amended standard (13:30:13). Second, we prepared transcripts for all 21 IASB meet-
ing audio playbacks in their original language, i.e., English13F13F12.  
For the content analysis, we limit our sample to the 14 board meetings between DP and 
ED (16:45:51). We do not include meetings prior to the release of the DP because we aim to 
observe board discussions under explicit consideration of constituents’ comment letter feed-
back. In compiling the DP, the IASB collected and presented different approaches without 
being selective, whereas, in the post-ED phase prior (tentative) decisions and ED proposals 
                                                 
10 The availability of IASB meeting audio playbacks grounds in the due process core principle of transparency 
as formulated in the IFRS Foundation’s Due Process Handbook  (IASC Foundation, 2006; IFRS Foundation, 
2013b). Accordingly, meetings of the IASB or the Interpretations Committee are generally open to the public 
(outside observers are either allowed to attend meetings in person or via a live-webcast after registering 
online). Moreover, all meetings are recorded and provided online (IFRS Foundation, 2013b: 3.2). As of No-
vember 2013, the IFRS Foundation website contains approximately 800 hours (33 days) of IASB meeting 
audio playbacks. 
11 The period further involves a meeting of six IASB members and the Analyst Representatives Group (later 
renamed into Capital Markets Advisory Committee) on 24 February 2010 (0:51:04). Although a recording is 
available, we are unable to transcribe it due to poor audio quality. 
12 We follow the basic transcription principles of Mergenthaler & Stinson (1992). Accordingly, we maintain 
syntactical errors, eye dialect, interruptions and duplication of phrases, but smooth out hesitation vowels for 
the purpose of readability. We mark incomprehensible and unarticulated phrases with square brackets. For 
parsimony, we abstain from indicating linguistic style (e.g., pitch, intonation, accentuation) in our transcripts, 
but mark nonverbal communication (e.g., laughter). Any statement is marked with a time label [h:mm:ss] and 
a speaker label (initials). Because speakers are not formally introduced, we identify them by the use of first 
names throughout all meetings. We fail to identify two members of the technical staff (U1 and U2) who ap-
pear on only a limited number of occasions. 
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were largely confirmed14F14F13. Accordingly, we do not include board meetings between the ED 
and the amended standard in our sample but resort to the respective transcripts to track major 
decisions that were made within the sample period. 
 
TABLE 2 
IASB meetings on the amendment of IAS 19 (2011) 
Phase  Date (dd/mm/yyyy)  Duration (h:mm:ss) 
Before DP (not included)  various   13:30:13 
DP to ED   19/11/2008   0:34:27 
   23/01/2009a   1:36:06 
     0:40:04 
   17/02/2009   1:59:24 
   18/03/2009a, b   1:11:41 
     1:16:31 
   22/04/2009   0:52:14 
   19/05/2009   1:06:05 
   21/07/2009   1:33:04 
   22/07/2009   0:06:08 
   15/09/2009   0:14:49 
   22/10/2009   1:13:37 
   17/11/2009   1:07:18 
   18/12/2009   1:05:27 
   21/01/2010   1:32:20 
   18/02/2010   0:36:36 
Sample period: DP to ED  n1 = 14   16:45:51 
ED to standard   16/09/2010   1:12:38 
   20/10/2010   2:42:18 
   16/11/2010a   1:31:33 
     1:08:22 
   13/12/2010   1:42:59 
   21/01/2011   1:40:27 
   02/02/2011   1:13:10 
   16/02/2011   1:29:43 
ED to standard (not included)  n2 =  7   12:41:00 
Total  N = 21   29:27:01 
TABLE 2 displays date and duration of 21 audio playbacks of IASB meetings on the amendment of 
IAS 19 (2011) between November 2008 and February 2011, arranged by due process phases. The DP to 
ED-phase includes 14 IASB meetings that took place after the end of the DP comment period until 
release of the ED (16:45:51, sample period). The ED to standard-phase covers seven board meetings 
that were held after the end of the ED comment period until release of the amended standard (12:41:00). 
No meetings took place during the comment periods. Our content analysis is limited to the DP to ED-
phase (sample period) and does not embrace board meetings prior to the DP and after the ED. Through-
out the paper we use the British date format dd/mm/yyyy. 
_________________ 
a Meeting audio playback provided in two MP3-files. 
b Original duration of the recording is 1:41:21. The meeting closes with a coffee break of 0:29:40 that    
  was accidentally recorded (not included). 
 
TABLE 3 presents all sample meeting attendees arranged by board members (Panel A), tech-
nical staff (Panel B) and senior staff (Panel C). 
                                                 
13  Agenda Paper 5B (November 2011) illustrates that nearly all major ED proposals were confirmed by the 
board in the post-ED phase. 
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We further collect all observer notes on the 14 sample board meetings. These papers are 
prepared by technical staff and provided to board members prior to a meeting (IFRS Founda-
tion, 2013b). They contain staff recommendations, executive summaries and illustrative ex-
amples. We include them in our analysis to illustrate staff proposals and supplement discus-
sions that are not self-explanatory using attendees’ statements (e.g., regarding numerical ex-
amples) or the progress of meetings. 
3.4.2 Content analysis and inductive coding 
Content analysis is a research method that aims to structure and describe the content of com-
munication by means of abstraction and simplification (Berelson, 1952; Dey, 1993; Flick, 
2014; Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 2004; Mayring, 2010; Neuendorf, 2012).Whereas content 
analysis may imply purely quantitative analyses (e.g., word counts), due to its mainly inter-
pretative and contextualising character, it is generally considered a qualitative approach. The 
basic methodical idea of content analysis is to abstract from the original complexity of com-
munication by arranging pieces of the same or similar meaning into definite categories. The 
outcome is a more accessible category (or, synonymously, code) framework that groups relat-
ed observations and that may be interpreted on its own, allowing for inferences to be drawn 
that extend beyond the original data (e.g., Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Krippendorff, 2004). Accord-
ingly, the definition and assignment of codes—ultimately guided by the researcher’s analyti-
cal aim—are methodical core issues in content analysis. Data categorisation (or, coding) may 
be performed in two different but not mutually exclusive ways. First, codes may be ex ante 
deduced from related theoretical considerations, comparable observations or extant evidence 
and then assigned to the data at hand (deductive content analysis). In that regard, deductive 
coding allows for the identification and re-search of established concepts in a novel data con-
text. Second, codes may be directly processed from the material itself (inductive content anal-
ysis). The inductive approach is grounded in gradually identifying, refining and validating 
categories that seem most salient with respect to the researcher’s purpose of analysis. Induc-
tive content analysis thus aims at the most naturalistic description of the communication at 
hand (Mayring, 2010).  
Because there is no prior study that applies content analysis to IASB meeting recordings 
comprehensively (to the best of our knowledge), we consider inductive content analysis the 
most promising approach to start with. Methodically, inductive content analysis involves an 
open coding process (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Accordingly, we 
jointly read through the transcript data and assigned preliminary categories to board and staff 
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members’ individual statements (or parts of them). In a second round, categories were refined 
by clustering codes of similar meaning and dropping redundant ones, which resulted in a final 
set of 205 categories. Consistent with our research interest in the aforementioned internal as-
pects of IASB standard setting, we arranged them by four main categories:  
1) Project elements: The first main category involves any project characteristics, standard 
elements and proposals that were discussed in the sample of IASB meetings. Subcate-
gories relate to scope and timing of the project, definitional issues (e.g., contribution-
based promises), recognition, measurement and presentation of pensions, disclosures 
and several quick-fix issues. 
2)  Arguments: The second main category reflects arguments that were brought forward 
in discussing and justifying project elements. We classify these into three subgroups. 
First, we identify conceptual arguments that were commonly used in different con-
texts, e.g., usefulness. Second, we cluster specialised arguments that were closely tied 
to individual project elements. Finally, we identify arguments of consistency that point 
to any related IAS/IFRS or to ongoing projects that were taken into account while 
drafting the amendments to IAS 19 (2011). 
3) References: Our third main category links individual statements to information sources 
whenever they were explicitly revealed by participants (e.g., citing comment letters).   
4) Governance: The last main category codes data that relate to any technical and organi-
sational matters in our sample meetings. The respective subcategories reflect board 
votes and voting results, internal policies and requests for input on unresolved issues. 
APPENDIX A provides a detailed breakdown of the category set, including category defini-
tions and further explanations. Inductive coding yields 1,993 codings in total. As we address 
different aspects of board meetings, individual statements may be coded with more than one 
category. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Summary descriptive statistics 
To illustrate the main categories’ relative importance and, in general, the relationship between 
categories and board and staff members, TABLE 4 displays the distribution of all 1,993 cod-
ings across the 25 sample board meeting participants. Of 1,993 codings, 1,173 (58.9 %) per-
tain to project elements, 481 (24.1 %) to arguments, 215 (10.8 %) to governance aspects and 
124 (6.2 %) to references. Among project elements, disclosure (308, 26.3 %) and presentation 
(264, 22.5 %) account for nearly half of the related codings (1,173). Arguments (481) that
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were put forth in the meeting discussions are mainly conceptual (223, 46.4 %). The remaining 
codings are almost evenly attributed to specialised (125) and consistency arguments (133). 
Participants’ references (124) largely include staff members having referred either to their 
own proposals (60, 48.4 %) or to comment letters (28, 22.6 %), whereas IASB members ar-
gued mainly with reference to particular constituents or examples (25, 20.2 %); however, 
compared with the other main categories, references played a subordinate role. Finally, board 
meeting governance (215) primarily related to calling for and taking votes (85, 39.5 %), re-
questing further input on unresolved issues (77, 35.8 %) and staff presentation (41, 19.1 %). 
Regarding individuals, we observe codings to be unevenly distributed across the IASB 
meeting participants, ranging from a minimum of 4 (TJ 15F15F14) to a maximum of 281 (DT) with an 
average of 86.6 codings per person. The distribution suggests that board meeting attendees, 
and particularly IASB members, engaged in heterogeneous ways in the sample IASB meet-
ings. In the sections below, we illustrate our findings per main category in more detail. 
3.5.2 Project elements: content level 
3.5.2.1 Chronology of IASB discussions and decisions 
To contextualise the sequence of board discussions on the amendment of IAS 19 (DP to ED), 
TABLE 5 illustrates the distribution of all 1,173 codings of the project element main category 
across the 14 sample IASB meetings. Complementarily, APPENDIX B summarises the tenta-
tive board decisions on focal project elements. 
The first meeting on 19 November 2008 was organised to present a comment letter 
summary on the DP and constituents’ views but did not lead to any formal decisions. Constit-
uents were mainly concerned that the suggested definition of contribution-based promises was 
too broad16F16F15. In that regard, RG commented that extensively addressing the boundaries of con-
tribution-based promises may endanger the timely completion of the project and suggested 
limiting the project scope to presentation (19/11/08, [0:09:55]) 17F17F16. The remainder of the first
                                                 
14 TJ (vice chairman) retired at the end of June 2009 and took part in only six of the 14 sample board meetings 
only. The board member with the least number of codings that served over the entire sample period was GG 
(13). 
15  The category of contribution-based promises was introduced in the DP to capture pension arrangements to 
which the previous requirements of IAS 19 had been difficult to apply. In that regard, the previous distinction 
between post-employment benefit plans and defined contribution plans was meant to be deleted (DP.PV8). 
According to DP.PV6–7 a contribution-based promise is a post-employment benefit promise, in which the 
benefit can be expressed as the accumulation of actual or notional contributions or any promised return on 
the same. By contrast, defined benefit promises are post-employment benefit promises that are not contribu-
tion-based. 
16  Throughout the paper, references to sample IASB meeting audio playbacks are indicated by date, speaker and 
time label. The suffix “cont” denotes the second part of meeting recordings that were provided in two sepa-
rate files (January and March 2009, see TABLE 2). 
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meeting dealt with the interrelatedness of pension presentation and the Financial Statement 
Presentation-project (FSP). In January 2009, the board continued its deliberations on project 
scope and schedule. In light of contribution-based promises being a “key risk”18F18F17, the board 
decided to address this category with a future revision of the standard (second phase) and to 
limit the project scope to the recognition, presentation and disclosure of pensions (first phase). 
Because it was deemed useful in the DP comment letters, it was decided that all changes in 
the DBO and plan assets should be separated into an employment, a financing and a remeas-
urement component. At DT’s suggestion, the board agreed to separate remeasurements on the 
face of the income statement, whereas employment and financing components may be pre-
sented either in the income statement or in the notes. In February 2009, the IASB picked up 
on defining the remeasurement component and continued its deliberations on the presentation 
of pension costs. It was tentatively decided that remeasurements should include the total re-
turn on plan assets and actuarial gains and losses from the DBO, but should exclude service 
and interest cost. Regarding presentation, SC suggested to determine interest cost based on the 
net funding position of a pension scheme and to allocate any other changes to the remeasure-
ment component. Because it was unclear which rate could be used to appropriately measure 
an interest accretion on the net position, some board members were sceptical but proposed to 
take account of SC’s net interest approach as an alternative presentation format. The March 
2009 meeting covered two areas. First, the IASB reaffirmed its original decision to disaggre-
gate pension changes into service cost, interest cost and remeasurements and decided to sepa-
rate these components on the face of the income statement. In addition, remeasurements 
should be presented net of tax. Second, board members voted on several quick-fix issues, i.e., 
definite matters that were identified by staff to be addressed expeditiously beforehand (see 
APPENDIX A, Panel A) 
In the next meetings, board and staff gradually worked through the internal agenda: in 
April 2009, the board confirmed its original decision to recognise all changes in the value of 
plan assets and the DBO in the period in which they occur (abolition of the corridor approach) 
and agreed upon the allocation of the plan administration costs. The board meetings of May 
2009, July 2009, and January and February 2010 were devoted to pension disclosures, par-
ticularly regarding their alignment with IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts, and with regard to plan 
risks, IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures. In July 2009, staff suggested revising the 
requirements on the discount rate for post-employment benefits in another side project. Fol-
                                                 
17  AP stated: “The key risk is probably around the contribution based from section because there would be-- It's 
not even clear to us now how much work would need to be done to get that to a workable standard.” 
23/01/09, AP [0:02:20]. 
 Chapter 3: Inside the Black Box of IASB Standard Setting 
64 
lowing feedback from outreach efforts to the International Actuaries Association (IAA), the 
board proposed removing the requirement to use a government bond rate in cases in which 
there is no deep market in high-quality corporate bonds (IAS 19.78). In August 2009, the lim-
ited amendment ED/2009/19 Discount Rate for Employee Benefits was issued with a 30-day 
comment period. Due to massive resistance in the comment letters, in October 2009, the IASB 
decided to drop the proposed amendment and return to the original requirement. Further dis-
cussions involved proposed amendments to IFRIC 14 as set forth in ED/2009/3 Prepayments 
of a Minimum Funding Requirement and accounting for termination benefits. The meeting of 
November 2009 substantially changed the previous approach to presenting pension costs. In 
light of concurrent board decisions on OCI presentation in the Financial Instruments and FSP 
project, staff suggested to either relocate remeasurements to the non-recyclable OCI section in 
a single statement of comprehensive income19F19F18 or to continue presenting pension costs in P&L. 
In favour of unambiguous treatment, the former was proposed in the ED (ED.119A) and re-
tained in the amended standard. In December 2009, the IASB finalised the definition of re-
measurements. The meetings in January and February 2010 addressed pension disclosures. 
3.5.2.2 Individual participation and group formation 
TABLE 4, Panel A suggests that, at the participant level, IASB members were inclined to 
focus on particular key issues (project elements) and to promote specific accounting concepts. 
To highlight the relation of individual board members and project elements, TABLE 6 breaks 
down how the highest (disclosure) and second-highest (presentation) ranked project element 
subcategories pertain to the top three (according to their rank order) IASB participants, JL, 
DT and SC. 
First, we observe that, in January 2009, DT strongly advocated that remeasurements be 
shown separately from other pension costs on the face of the income statement (DT, 
[1:22:33]), which was later agreed upon by the board.  
                                                 
18  The staff proposal to relocate remeasurements was contingent on concurrent deliberations regarding the 
presentation of OCI in phase B of the Financial Statement Presentation project (jointly with the FASB). In 
the October 2008 DP titled Preliminary Views on Financial Statement Presentation, the IASB had proposed 
requiring comprehensive income and its components to be presented in a single statement of comprehensive 
income only (DP.3.24), i.e., to remove the previous option for a dual statement of profit or loss and other 
comprehensive income. The single-statement approach had been retained in ED/2010/5, although the state-
ment was relabeled as Statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income (ED.81). Because the 
FASB ultimately decided not to require a single statement of comprehensive income, the IASB maintained 
the previous option to present a separate statement of profit or loss (IASB, 2011). 
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TABLE 6 
Focal project elements of DT, SC and JL 
 DT SC JL 
Presentation 38 50 30 
Presentation (general) 5 9 1 
Net interest approach 4 22 5 
Net expense only   
Separation of remeasurements 5 1 2 
Separation of interest cost 5   
Income statement layout   
 Layout (general) 3  3 
 Net of tax presentation 4 1 12 
 One item 4 1 2 
 Two items 2 3  
 Three items 5 1  
 Postpone 1   
Disaggregation of pension costs   
 Disaggregation (general) 6 3 
 Trias: Employment, financing, remeasurements   
 Permit disaggregation of remeasurements 1  
 Prohibit disaggregation of actual return on plan assets 5 1 
+ Location   1 
Disclosure 40 33 42 
Disclosure (general) 9 3 5 
Guidance on materiality and disaggregation 2 2  
Actuarial assumptions 1 2 2 
Mortality rates and longevity 7 5 1 
Alternative measure   
 Accumulated benefit obligation 7 4 6 
 Vested benefit obligation 1  1 
 Buyout liability 5 1 
Curtailments and settlements   
Best estimate of future contributions 2   
Fair value of plan assets 1 1 
Multiemployer plans  1 
Plan risks   
 Plan risks (general) 2 1 5 
 Funding risk 1 3 
 Credit risk  1 
 Focus on net risk 3 1 
 Sensitivity analysis 2 3 5 
 Stress testing, scenario analysis 1  
 Liquidity analysis 1  
Breakdown of demographic and financial assumptions   
Severance package 1  5 
Reconciliation 4 1 2 
Significant changes in service cost 1  2 
Review disclosure requirements 1   
(Continued) 
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TABLE 6—Continued 
Focal project elements of DT, SC and JL 
TABLE 6 illustrates the distribution of a subset of 233 codings of the project element 
subcategories “Presentation” and “Disclosure”—including their first and second branch 
subcategories—across the IASB members DT, SC and JL. “+” denotes a category with 
further (untabulated) subcategories. Subtotals per board member for “Presentation” and 
“Disclosure” are provided in italics. 
 
Regarding the disclosure of actuarial assumptions, DT emphasised that information on mor-
tality rates was very useful (May 2009): 
“I’m going to live for 19. John’s going live for another four. In France because egalitar-
ian society everybody lives 23 years, man and woman. (…) Now if you had a mining 
industry and they say everyone’s going to live for 40 years after they retired at 65, you 
know, that’s just nonsense. You’d really want to know-- I think it’s probably the most 
important piece of information. Now it may be difficult but I think we should do it.” 
19/05/09, DT [0:12:31]. 
In this respect, DT objected to the staff recommendation to require disclosure of the process 
of determining key actuarial assumptions instead of specifying them20F20F19. DT was strongly sup-
ported by PK and by SC, who argued that merely describing the process would lead to boiler-
plate (SC [0:14:07]). By contrast, PC, RG, JL and JE argued that detailed mortality disclo-
sures were not useful—particularly, if provided by multinational companies— and WMG 
suggested framing a question in the ED as to whether constituents would feel the need to have 
additional disclosure on mortality rates. Eventually, the board agreed that the staff recom-
mendation would be included in the ED (ED.125G(b)). Because constituents affirmed the 
boilerplate argument, it was withdrawn from the final standard. Instead, IAS 19.144 mandates 
disclosure of significant actuarial assumptions, including mortality rates. 
A major example of an individual board member’s belief in one accounting concept is 
the net interest presentation approach that was proposed by SC in February 2009. In the con-
text of debating the arbitrariness of the expected return on plan assets, SC suggested measur-
ing the interest accretion on the net surplus or deficit of the pension plan and to put the re-
maining changes into remeasurements. In response to the following discussion on an appro-
priate discount rate, SC indicated that he would either use the same rate as for the liability 
(corporate bond rate) or, in the event of a surplus, consider a risk-free rate (SC, [0:36:14] and 
[1:03:49]). SC emphasised the practicability and particular information content of the net in-
terest concept as follows: 
                                                 
19  U1 explains that, although many constituents had also asked that the disclosure of mortality rates be required, 
the staff followed the recommendation of the Employee Benefits Working Group to inform constituents of 
the process involved in identifying those assumptions that are significant to the individual plan (19/05/09, U1 
[0:11:17]. 
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“Suppose you have two companies: One with the entirely unfunded pension plan, the 
other one with the funded; same liability but funded. If you go down the route of having 
the interest accretion on the gross liability in the interest line, and the full asset return 
down below in remeasurement, then these two companies, one of which funded, one un-
funded, would appear to be the same above the remeasurement line. They will both have 
a service cost, both have the gross interest expense. That profit before remeasurement, I 
don't think it's going to be very useful in that case because there's a vast difference be-
tween a company that has a completely unfunded pension plan and the one that's fully 
funded. By doing it, by looking at the interest accretion on the net amount, you success-
fully differentiate between those two companies at the remeasurement line. (…) If you 
have fully-funded scheme, asset-liability matching, that's going to be small. If' it's an 
unfunded scheme and you're not hedging the interest rate exposure, it could be large. 
(…) But I feel that the actual profit before remeasurement and the remeasurement line 
will both have important information content.” 17/02/09, SC [1:03:49]. 
SC noted that his approach was inspired by a DP proposal for imputing interest income on 
plan assets based on corporate bond yields21F21F20, although this notion found little support in the 
comment letters. In the board debate regarding this major issue, participants’ formed three 
groups that espoused the following views: 
 Supportive: JS supported SC’s proposal in principle but underlined that he would like to 
get further (presumably external) input on its relative usefulness (JS, [0:38:25]). Similarly, 
JE strongly supported the concept, which he believed was “a rather elegant model” and “a 
viable solution moving this forward” (JE, [0:40:36]), which he later reaffirmed (JE, 
[1:28:35]). PC admitted that he had not liked the approach at first but began to consider it 
worth exploring over the course of the discussion. In his opinion, the suggested artificial 
disaggregation resembled separating out an embedded derivative. However, he was con-
cerned that “if we go on through this process, splitting artificially into different compo-
nents, we need to make sure that the users would understand what's going on there.” (PC, 
[1:01:27]). 
 Neutral: Consistent with the supporters, MB considered the net interest approach worth 
exploring but was concerned about which discount rate to apply to the net position (MB, 
[0:54:30]). AP took up her point and argued that, although “Stephen’s method works fine 
in terms of concept”, deciding on an appropriate discount rate would touch pension meas-
                                                 
20 The DP suggested three different approaches for presenting pension costs (DP.3.10–16). Among these, the 
third approach (presentation of interest cost on DBO and plan assets in profit or loss) proposed three different 
methods of imputing interest income to plan assets: 1) maintaining the expected return on plan assets; 2) us-
ing dividends received on equity plan assets and interest earned on debt plan assets; and 3) using market 
yields on high quality corporate bonds (DP.3.29). Accordingly, SC noted: “(…) this method is effectively in 
the discussion paper, except it is characterized as use of an expected return on the full amount of the assets, 
but just at the corporate bond rate. Mathematically, it gives you the same answer.  My campaign to have the 
description, the discussion paper, consistent with what I've just been describing which is the net approach.  
And it is in there, in fact isn’t it, it's just not quite that visible.” 17/02/09, SC [1:03:49]. 
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urement (AP, [0:56:57]), which the board had previously decided to exclude from the pro-
ject scope. 
 Opposing: WU noted that the board was “trying to compress a lot of stuff into a display 
issue” (WU, [0:58:33]). Moreover, WU argued that the net interest presentation was not 
consistent with common principles of pension accounting and, if implemented, display of 
pensions would completely differ from their measurement (WU, [1:00:27]). JL stated that 
he was not convinced that a net measure was even the right way to look at pensions: 
“What bothers me more than now than anything else about it, now that I see it as that, is 
the focus on the net. Because I don't think we've reached the conclusion that that's the 
proper focus. My bothers coming in to any pension things is, I wanna start with the fact 
that I have an obligation and I like to measure that liability like any other liability. That 
fact that I choose to fund it, or regulator makes me fund it is coincidental, [] perhaps in 
many respects, or just something for tax driven or whatever reason that I did it. But I'm 
not so sure I even want to embrace net.” 17/02/09, JL [1:17:39]. 
Similarly, GG noted that he generally felt uneasy about netting positions on the asset and 
liability side that are measured differently. Continuing the discussion on net presentation 
would thus most likely not produce viable results (GG, [1:25:01]). 
In the course of the debate, MB brought up a different interpretation of net interest presenta-
tion, i.e., to net interest income on plan assets based on expected return and interest expense 
on the liability using the corporate bond rate (MB, [1:12:47]), although it was not consistent 
with SC’s concept. In his clarification towards MB, SC indirectly pointed to another ad-
vantage of the net interest approach using a single rate—the coherence of the interest effect 
and the funding status of a pension plan22F22F21: 
“But the point is at the moment, one of the real difficulties is that you have the interest 
accretion on the liability at the AA-rate and you have expected returns on the assets, so 
they're much on a higher rate. So even with the fund-- something which is fully funded, 
you're putting a net credit in the income statement equal to the spread between those 
two rates. That net credit in my mind is not value adding, because although it represents 
an expected future gain from the investment and equity, it's equally offset by the risk 
that you take on from adopting that asset allocation strategy. And I think that's one of 
the most confusing parts of the current pensions accounting system.” 17/02/09, SC 
[1:21:12]. 
As no further decisions on presentation were made in February 2009, SC brought up his con-
cept on several later occasions. In the board debate on the disaggregation of pension costs, he 
outlined the usefulness of the net interest approach once more: 
                                                 
21  This argument, among others, was later used in the ED to conceptually justify the net interest approach. 
BC.30 reads: “Thus a reporting entity recognises interest income when the plan has a surplus, and interest 
cost when the plan has a deficit”. 
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 “In terms of the disaggregation of the return, my preference which we expressed last 
time would be to calculate an interest accretion on the net pension funds that was what 
I’ve said. Now I recognised that we measure the asset and liability differently so that we 
have conceptual problems in that area and we discussed that last time, but I still main-
tain that that would be the most useful approach. My second approach would be to stick 
with what we have now, which is the expected return on the plan assets. I disagree that 
that is a meaningless disaggregation is what-- it’s some sort of return that you’d hope 
for that you didn’t achieve.” 18/03/09, SC [0:56:25]. 
Similarly, in November 2009, SC strongly advocated his personal preference based on a two-
fold argument of comparability. At that time, the staff had previously proposed relocating 
remeasurements to OCI: 
“My issue has more to do with the interest line, the fact that the interest proposed to be 
calculated along the gross liability and I saw but that created enormous difficulties when 
we came to comparing companies with funded and unfunded schemes (…) The other 
aspect I don’t especially like at the moment is the expected return on the assets, not be-
cause I believe that is conceptually wrong, I just feel that we have the problem of differ-
ent companies making different estimates so that we can have the spread of estimates 
for their switch produces an element of lack of comparability. Okay, we disclose but 
making adjustments is quite difficult. My preferred solution would be to do what I sug-
gested in the first place which is to calculate the interest amount on the net surplus or 
deficit (…)”. 17/11/09, SC [0:06:35]. 
In the recurring debate, we observe similar factions as those revealed in February 2009. 
Whereas JE strongly supported SC’s concept once again (e.g., JE [0:39:36]), RG had the 
board consider that they would be choosing “another arbitrary number instead of the expected 
return”—although he was sympathetic to the approach in general (RG [0:42:12]). In conclu-
sion, JS suggested continuing the discussion on the basis of an illustrative staff paper (JS, 
[0:48:47]), which was brought forward by AP in December 2009. Intriguingly, the staff rec-
ommended maintaining the requirement to recognise an expected return on plan assets (AP, 
[0:32:20]). In response, PMC emphasised that analysts understood managements’ overopti-
mistic assumptions for expected returns a major problem of current pension accounting and 
that the staff recommendation would not bring any improvement (PMC, [0:33:23]). RG re-
peated his original concern that the net interest approach was arbitrary but admitted that it 
would indeed facilitate comparability. In variation of the concept, however, he suggested rec-
ognising net interest expenses for a plan in deficit only because net interest income (i.e., on a 
plan surplus) would have no informational benefit (RG, [0:35:41]). Once again, JL strongly 
objected to the net interest concept because it was based on hypothetical calculations (JL, 
[0:38:19]) but also rejected the staff recommendation because, in his eyes, it brought no im-
provement (JL, [0:49:36]). By contrast, he suggested recognising any changes in both the lia-
bility and plan assets other than service cost in OCI (JL, [0:38:19]), which was supported by 
 Chapter 3: Inside the Black Box of IASB Standard Setting 
70 
PF because “it defuses the emotional aspects of this discussion” (PF, [0:41:58]). TY agreed 
with the net interest concept being hypothetical and reaffirmed his view that pension costs 
should collectively be presented in P&L (TY, [0:43:47]). As previously argued, JE strongly 
supported SC’s net interest approach, which he considered “[e]asy to understand, very, very 
straightforward” (JE, [0:41:00]). In defence of his approach, SC argued that net interest in-
come was not arbitrary but did indeed have economic meaning. Moreover, putting interest 
cost in OCI “would be a step backwards in terms of transparency of financial reporting” (SC, 
[0:50:06]). When DT took the final vote in December 2009, the presentation of a net interest 
component based on the corporate bond rate was tentatively accepted by a majority of 13 
board members (DT, [1:02:29]) and incorporated in the ED, accordingly (ED.119A–C). 
Moreover, SC also suggested extending the net perspective to disclosures. When the 
board debated the sensitivity analyses of plan risks in May 2009, SC raised concerns about the 
proposed requirements separately focusing on the plan assets and pension liability, whereas in 
a fully funded plan, these risks might be offset. Accordingly, he noted that he “would like to 
see a greater emphasis on the impact on the net position rather than the two components” (SC, 
[0:34:30]), which was further supported by PF in July 2009 (PF, [0:45:23]). AMG, however, 
countered that a sensitivity analysis on the net was too complex to prepare (AMG, [0:36:49]). 
Similarly, GG argued that providing sensitivity information on the asset and liability side was 
much clearer (GG, [0:40:42]). In the February 2010 agenda paper, the staff decided to propose 
an option, i.e., to disclose the impact of changes in actuarial assumptions on either the DBO 
or the net defined asset or liability. For reasons involving complexity, the ED ultimately ab-
stained from the idea of a net sensitivity analysis (BC.64). 
Our third example relates to the net of tax presentation of the remeasurement compo-
nent. Having preceded the board’s decision to separate remeasurements on the face of the 
income statement, the January 2009 staff paper had illustrated a sample display format that 
showed remeasurements net of tax subsequent to after-tax profit.23F23F22 JL expressed his opposi-
tion to the proposal clearly: 
“We agreed we're gonna show that separate on the face, but I don't know how to do it, 
okay? So, now, having decided, I don't know how to do it, I certainly didn't agree that 
I'd do a net of tax which I will object to. I don't know why this is anymore net of tax 
than any other lines net of tax. So, that's absolutely I didn't think I agree with you. I 
wouldn't agree to that.” 23/01/09 (cont), JL [0:03:20]. 
                                                 
22  In November 2009, AMG explained that the rationale for presenting remeasurements net of tax was “that 
entities could if they wish draw a subtotal that was profits after tax but before pension remeasurements” 
(AMG, [0:23:27]). 
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Following the board decision to explore ways of prominently presenting the remeasurement 
component, staff illustrated five different presentation formats in their March 2009 Agenda 
Paper 8a. Whereas three of those formats showed remeasurements before tax, two formats 
presented them net of tax. With regard to the latter, JL repeatedly stressed that netting re-
measurements was nothing but an arbitrary calculation (e.g., JL, [0:35:50]). When TJ argued 
that “almost the whole world wants the net of tax” and that the board would go against what 
everybody wanted if it did not go that way (18/03/09 cont, TJ [0:11:29]), JL replied: “Oh, 
let’s just hire Louis Harris and let him just set accounts” (JL, [0:11:49]) 24F24F23. In the vote of 
March 2009, a majority of eight board members nonetheless supported presenting remeas-
urements net of tax. When staff suggested moving the remeasurement component to OCI in 
November 2009, it maintained showing them net of tax, which was once again strictly op-
posed by JL at the very beginning of the meeting (JL, [0:04:03]). He was backed by TY, who 
expressed concern about some items being recognised before tax and others not being recog-
nised (TY, [0:12:33]). Intriguingly, the ED abstained from requiring remeasurements to be 
presented net of tax. Because the matter was no longer discussed in any of the remaining 
board meetings, it is unclear why this was so, however. It seems likely that the approach was 
simply straightened out because IAS 1.91 (effective 2009) already contained an option for 
net-of-tax presentation of OCI items25F25F24. 
A final example is TY’s belief that any changes in the DBO and plan assets should be 
recognised in P&L and presented as one line item (e.g., 23/01/09, TY [1:30:57]). TY clung to 
this notion even after related board discussions had already moved forward considerably, such 
as regarding the disaggregation of pension costs (March 2009) or the relocation of remeas-
urements to OCI (November 2009). Overall, TY’s arguments seem to have received little at-
tention, and he was eventually the only board member to formally dissent in the last meeting 
of February 2010. His reasoning was officially set out in ED.AV1-9. 
3.5.3 Role of arguments 
In this section, we highlight how argumentation affected board meeting decisions. We group 
arguments into three categories: conceptual arguments used in multiple contexts, specialised 
arguments closely tied to particular project elements and arguments regarding consistency 
with other IASB projects or IAS/IFRS. First, TABLE 7 breaks down TABLE 4, Panel B and 
displays the distribution of arguments across the meeting participants. The distribution sug-
                                                 
23 JL was presumably referring to the American pollster and public opinion analyst Louis Harris. 
24 According to IAS 1.91, OCI components may be presented either net of tax or before tax, disclosing the 
aggregate amount of tax related to these items. 
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-gests that argumentation largely followed the individual participation on project elements. 
Across meeting participants and the top contributors, accordingly, conceptual arguments 
played the largest role (223; 46.4 %), followed by specialised arguments (125; 26.0 %) and 
arguments of consistency (133; 27.6 %). 
Second, as the main analysis in this section, TABLE 8 displays the distribution of code 
relations between arguments and the project element-main categories26F26F25. Of all 498 codings, 
237 (47.6 %) pertain to conceptual arguments, 135 (27.1 %) to specialised arguments and 83 
(25.3 %) to consistency arguments, which, in rank order, corresponds to the previous findings. 
Among conceptual arguments, usefulness (40) and arbitrariness (31) are the most and second-
most common arguments, whereas among specialised arguments, external resistance (19) and 
the interrelation with pension measurement (11) are most and second-most common. Finally, 
among consistency arguments, the relationship to the FSP project (41) and internal consisten-
cy (17), are the most and second-most common arguments. At the project element level, 171 
(34.3 %) code relations pertain to disclosures, 120 (24.0 %) to presentation and 65 (13.0 %) to 
recognition; in other words, argumentation largely centred on the main project issues. 
We find that disclosure requirements were primarily debated in light of their usefulness 
and materiality, whereas in the beginning, the entire disclosure package was criticised for 
providing information overload and containing redundant requirements. Further counterargu-
ments included specific disclosures having been too costly or too complex to prepare. In terms 
of consistency, plan risk disclosures were laid out in accordance with IFRS 7 Financial In-
struments: Disclosures. 
Debates regarding the usefulness of specific disclosures related to two main areas. In 
May 2009, DT advocated disclosing mortality rates as material and useful (see 3.5.2.2). SC 
enquired as to whether the technical staff would consider the mandatory disclosure of any 
alternative measure of the pension obligation. He noted that in the UK, there was a (volun-
tary) recommendation to disclose the buyout liability that approximately one-third to one-half 
of the companies complied with and that was highly appreciated by analysts, moreover (SC, 
[1:00:42]). At the board’s request, the staff presented three alternative measures in July 2009: 
the value of settlement, its fair value or the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO)27F27F26. 
                                                 
25  The number of code relations (498) is slightly higher than the number of codings at the participant level (481; 
see TABLE 4, Panel B and TABLE 7), as multiple references to one project element by a participant are 
counted as such to account for potential overlaps with different arguments. 
26  The ABO definition in Agenda Paper 5B corresponds to the definition of SFAS 87.264 under US GAAP. An 
ABO differs from the projected benefit obligation in that does not include assumptions about future salary 
levels. Agenda Paper 5B.19 states that disclosure of the ABO has been required by SFAS 132(R).5e, as rec-
ommended by the UK Accounting Standards Board Reporting Statement and proposed by the Pro-active Ac-
counting Activities in Europe (PAAinE) Discussion Paper titled The Financial Reporting of Pensions. 
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TABLE 8 
Distribution of code relations between arguments and project elements 
 Project elements 
Arguments P
ro
je
ct
 sc
op
e 
Pr
oj
ec
t t
im
e 
 
ta
bl
e 
D
ef
in
iti
on
s 
R
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Q
ui
ck
-f
ix
 
is
su
es
 
Tr
an
si
tio
na
l 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
(E
D
) I
FR
IC
 1
4 
Si
de
 is
su
es
 
T
ot
al
 
Conceptual     (237)
 Usefulness    3 3 5 27 2    40
 Arbitrariness   1 7 1 16 2 1   3 31
 Comparability    2 8 10 2 1  1  24
 General understanding   1 5 3 3 1 1    14
 Materiality      2 17     19
 Cost-benefit relation     4  12     16
 Complexity and difficulty    2 6  7    2 17
 Information overload       15     15
 Practicability     2 2 2 4 4   14
 Importance      2 8     10
 Observability     3 1 1  3   8
 Cohesiveness     1 5      6
 Transparency    1  4 1     6
 Definition, wording       6     6
 Mismatch     2 2 1     5
 Recycling    2  1      3
 Forecasting      2      2
 Reliability     1       1
Specialised     (135)
 External resistance 2 2  5 2 6 1 1    19
 Touches measurement    3 1  1 6    11
 Lack of causal relation    6 1 2      9
 Information content      9      9
 Confusion   1 1   3  1 1  7
 Contains redundancies       8     8
 Pro-forma reporting    1  6      7
 No improvement   1  1 1  2    5
 Coherence   2 4  1      7
 Cross-country heterogene-
ity       
5     5
 Boiler plate       5     5
 Prejudgement of future 
decisions       
4     4
 Hypothetical    1 1 3      5
 Relates to presentation    1 2       3
 Overoptimistic assump-
tions     
3 1      4
 Induces volatility    2   1    1 4
 Supplements presentation       3     3
 Behavioral impact      3 1     4
 No cross-reference to 
uncompleted document     
2       2
(Continued)
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TABLE 8—Continued 
Distribution of code relations between arguments and project elements 
 Project elements 
Arguments P
ro
je
ct
 sc
op
e 
Pr
oj
ec
t t
im
e 
 
ta
bl
e 
D
ef
in
iti
on
s 
R
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Q
ui
ck
-f
ix
 
is
su
es
 
Tr
an
si
tio
na
l 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
(E
D
) I
FR
IC
 1
4 
Si
de
 is
su
es
 
T
ot
al
 
Specialised     
 (…)            
 Placement (FS, MC)       2     2
 Need for agreement     2       2
 Habit     3       3
 Coercion     2       2
 Compensation of inade-
quacies       
2     2
 Lack of discipline       1     1
 Indicator of flexibility       1     1
 Unintended consequences          1  1
Consistency            (126)
 Internal consistency   3 4  6 2 1   1 17
 FSP  5 5 9  18 2    2 41
 FVM     5  3 5    13
 Emission rights          1  1
 Annual Improvements  1   4       5
 IAS 1      6      6
 IAS 24       1     1
 IAS 37    2  2 1 1  4  10
 IFRS 2    1        1
 IFRS 4       2     2
 IFRS 7       12     12
 IFRS for SMEs       1     1
 UK-GAAP       1     1
 US-GAAP    3  1 6 1  2 2 15
Total 2 8 14 65 63 120 171 26 8 10 11 (498)
Rank    3 4 2 1 5     
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TABLE 8 illustrates the distribution of 498 code relations (overlaps) between arguments and the first branch of project element 
subcategories. The number of code relations (498) is slightly higher than the number of codings at the participant level (481; see 
TABLE 4, Panel B and TABLE 7), as multiple references to one project element by a participant are counted as such to account 
for potential overlaps with different arguments. Subtotals per first level subcategories of arguments are provided in parentheses. 
 
The staff concluded, however, that the costs of providing alternative measures would exceed 
the benefits and that respective disclosure requirements “could be wrongly perceived as the 
board's future direction in the comprehensive project” (U2, [0:19:54]). Accordingly, it was 
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recommended that the disclosure of any alternative measure should not be required. SC coun-
tered that disclosing the ABO was feasible and useful due its relationship to the DBO28F28F27: 
“The one I felt that could be done is the ABO. And to my mind, that would just be a 
disaggregation of the PBO into the component which is arising from the salary growth, 
and I think that would be useful.“ 21/07/09, SC [0:23:50]. 
RG suggested reaching out to national standard setters to refine the cost-benefit assessment of 
disclosing the ABO. Whereas summary feedback from national standard setters, the Employ-
ee Benefit Working Group and the IAA indicated that disclosure of the ABO was not too 
costly to implement, respondents raised concerns regarding the definition of the ABO and the 
risk of confusing users (17/11/09, U2 [0:50:32]). In the debate, GG raised the concern that 
defining the ABO as DBO without salary increases could not be sensibly applied in jurisdic-
tions with statutory salary increases (GG, [0:55:59]). Consistent with prior staff arguments, JE 
noted that he felt reluctant about introducing a new method of measurement that might not be 
pursued in the future (JE, [0:59:18]). Among the supporters, JL noted that in the US, the 
ABO—and not the DBO—was often understood as the “right” measure of pension liability. 
Similarly, SC argued that “in the US it is a meaningful number and it seems to be calculated 
perfect sensibly” (SC, [0:59:59]). Moreover, from an investor’s perspective, comparing ABO 
and DBO pointed to the (financial) flexibility arising from a pension plan. DT finally ex-
pressed that he felt uneasy about not being aligned with US GAAP (DT, [1:04:26]) on this 
matter. In the respective vote, eight (of 15) board members voted in favour of including man-
datory disclosure of the ABO in the ED. However, because many constituents perceived such 
information to be relevant only in rare circumstances, the requirement was withdrawn from 
the final standard (BC.244(b)). 
Second, the entirety of disclosures was debated in light of potential information over-
load. In January 2010, AMG presented a preliminary set of disclosure items with as many as 
28 main paragraphs. She explained that the disclosure package entailed the prior require-
ments, risk disclosures from IFRS 7 and requirements envisioned in prior meetings but would 
still add disclosures on plan assets from the Fair Value Measurement project (AMG, 
[0:00:42] and [0:01:34]), whereupon DT retorted, “And then multiply by ten, is it?” (DT, 
[0:01:31]). With respect to the complexity of providing meaningful information, PD figura-
tively noted: 
“I think users will complain that they will receive not [about] pensions report, but a spe-
cific bound volume in addition to that, dealing with pension disclosures that will be de-
livered separately because the post office cannot handle that package. So there is a need 
                                                 
27  SC uses the US term PBO (projected benefit obligation), which is synonymous with DBO. 
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to be selective in which information can really be useful to investors, if we can help a 
little in this aspect, I think it will be good.” 21/01/10, PD [0:08:22]. 
Similarly, JE argued that the board should be careful when adding new requirements and sug-
gested framing a question in the ED as to whether specific disclosures could be rationalised or 
even dropped (JE, [0:14:50)]. By contrast, PF strongly contradicted the notion of “overkill” 
based on the importance of disclosures from the investors’ perspective. In practice, moreover, 
even multinational enterprises reasonably limited pension disclosures to their significant plans 
(PF, [0:22:09]). While DT agreed with the latter, he reaffirmed his concerns about the “sheer 
heap” of disclosures. He suggested specifying disclosure objectives in accordance with user 
demands and have the requirements streamlined by an internal subgroup (DT, [0:30:51]) 29F29F28. 
RG, “horrified by the lengths of these disclosures”, raised doubts as to whether users could 
agree upon disclosures whose existence even the board failed to justify. If not, he would “just 
scrap them and give some very high-level disclosures about the plans including mortality 
rate” (RG, [0:37:12]). He further noted that from his experience with other working groups, 
there was no “right” volume of disclosures. Eventually, DT requested staff to ask users30F30F29 
about the (desired) disclosure objectives and streamline disclosure requirements with the fur-
ther support of JE and RG (DT, [1:07:25]). In February 2010, AMG presented a reduced dis-
closure set of 14 main paragraphs that was approved for incorporation in the ED. 
The second main topic, pension presentation, was primarily discussed against the back-
ground of arbitrariness and comparability. Specialised arguments related to the avoidance of 
pro forma reporting and the particular information content of SC’s net interest approach. Be-
yond that, presentation was determined by the boundaries of the ongoing FSP project (con-
sistency). 
Arbitrariness was the major counterargument against the net of tax-presentation of re-
measurements as well as SC’s net interest approach. The latter, moreover, would facilitate the 
comparability of companies with different funding statuses, and accordingly, would entail 
considerable information content (see 3.5.2.2). In March 2009, the need for comparability was 
also brought forward to encourage standardised presentation in the income statement. In re-
                                                 
28  DT’s exact wording was more bold, however: “I would like this free-guilty users to tell us what exactly they 
want to know from these pension benefits, I would then make those the objectives, and instead of this sort of 
thing ‘identifies the amount’. It's fine, that standard rule forward stuff.  (…) And then I would ask the three of 
them plus Jan and Bob to sit down together and we’ll lock them in a room. I suspect we might come out with 
three pages.” JL jokingly replied “Well, I suspect Bob and Jan die”, which was countered by JE with, “I think 
Jim should be in that room as well.” (21/01/10, DT, JL, JE, [0:30:51]–[0:32:04]). 
29  At this point, it is not entirely clear who exactly is meant by “users”. Agenda Paper 12.2 indicated that in 
having worked out the streamlined disclosure package, the “staff have consulted selected Board members 
with user and preparer backgrounds”, but remained silent about the exact ones. We note that both supporting 
members JE and RG can be associated with a preparer background (see TABLE 3). 
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sponse to staff having illustrated five different presentation formats, DT argued that users 
would prefer a standardised format over a “do-it-yourself-kit” (DT, [0:25:11] and [0:25:59]). 
Interestingly, in the March 2009 debate on the disaggregation and presentation of pension 
costs, the board seemed utterly afraid of specifying any—imperfect, in their eyes—
presentation format that would “force” prepares into pro forma reporting. DT, for instance, 
noted: 
“Would it be beneficial if we broke it into three and how do we show it and, what sort 
of information would you get without going to pro formas, because I think if we have to 
keep forcing people into pro formas, we’re failing. If we can stop that we’re probably 
are succeeding and I’m not just talking about management, I’m talking about users. If 
they have to recast it all then we haven’t got it quite right.” (18/03/09, DT [1:00:56]. 
In conclusion, the board tentatively decided upon disaggregating any changes in the net de-
fined liability into three components, i.e., service cost, interest cost and remeasurements, 
which were basically maintained in both the ED and final standard. 
The third main topic, recognition of pension costs, was closely tied to presentation, alt-
hough it was subject to a more complex and notably changing pattern of argumentation. Re-
spective board decisions brought two major innovations, i.e., the abolition of the prior 
smoothing mechanism (corridor approach)—the central motive for the amendment of IAS 
19—and the explicit split of pension costs into P&L (service and interest cost) and OCI (re-
measurements) components. 
With regard to the former, AP outlined in November 2008 that constituents largely sup-
ported the recognition of any changes in plan assets and the DBO in the period in which they 
occur (AP, [0:01:42]; similarly PD, [0:12:51]). Due to constituents’ differing views on presen-
tation and the ongoing FSP project, however, staff would reopen the discussion on immediate 
recognition but not before the board had agreed upon presentation issues (18/03/09, AP, 
[0:00:13]). In April 2009, the board reaffirmed its original decision with eleven positive votes 
(DT, [0:45:45]). 
Allocating pension costs, however, changed substantially over the course of the board 
meetings. The starting point was the January 2009 staff recommendation to recognise all 
changes in plan assets and the DBO in P&L, contingent on clearly separating cost components 
in the income statement (AP, [0:42:22]). We find that (full) recognition in P&L at this point 
was repeatedly justified from a general conceptual understanding, such as in the following: 
“We're aware that that's quite a big decision to make and the reason we've made that 
recommendation is that we think that the important thing is to provide the separation of 
the components and you can do that under current IFRS. (…) So, we think that using 
OCI is unnecessary to some extent. Conceptually, of course, we continue to hold the 
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view that there's no basis in IFRS for recognising any items outside profit or loss. And 
also, we think it's unclear how we could identify components be recognised outside 
profit and loss except in an arbitrary way.” 23/01/09, AP [0:42:22]. 
Agenda Paper 16C.35c repeated that there was neither a conceptual basis31F31F30 to present any 
items outside P&L nor a need to recognise components in OCI. In response to AP’s argument 
of arbitrariness, WMG added that there was “no secret methodology that provides the appro-
priate split” and that artificially separating items to be put into OCI would “set a very danger-
ous precedent” (WMG, [0:45:11]). By contrast, project manager AMG herself emphasised 
that fully recognising pension costs in P&L may trigger massive (external) resentments 
(AMG, [0:44:29]). JL specified that the IASB was vulnerable in two respects, i.e., for putting 
changes relating to an imperfectly measured balance sheet item32F32F31 in P&L and for being incon-
sistent with US GAAP: 
“People are gonna raise hell and we got to decide whether we're willing to stand up to 
that. But our vulnerabilities are, people say one of the problems of putting this in profit 
loss is you haven't measured it right. And you won't tell-- you won't look at how to 
measure it. You want to do that a decade from now. And so, why are you making me 
put this in profit loss? (…) [T]hat's gonna be an argument and very difficult to review. 
Second point they're gonna do is say, on a level playing field, not US GAAP.” 
(23/01/09, JL [0:51:12]. 
In other words, GG stated that the board was “blocked by measurement” (GG, [0:53:36]); 
similarly, JS argued that the board could not “win” without the right measurement basis (JS, 
[1:01:52]). Despite those counterarguments, a majority of eleven IASB members voted in 
favour of recognising all changes in plan assets and the DBO in P&L (AP, AMG [1:20:46]).  
However, by October 2009, the context of this decision had changed considerably. First, 
Agenda Paper 7B explained that in their joint meeting on OCI presentation (part of the FSP 
project), IASB and FASB had agreed upon requiring a single statement of comprehensive 
income, i.e., to eliminate the previous option of presenting a dual statement of P&L and OCI. 
Moreover, the FASB had favoured disaggregating remeasurements in the income statement, 
which was understood to likely also affect the IASB (it did not, however). Second, the Finan-
cial Instruments project maintained a classification category that still required the use of OCI. 
To avoid potential changes to pension presentation from future decisions within the FSP pro-
                                                 
30  Agenda Paper 16C.34b clarifies that the conceptual understanding is based on the staff’s (narrow) contempla-
tion of both the Conceptual Framework and IAS 1, which provide no basis for presenting items outside profit 
or loss. It is acknowledged, however, that the Conceptual Framework was written before OCI came into use. 
31  According to Agenda Paper 16B, Part G, some constituents believed that a comprehensive review of pension 
measurements was required (e.g., changing measurement to ABO from DBO). The board decided, however, 
to exclude pension measurements from the scope of the (short-term) amendment to IAS 19. Cooper (2015) 
recently outlined that, in its current research project on pension accounting, the IASB will focus on meas-
urement issues, particularly regarding hybrid schemes. 
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ject, staff recommended that the board either continue requiring all pension cost components 
to be recognised in P&L or return to one prior option of IAS 19, i.e., to recognise actuarial 
gains or losses (the staff summary used the old term) in OCI and to recognise the remaining 
components in P&L. Given the problem of “flawed” measurement, JE considered the latter to 
be a practical solution, whereas PMC and TY preferred to return to the board’s original deci-
sion and run all cost through P&L (PMC, [0:10:34]); TY, [0:12:33]). DT made it clear that he 
was willing to accept a split between P&L and OCI contingent on having a single statement of 
comprehensive income because he did not like the “idea of taking the fluctuations in pensions 
and dumping it four pages further on” (DT, [0:29:29]). The notion of separating pension costs 
pointed to another issue that had to be resolved—attaining a more precise definition of re-
measurements. In this regard, JL raised concerns as to whether changes in the estimates of 
service cost should be included in remeasurements or in current service cost (JL, [0:04:03]), 
and SC raised concerns regarding where to put net interest. In the respective vote, however, a 
majority of ten IASB members supported relocating remeasurements to OCI (DT, [0:31:20]). 
The definitional issues on remeasurements were finally resolved in December 2009. 
3.5.4 References, governance and other observations 
TABLE 4, Panel C illustrates whether and to what extent IASB meeting participants explicitly 
referred to the source of their statements or arguments. We observe that staff proposals, as set 
forth in agenda papers, are a dominant source of information that is largely referred to by staff 
members. Beyond that, staff occasionally affirmed and justified their proposals with (selected) 
comment letter feedback. By contrast, board members argued with reference to the perspec-
tive of (particular) constituents (e.g., analysts) or grounded their statements in case examples. 
PK, for instance, noted that, from the perspective of an auditor or user of financial statements, 
he would be perfectly happy with pension cost merely being disaggregated in the notes 
(18/03/09, PK [0:53:08]). SC, for example, created a numerical example to further justify the 
information content of his net interest concept (17/02/09, SC [1:22:39]). 
Intriguingly, IASB members only rarely made references that clearly related to their 
personal or professional backgrounds. In a debate on the terms deep vs. active market, Chi-
nese board member WZ, for instance, exemplified:  
“We never say Chinese market is a deep market. It’s an emerging market and matured, 
you can say it’s active but we never say we’re a deep market.” 18/03/09 (cont), WZ 
[0:27:33]. 
Beyond that, JL occasionally utilised his extensive background working with the FASB, 
whereas DT referenced his UK ASB history. 
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With regard to board meeting governance, TABLE 4, Panel D highlights the key roles 
of single IASB meeting participants. First, we find that DT not only took an active part in the 
board discussions, but, was also responsible for leading the meetings and calling for and tak-
ing votes in his capacity as chairman, i.e., for taking IASB decisions. Moreover, he initiated 
the exploration of open issues (further development), for instance, by requesting further staff 
analyses and proposals or consulting with (external) experts (e.g., IAA). Prior sections contain 
respective examples.  
As shown in TABLE 4, the top three IASB contributors—DT, JL and SC—were closely 
followed by the senior project manager AMG (rank four) and technical staff member AP 
(rank five), suggesting the prominent role of staff in general. In particular, technical staff 
members opened, and implicitly structured, the sample IASB meetings by presenting corner-
stones of the agenda papers (staff presentation) and introducing staff proposals that were the 
exclusive basis for any (tentative) board decisions33F33F32. Corroborating the concept of technical 
staff acting as an IASB intermediary, staff members, as noted above, also responded to any 
requests for further analyses and recommendations regarding unresolved matters. We find 
further support for this notion in the prominent position of senior technical manager AMG, 
who, apart from the technical role, significantly contributed to the main board debates at eye 
level with IASB members (TABLE 4, Panel A) with the frequent use of conceptual and con-
sistency arguments (TABLE 4, Panel B). We also observe that IASB members respected and 
explicitly referred to the pivotal role of the technical staff. In the debate on the disclosure 
package, for instance, WMG sympathised with staff members who, in his eyes, were entrusted 
with a “hopeless task”: 
“And I feel so sorry for the staff in those circumstances because we give them so many 
mixed messages. I go and talk to a working group, do some outreach, find out what 
people want, get people from around the board table aside and try to determine what 
you think is gonna be a useful information. And I bring back what we asked them to, 
and then we say to them ‘It's too much’. I must say I feel rather sorry for the staff in 
those circumstances because I think we leave them with hopeless task.” (21/01/10, 
WMG [0:58:31]. 
Occasionally, board members also openly commended staff members for their thoughtful rec-
ommendations and progress on standard elements (not tabulated). From our understanding, 
however, board-staff relations were not unilaterally biased towards the manifold information 
requirements of the IASB. In January 2009, for example, JE encouraged staff to feel free to 
convene extra board meetings to speed up board decisions with respect to project time frame 
                                                 
32 This internal policy is referred to on several occasions, such as by MB: “We used to have a policy that you 
had to vote the staff recommendation.” (18/03/09, MB [1:05:35]). 
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(JE, [0:35:54]). In addition, IASB members typically supported the advancement of staff rec-
ommendations and provided constructive suggestions whenever possible.   
We finally note a few general observations from the board meeting content analysis. 
First, it is notable that non-native English speaking IASB members, on average, account for 
substantially fewer total codings per person (60.0) than native speakers (105.0). Given the 
multinational professional background of non-native board members, which would typically 
involve a proficiency of English close to the native level, we do not intend to suggest a causal 
relationship here. Notably, TY—the only IASB member to dissent from the ED and the final 
standard—frequently struggled to express himself, which often resulted in queries from other 
participants, occasional misunderstandings and sometimes impatience. Our impression from 
the sample meetings’ etiquette and culture of discussions is that they were generally polite 
(e.g., speakers rarely interrupt one another), respectful, constructive, highly professional and 
topic-oriented debate, although board debates were frequently heated and many board mem-
bers turned out to be disputatious discussants. However, the atmosphere was often relaxed and 
even jokey34F34F33. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to shed light on private IASB standard setting from an inter-
nal perspective. Three aspects of the rule-making process were of particular interest: the dy-
namics of board discussions and (tentative) decisions along with the potential impact of single 
IASB and staff members, the array of arguments brought forward in IASB debates and the 
role of board-staff relations. 
Based on a content analysis of 14 IASB meeting audio playbacks on the amendment of 
IAS 19 Employee Benefits (2011) between November 2008 and February 2010 (DP to ED), 
we identify a set of 205 categories, embodying 1,993 codings in total, which we arrange into 
four main categories: project elements, arguments, references and governance. Of 1,993 cod-
ings, 1,173 (58.9 %) pertain to project elements, 481 (24.1 %) to arguments, 215 (10.8 %) to 
governance aspects and 124 (6.2 %) to references. 
At the content level, we first expose the chronology of IASB discussions and tentative 
decisions. We further observe that meeting attendees generally engaged in the board meeting 
debates in heterogeneous ways and that IASB members were inclined to focus on individual 
                                                 
33 Apart from other examples provided in this paper, GG, for instance, noted in the July 2009 debate on mortali-
ty rates, “In France women live longer, especially widows” ([1:04:23]). At the end of the November 2009 
meeting, DT went on to the next project saying, “Okay income taxes, Jim and I go down into the pub ‘cause 
we can’t agree on anything in income taxes” ([1:06:29]). 
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key issues. In this regard, we exemplify how the top three contributing board members—DT, 
SC and JL—impacted board debates and decisions. We find that SC individually raised and 
defended the concept of net interest presentation that was ultimately included in the ED. DT 
facilitated the present disaggregation of pension changes into three components. JL vehement-
ly opposed presenting remeasurements net of tax, which was presumably given up only for 
the reason of maintaining consistency with IAS 1. 
Argumentation largely followed the sample board meetings’ focal topics (disclosure, 
presentation and recognition), whereas conceptual arguments played a greater role than spe-
cialised and consistency arguments. We observe that disclosure regulation was debated in the 
light of usefulness, materiality and complexity. The initial disclosure package was heavily 
criticised for its information overload and was streamlined, accordingly. Pension presentation 
was largely discussed from the perspective of (avoiding) arbitrariness and (attaining) compa-
rability. Specialised arguments were related to avoiding pro forma reporting and the particular 
information content of SC’s net interest approach. Finally, we illustrate that the (envisioned) 
recognition of pension cost was justified with a general conceptual understanding, which was 
considerably challenged by contextual changes in the joint FSP project. Eventually, the board 
was “pushed” towards a more pragmatic way of drafting pension recognition. 
Regarding references, we find that agenda papers were the dominant source of board in-
formation. Staff occasionally reaffirmed its proposals by reciting (selected) comment letters. 
IASB members argued with references to the perspectives of particular constituents or exam-
ples but only scarcely referred to their personal or professional background (at least, visibly). 
Findings on board meeting governance point to individual key roles. In his capacity as chair-
man, DT was responsible for taking votes and requesting the exploration of unresolved issues, 
in addition to taking an active part in the board discussions. Staff members opened and struc-
tured board meetings on the basis of their agenda papers. Beyond that, senior technical man-
ager AMG contributed to the board debates at eye level. Overall, our findings corroborate the 
perception of technical staff acting as an IASB intermediary. We finally point to further ob-
servations regarding the language proficiency of IASB members and the general board eti-
quette and culture of discussion.  
Our findings should be interpreted with caution, however. First, our observations are re-
stricted to the sphere of board meetings. Accordingly, we are unable to identify opinion mak-
ing outside of the IASB discussions at hand or any further interaction between board members 
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and staff members 35F35F34. Second, observable participation does not necessarily point to the degree 
of formal influence (voting), as IASB members have one vote each36F36F35. Regarding observabil-
ity, we understand that board members are not formally obligated to contribute to meeting 
discussions, i.e., they may remain silent but still influence the outcome through their vote. 
Similarly, participants may not feel the need to reveal their individual position if it has previ-
ously been stated by someone else, or more strategically, they may involve themselves in dis-
cussions only at certain points in time. Likewise, we are limited to identifying only those ref-
erences that were explicitly revealed by meeting attendees, which may explain the subordinate 
role of this main category. 
Although we feel that the content analysis of board meeting audio playbacks provides 
novel and valuable insights into the black box of IASB standard setting, further research may 
help complement our results. Above all, exploiting additional sources, particularly surveys 
and interviews of IASB and staff members, seems promising to reappraise our interpretations. 
Further comparative research based on the vast amount of (audio) material provided by the 
IASB (or other standard setters) may broaden our understanding of the role of key players in 
the due process, group formation, argumentation, and particularly references as well as gov-
ernance aspects, such as the role of staff in different contexts and beyond the boundaries of 
one single standard setting project. This may also include further dimensions of board meet-
ing discussions that have not yet been analysed in depth, such as power, the style of negotia-
tion and communication or rhetoric in general. 
  
                                                 
34  We find only one statement that points to an interaction outside the examined board meetings. Regarding the 
interrelation of decisions on pension presentation and the FSP project, MB noted in November 2008: “Yeah. 
I have a similar view. I actually talked to the staff about it. I think we should at least lay this out and see what 
it looks like so people can know how this would be displayed in the financial statement presentation project.” 
(MB, [0:15:59]). 
35 In the case of a tied vote on any decision made by a simple majority of board members, the chairman has an 
additional vote (IFRS Foundation, 2013b: 3.21). 
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nd
 th
e 
re
sp
on
se
s t
o 
th
e 
D
P 
to
w
ar
ds
 tw
o 
se
pa
ra
te
 e
xp
os
ur
e 
dr
af
ts
, a
s f
ol
lo
w
s:
 
 
Pa
rt 
1:
 R
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
an
d 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 th
e 
de
fin
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
an
d 
in
 p
la
n 
as
se
ts
, d
is
cl
os
ur
es
, a
nd
 o
th
er
 is
-
su
es
 ra
is
ed
 in
 th
e 
co
m
m
en
t l
et
te
rs
 th
at
 c
an
 b
e 
ad
dr
es
se
d 
ex
pe
di
tio
us
ly
. 
 
Pa
rt 
2:
 C
on
tri
bu
tio
n-
ba
se
d 
pr
om
is
es
, p
ot
en
tia
lly
 a
s p
ar
t o
f a
 c
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 re
vi
ew
 o
f p
en
si
on
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g.
 
 O
n 
pa
rt 
1 
th
e 
B
oa
rd
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
de
ci
de
d 
th
at
 e
nt
iti
es
 sh
ou
ld
: 
 
di
sa
gg
re
ga
te
 c
ha
ng
es
 i
n 
th
e 
de
fin
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
an
d 
in
 p
la
n 
as
se
ts
 i
nt
o 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t, 
fin
an
ci
ng
 a
nd
 r
em
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s, 
an
d 
re
co
gn
is
e 
th
e 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s 
in
 th
e 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t. 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 w
ill
 c
on
si
de
r a
t a
 fu
tu
re
 m
ee
tin
g 
ho
w
 to
 d
e-
fin
e 
th
os
e 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s. 
 
di
sc
lo
se
 th
e 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nd
 fi
na
nc
in
g 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s 
ei
th
er
 in
 th
e 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t o
r i
n 
th
e 
no
te
s, 
an
d 
pr
es
en
t t
he
 re
m
ea
su
re
-
m
en
t c
om
po
ne
nt
 in
 th
e 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t. 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 p
la
ns
 to
 e
xp
lo
re
 w
ay
s 
to
 p
re
se
nt
 th
e 
re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t c
om
po
ne
nt
 in
 a
 w
ay
 th
at
 d
is
tin
gu
is
he
s 
it 
fr
om
 o
th
er
 it
em
s 
of
 p
ro
fit
 o
r 
lo
ss
. 
17
/0
2/
20
09
 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 o
f r
em
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
ho
w
 to
 sp
lit
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
s i
n 
th
e 
de
fin
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
an
d 
in
 p
la
n 
as
se
ts
 in
to
 a
 re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t c
om
po
ne
nt
 a
nd
 
ot
he
r c
ha
ng
es
. T
he
 B
oa
rd
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
de
ci
de
d 
th
at
 th
e 
re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t c
om
po
ne
nt
 sh
ou
ld
: 
 
ex
cl
ud
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
co
st
 a
nd
 in
te
re
st
 c
os
t. 
 
in
cl
ud
e 
th
e 
to
ta
l r
et
ur
n 
on
 p
la
n 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 a
ct
ua
ria
l g
ai
ns
 a
nd
 lo
ss
es
 o
n 
th
e 
de
fin
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n.
 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
id
 n
ot
 d
ec
id
e 
ho
w
 e
nt
iti
es
 s
ho
ul
d 
pr
es
en
t t
he
se
 c
om
po
ne
nt
s 
in
 th
e 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t, 
no
r w
he
th
er
 it
 s
ho
ul
d 
re
qu
ire
 e
nt
iti
es
 
to
 p
re
se
nt
 th
e 
re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t c
om
po
ne
nt
 a
s a
 si
ng
le
 li
ne
 it
em
. 
18
/0
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20
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     D
is
ag
gr
eg
at
io
n 
of
 p
en
si
on
s c
os
ts
 
     Ef
fe
ct
s o
f s
et
tle
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 c
ur
ta
il-
m
en
ts
 
In
 J
an
ua
ry
, t
he
 B
oa
rd
 d
ec
id
ed
 to
 d
ev
el
op
 tw
o 
se
pa
ra
te
 e
xp
os
ur
e 
dr
af
ts
 fr
om
 th
e 
pr
op
os
al
s 
in
 th
e 
di
sc
us
si
on
 p
ap
er
 P
re
lim
in
ar
y 
V
ie
w
s 
on
 
A
m
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 I
A
S 
19
-E
m
pl
oy
ee
 B
en
ef
its
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
sp
on
se
s 
to
 th
em
. A
t t
hi
s 
m
ee
tin
g,
 th
e 
B
oa
rd
 c
on
tin
ue
d 
its
 d
is
cu
ss
io
n 
of
 th
e 
fir
st
 
ex
po
su
re
 d
ra
ft,
 w
hi
ch
 w
ill
 a
dd
re
ss
 re
co
gn
iti
on
 a
nd
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
of
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 th
e 
de
fin
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
an
d 
in
 p
la
n 
as
se
ts
, d
is
cl
o-
su
re
s, 
an
d 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s r
ai
se
d 
in
 th
e 
co
m
m
en
t l
et
te
rs
 th
at
 c
an
 b
e 
ad
dr
es
se
d 
ex
pe
di
tio
us
ly
. 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
ec
id
ed
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
th
at
 a
n 
en
tit
y 
sh
ou
ld
 se
pa
ra
te
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 th
e 
ne
t d
ef
in
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
as
se
t o
r l
ia
bi
lit
y 
in
to
 th
re
e 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s:
 
 
se
rv
ic
e 
co
st
 
 
in
te
re
st
 c
os
t o
n 
th
e 
de
fin
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
to
 b
e 
pr
es
en
te
d 
in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
w
ay
 a
s o
th
er
 fi
na
nc
e 
co
st
s 
 
re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 c
om
pr
is
in
g 
ot
he
r c
ha
ng
es
 in
 th
e 
de
fin
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
an
d 
in
 p
la
n 
as
se
ts
 to
 b
e 
pr
es
en
te
d 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 in
 th
e 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t n
et
 o
f t
ax
 e
ff
ec
ts
. 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 a
ls
o 
de
ci
de
d 
te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
th
at
 a
n 
en
tit
y 
sh
ou
ld
: 
 
cl
as
si
fy
 th
e 
ga
in
 o
r l
os
s o
n 
se
ttl
em
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f t
he
 a
ss
et
 c
ei
lin
g 
in
 th
e 
re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 c
om
po
ne
nt
. 
 
cl
as
si
fy
 th
e 
ga
in
 o
r l
os
s o
n 
cu
rta
ilm
en
t w
ith
 se
rv
ic
e 
co
st
s. 
 
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
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D
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 d
ec
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(…
) 
Q
ui
ck
-f
ix
 is
su
es
 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
ec
id
ed
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y:
 
 
no
t t
o 
pr
ov
id
e 
ad
di
tio
na
l g
ui
da
nc
e 
on
 h
ow
 to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 d
is
co
un
t r
at
e.
 H
ow
ev
er
, w
he
n 
th
e 
B
oa
rd
 fi
na
lis
es
 th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f a
n 
 a
ct
iv
e 
m
ar
ke
t  
in
 it
s p
ro
je
ct
 o
n 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t, 
th
e 
B
oa
rd
 m
ay
 c
on
si
de
r b
rin
gi
ng
 th
at
 te
rm
 a
nd
 re
la
te
d 
gu
id
an
ce
 in
to
 IA
S 
19
, t
o 
re
pl
ac
e 
th
e 
te
rm
  d
ee
p 
m
ar
ke
t .
 
 
no
t t
o 
in
tro
du
ce
 a
 b
la
nk
et
 e
xe
m
pt
io
n 
fr
om
 d
ef
in
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
fo
r m
ul
ti-
em
pl
oy
er
 p
la
ns
. 
 
to
 c
la
rif
y 
th
at
 a
n 
en
tit
y 
sh
ou
ld
 c
on
si
de
r e
xp
ec
te
d 
fu
tu
re
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 s
al
ar
ie
s 
w
he
n 
as
se
ss
in
g 
w
he
th
er
 b
en
ef
its
 a
ttr
ib
ut
e 
hi
gh
er
 
be
ne
fit
s t
o 
la
te
r y
ea
rs
. 
 
to
 c
la
rif
y 
th
at
 a
n 
en
tit
y 
sh
ou
ld
 c
on
si
de
r r
is
k-
sh
ar
in
g 
an
d 
or
 c
on
di
tio
na
l i
nd
ex
at
io
n 
fe
at
ur
es
 w
he
n 
de
te
rm
in
in
g 
th
e 
be
st
 e
st
im
at
e 
of
 th
e 
de
fin
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n.
 
 
to
 a
m
en
d 
th
e 
B
as
is
 fo
r C
on
cl
us
io
ns
 o
n 
IA
S 
19
 to
 c
la
rif
y 
th
at
 th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
s 
of
 s
ho
rt-
te
rm
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 b
en
ef
its
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 lo
ng
-
te
rm
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 b
en
ef
its
 a
re
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
tim
in
g 
of
 w
he
n 
th
e 
en
tit
y 
ex
pe
ct
s t
he
 b
en
ef
it 
to
 b
ec
om
e 
du
e 
to
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
. 
 
to
 c
la
rif
y 
th
at
 ta
x 
pa
ya
bl
e 
by
 th
e 
pl
an
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 th
e 
re
tu
rn
 o
n 
pl
an
 a
ss
et
s 
or
 in
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t o
f t
he
 o
bl
ig
at
io
n 
de
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
he
 ta
x.
 T
he
 s
ta
ff
 w
ill
 c
on
si
de
r w
he
re
 c
os
ts
 o
f a
dm
in
is
te
rin
g 
a 
pl
an
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 th
e 
lig
ht
 
of
 th
is
 d
ec
is
io
n.
 
22
/0
4/
20
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  Im
m
ed
ia
te
 re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f c
ha
ng
es
 
in
 p
la
n 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 P
EB
 
R
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
of
 u
nv
es
te
d 
pa
st
 se
r-
vi
ce
 c
os
t 
 A
llo
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n 
co
st
 
   Pr
oj
ec
t s
co
pe
 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 c
on
tin
ue
d 
its
 d
is
cu
ss
io
n 
of
 re
co
gn
iti
on
 a
nd
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
of
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 th
e 
ne
t d
ef
in
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
as
se
t o
r l
ia
bi
lit
y.
 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
ec
id
ed
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
th
at
 e
nt
iti
es
 sh
ou
ld
 re
co
gn
is
e:
 
 
al
l c
ha
ng
es
 in
 th
e 
va
lu
e 
of
 p
la
n 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 th
e 
po
st
-e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
pe
rio
d 
in
 w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 o
c-
cu
r. 
 
un
ve
st
ed
 p
as
t s
er
vi
ce
 c
os
t i
n 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
of
 th
e 
re
la
te
d 
pl
an
 a
m
en
dm
en
t. 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
ec
id
ed
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
th
at
 e
nt
iti
es
 s
ho
ul
d 
in
cl
ud
e 
th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 a
dm
in
is
te
rin
g 
th
e 
pl
an
 in
 th
e 
de
fin
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n,
 u
nl
es
s 
th
ey
 re
la
te
 to
 th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f p
la
n 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 th
e 
be
ne
fit
 p
ro
m
is
e 
do
es
 n
ot
 d
ep
en
d 
on
 th
e 
re
tu
rn
 o
n 
th
os
e 
pl
an
 a
ss
et
s. 
 N
ex
t s
te
ps
: T
he
 B
oa
rd
 h
as
 c
om
pl
et
ed
 it
s 
re
de
lib
er
at
io
ns
 o
n 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 a
nd
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ne
t d
ef
in
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
as
se
t o
r l
ia
bi
lit
y.
 T
he
 
B
oa
rd
 w
ill
 d
is
cu
ss
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
an
d 
tra
ns
iti
on
 re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 a
t a
 f
ut
ur
e 
m
ee
tin
g,
 w
ith
 a
 v
ie
w
 to
 p
ub
lis
hi
ng
 a
n 
ex
po
su
re
 d
ra
ft 
in
 th
e 
th
ird
 
qu
ar
te
r o
f 2
00
9.
 
19
/0
5/
20
09
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
es
 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 c
on
tin
ue
d 
its
 d
is
cu
ss
io
n 
on
 p
os
t-e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t b
en
ef
its
 a
nd
 d
ec
id
ed
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y:
 
 
to
 a
lig
n 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 f
or
 p
os
t-e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
be
ne
fit
s 
w
ith
 t
ho
se
 in
 I
FR
S 
4–
In
su
ra
nc
e 
C
on
tra
ct
s 
an
d 
IF
R
S 
7–
Fi
na
nc
ia
l I
ns
tru
m
en
ts
: D
is
cl
os
ur
es
. 
 
to
 re
qu
ire
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 d
is
cl
os
ur
es
 fo
r p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 in
 m
ul
ti-
em
pl
oy
er
 p
la
ns
. 
 
no
t t
o 
in
cl
ud
e 
in
 IA
S 
19
 g
ui
da
nc
e 
on
 m
at
er
ia
lit
y 
fo
r d
is
cl
os
ur
es
. 
 
to
 d
el
et
e 
fr
om
 IA
S 
19
 th
e 
re
fe
re
nc
es
 to
 c
ur
ta
ilm
en
ts
 a
nd
 se
ttl
em
en
ts
. O
th
er
 c
ha
ng
es
 p
ro
po
se
d 
in
 th
is
 p
ro
je
ct
 w
ou
ld
 re
m
ov
e 
th
e 
ne
ed
 to
 d
is
tin
gu
is
h 
cu
rta
ilm
en
ts
 fr
om
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
pa
st
 se
rv
ic
e 
co
st
 a
nd
 se
ttl
em
en
ts
 fr
om
 o
th
er
 re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
. 
 
to
 re
qu
ire
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f p
la
n 
am
en
dm
en
ts
, w
ith
 a
 n
ar
ra
tiv
e 
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
am
en
dm
en
ts
. 
 
to
 r
eq
ui
re
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 n
on
-r
ou
tin
e 
se
ttl
em
en
ts
, d
ef
in
ed
 u
si
ng
 w
or
di
ng
 s
im
ila
r 
to
 th
at
 u
se
d 
in
 I
FR
IC
 U
pd
at
e 
in
 M
ay
 2
00
8 
(e
ve
nt
s n
ot
 c
ov
er
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
ac
tu
ar
ia
l a
ss
um
pt
io
ns
). 
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
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 d
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  R
em
ov
al
 o
f g
ov
er
nm
en
t b
on
d 
ra
te
 
      Tr
an
si
tio
n 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
    D
is
cl
os
ur
es
 
          Sh
or
t t
er
m
 E
D
 o
n 
di
sc
ou
nt
 ra
te
 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
is
cu
ss
ed
 th
e 
di
sc
ou
nt
 ra
te
 fo
r p
os
t-e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
, d
is
cl
os
ur
es
 fo
r d
ef
in
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
pl
an
s a
nd
 tr
an
si
tio
n.
 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
ec
id
ed
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y:
 
 
to
 re
m
ov
e 
fr
om
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 7
8 
of
 IA
S 
19
–E
m
pl
oy
ee
 B
en
ef
its
 th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t t
o 
us
e 
a 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t b
on
d 
ra
te
 w
he
n 
th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
de
ep
 m
ar
ke
t i
n 
hi
gh
 q
ua
lit
y 
co
rp
or
at
e 
bo
nd
s. 
In
st
ea
d,
 e
nt
iti
es
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 e
st
im
at
e 
th
e 
ra
te
 fo
r h
ig
h 
qu
al
ity
 c
or
po
ra
te
 
bo
nd
s i
n 
al
l c
as
es
. 
 
to
 d
ire
ct
 e
nt
iti
es
 to
 th
e 
gu
id
an
ce
 o
n 
de
te
rm
in
in
g 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
in
 I
A
S 
39
–F
in
an
ci
al
 I
ns
tru
m
en
ts
: R
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
an
d 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
fo
r g
ui
da
nc
e 
on
 h
ow
 to
 e
st
im
at
e 
a 
hi
gh
 q
ua
lit
y 
co
rp
or
at
e 
bo
nd
 ra
te
 (w
ith
 a
 fo
ot
no
te
 th
at
 th
e 
ex
po
su
re
 d
ra
ft 
Fa
ir 
V
al
ue
 M
ea
s-
ur
em
en
t p
ro
po
se
s t
o 
re
pl
ac
e 
th
is
 g
ui
da
nc
e)
. 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 w
ill
 d
is
cu
ss
 th
e 
tra
ns
iti
on
 fo
r t
he
 a
m
en
dm
en
t t
o 
th
e 
di
sc
ou
nt
 ra
te
 a
t a
n 
ad
di
tio
na
l m
ee
tin
g 
to
 b
e 
he
ld
 b
y 
te
le
co
nf
er
en
ce
 o
n 
4 
A
ug
us
t. 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
ec
id
ed
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
th
at
 e
nt
iti
es
 s
ho
ul
d 
ap
pl
y 
th
e 
ot
he
r p
ro
po
se
d 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 I
A
S 
19
 r
et
ro
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 T
hi
s 
is
 in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 o
f I
A
S 
8 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
Po
lic
ie
s, 
C
ha
ng
es
 in
 A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
Es
tim
at
es
 a
nd
 E
rr
or
s a
nd
 IF
R
S 
1 
Fi
rs
t-
tim
e 
A
do
pt
io
n 
of
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l F
in
an
ci
al
 R
ep
or
tin
g 
St
an
da
rd
s. 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
ec
id
ed
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
th
at
 a
n 
en
tit
y 
sh
ou
ld
 d
is
cl
os
e:
 
 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
se
t o
ut
 in
 A
ge
nd
a 
pa
pe
r 5
C
 fo
r t
hi
s m
ee
tin
g,
 e
xc
ep
t t
ha
t i
t s
ho
ul
d 
ap
pl
y 
th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 o
f p
ar
ag
ra
ph
s 3
1-
 4
2 
of
 I
FR
S 
7–
Fi
na
nc
ia
l I
ns
tru
m
en
ts
: D
is
cl
os
ur
es
 to
 th
e 
ne
t b
en
ef
it 
as
se
t o
r 
lia
bi
lit
y.
 I
f 
it 
is
 n
ot
 f
ea
si
bl
e 
to
 d
is
cl
os
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t t
he
 n
et
 a
ss
et
 o
r l
ia
bi
lit
y,
 a
n 
en
tit
y 
sh
ou
ld
 p
ro
vi
de
 th
at
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 fo
r t
he
 d
ef
in
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
an
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
pl
an
 a
ss
et
s, 
to
ge
th
er
 w
ith
 a
n 
ex
pl
an
at
io
n 
of
 h
ow
 th
e 
ris
ks
 re
la
tin
g 
to
 th
e 
de
fin
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
an
d 
th
e 
pl
an
 a
ss
et
s 
ar
e 
lin
ke
d.
 
 
a 
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
lim
ita
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 m
et
ho
ds
 u
se
d 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 th
e 
ris
k 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s. 
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t i
ts
 b
es
t e
st
im
at
es
 o
f 
th
e 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
 it
 e
xp
ec
ts
 to
 p
ay
 to
 th
e 
pl
an
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
ne
xt
 a
nn
ua
l p
er
io
d,
 d
is
tin
-
gu
is
hi
ng
 re
qu
ire
d 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
, d
is
cr
et
io
na
ry
 c
on
tri
bu
tio
ns
 a
nd
 n
on
-c
as
h 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
. 
 
th
e 
ac
cu
m
ul
at
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
(i.
e.
, t
he
 d
ef
in
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n,
 e
xc
lu
di
ng
 p
ro
je
ct
ed
 g
ro
w
th
 in
 sa
la
rie
s)
. 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 in
te
nd
s 
to
 p
ub
lis
h 
an
 e
xp
os
ur
e 
dr
af
t c
on
ta
in
in
g 
th
e 
pr
op
os
ed
 a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 o
n 
th
e 
di
sc
ou
nt
 ra
te
 a
s 
so
on
 a
s 
po
ss
ib
le
, w
ith
 a
 3
0 
da
y 
co
m
m
en
t p
er
io
d.
 T
he
 B
oa
rd
 in
te
nd
s 
to
 fi
na
lis
e 
an
y 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 th
e 
di
sc
ou
nt
 ra
te
 in
 ti
m
e 
fo
r 2
00
9 
ye
ar
-e
nd
s. 
A
s 
a 
re
su
lt 
of
 d
e-
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
 re
la
tin
g 
to
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
t p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
in
 o
th
er
 p
ro
je
ct
s, 
th
e 
B
oa
rd
 in
te
nd
s 
to
 re
vi
ew
 in
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 2
00
9 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
tim
et
ab
le
 fo
r a
n 
ex
po
su
re
 d
ra
ft 
of
 a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 IA
S 
19
 re
la
tin
g 
to
 re
co
gn
iti
on
, p
re
se
nt
at
io
n,
 d
is
cl
os
ur
es
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 is
su
es
. 
22
/0
7/
20
09
 
 
Se
e 
21
/0
7/
20
09
. 
15
/0
9/
20
09
 
   Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 (i
n 
th
e 
lig
ht
 o
f t
he
 O
ct
ob
er
 2
00
9 
Jo
in
t 
M
ee
tin
g)
 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
is
cu
ss
ed
 t
he
 p
ub
lic
at
io
n 
tim
et
ab
le
 f
or
 a
n 
ex
po
su
re
 d
ra
ft 
of
 a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 t
o 
IA
S 
19
 r
el
at
in
g 
to
 r
ec
og
ni
tio
n,
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n,
 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s a
nd
 o
th
er
 is
su
es
 ('
th
e 
ED
').
 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
ec
id
ed
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
th
at
: 
 
af
te
r t
he
 O
ct
ob
er
 jo
in
t m
ee
tin
g 
th
e 
st
af
f s
ho
ul
d 
co
ns
id
er
 w
he
th
er
 th
e 
B
oa
rd
's 
co
nc
lu
si
on
s o
n 
th
e 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 o
th
er
 c
om
pr
e-
he
ns
iv
e 
in
co
m
e 
ha
ve
 a
ny
 im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 fo
r t
he
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t c
om
po
ne
nt
 o
f t
he
 p
os
t e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n;
 
 
an
y 
di
sc
us
si
on
 o
f s
uc
h 
im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 w
ou
ld
 ta
ke
 p
la
ce
 a
t t
he
 N
ov
em
be
r m
ee
tin
g.
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Co
nt
in
ue
d 
Fo
ca
l t
op
ic
s a
nd
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 o
f t
he
 sa
m
pl
e 
IA
SB
 m
ee
tin
gs
 
D
at
e 
T
op
ic
s 
(T
en
ta
tiv
e)
 b
oa
rd
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 
22
/1
0/
20
09
 
A
m
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 IF
R
IC
 1
4 
     Pr
ep
ay
m
en
ts
 o
f a
 m
in
im
um
 fu
nd
-
in
g 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
         G
ov
er
nm
en
t b
on
d 
ra
te
 
     Te
rm
in
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
is
cu
ss
ed
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
po
ss
ib
le
 a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 IF
R
IC
 1
4 
IA
S 
19
-T
he
 L
im
it 
on
 a
 D
ef
in
ed
 B
en
ef
it 
A
ss
et
, M
in
im
um
 F
un
di
ng
 
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 th
ei
r I
nt
er
ac
tio
n 
an
d 
IA
S 
19
-E
m
pl
oy
ee
 B
en
ef
its
: 
 
pr
ep
ay
m
en
ts
 o
f a
 m
in
im
um
 fu
nd
in
g 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
 
di
sc
ou
nt
 ra
te
 fo
r e
m
pl
oy
ee
 b
en
ef
its
 
 
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
is
cu
ss
ed
 re
sp
on
se
s t
o 
its
 e
xp
os
ur
e 
dr
af
t (
ED
) P
re
pa
ym
en
ts
 o
f a
 M
in
im
um
 F
un
di
ng
 R
eq
ui
re
m
en
t (
A
m
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 IF
R
S 
14
), 
pu
bl
is
he
d 
in
 M
ay
 2
00
9,
 a
nd
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y:
 
 
co
nf
irm
ed
 th
e 
sc
op
e 
of
 th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t a
s p
ro
po
se
d 
in
 th
e 
ED
 
 
co
nf
irm
ed
 th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
s 
pr
op
os
ed
 in
 th
e 
ED
. H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 B
oa
rd
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
de
ci
de
d 
to
 p
ro
po
se
 c
la
rif
yi
ng
 th
at
 a
 m
in
im
um
 
fu
nd
in
g 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t m
us
t b
e 
en
fo
rc
ea
bl
e 
in
 th
e 
fo
rth
co
m
in
g 
ED
 o
f p
ro
po
se
d 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 IA
S 
19
. 
 
re
in
st
at
ed
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
2 
of
 IF
R
IC
 1
4.
 
 
co
nf
irm
ed
 th
e 
tra
ns
iti
on
al
 a
rr
an
ge
m
en
ts
 a
s p
ro
po
se
d 
in
 th
e 
ED
. 
 
de
ci
de
d 
to
 re
qu
ire
 e
nt
iti
es
 to
 a
pp
ly
 th
e 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 fo
r a
nn
ua
l p
er
io
ds
 b
eg
in
ni
ng
 o
n 
or
 a
fte
r 1
 J
an
ua
ry
 2
01
1 
w
ith
 e
ar
ly
 a
do
p-
tio
n 
pe
rm
itt
ed
. 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
is
cu
ss
ed
 re
sp
on
se
s t
o 
th
e 
ex
po
su
re
 d
ra
ft 
D
isc
ou
nt
 R
at
e 
fo
r E
m
pl
oy
ee
 B
en
ef
its
 (a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 IA
S 
19
), 
pu
bl
is
he
d 
in
 A
ug
us
t 
20
09
. T
he
 re
sp
on
se
s 
to
 th
e 
ED
 in
di
ca
te
d 
th
at
 th
e 
pr
op
os
ed
 a
m
en
dm
en
t r
ai
se
d 
m
or
e 
co
m
pl
ex
 is
su
es
 th
an
 h
ad
 b
ee
n 
ex
pe
ct
ed
. T
he
 B
oa
rd
 
th
er
ef
or
e 
de
ci
de
d 
to
 a
dh
er
e 
to
 it
s 
or
ig
in
al
 p
la
n 
to
 a
dd
re
ss
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t i
ss
ue
s 
on
ly
 in
 th
e 
co
nt
ex
t o
f 
a 
fu
nd
am
en
ta
l r
ev
ie
w
. T
hu
s, 
th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
ec
id
ed
 n
ot
 to
 p
ro
ce
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
am
en
dm
en
t, 
w
hi
ch
 m
ea
ns
 th
at
 e
nt
iti
es
 w
ill
 s
til
l n
ee
d 
to
 r
ef
er
 to
 a
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t b
on
d 
ra
te
 w
he
n 
th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
de
ep
 m
ar
ke
t i
n 
hi
gh
-q
ua
lit
y 
co
rp
or
at
e 
bo
nd
s. 
 
 In
 J
un
e 
20
05
, t
he
 B
oa
rd
 p
ub
lis
he
d 
an
 E
xp
os
ur
e 
D
ra
ft 
of
 A
m
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 IA
S 
19
, d
ea
lin
g 
w
ith
 th
e 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
fo
r t
er
m
in
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s, 
to
ge
th
er
 w
ith
 p
ro
po
se
d 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 I
A
S 
37
 P
ro
vi
si
on
s, 
C
on
tin
ge
nt
 L
ia
bi
lit
ie
s 
an
d 
C
on
tin
ge
nt
 A
ss
et
s. 
A
t t
hi
s 
m
ee
tin
g,
 th
e 
B
oa
rd
 
te
nt
at
iv
el
y:
 
 
co
nf
irm
ed
 it
s p
re
vi
ou
s d
ec
is
io
ns
 o
n 
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s. 
 
de
ci
de
d 
th
at
 e
nt
iti
es
 s
ho
ul
d 
ap
pl
y 
th
e 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 fo
r a
nn
ua
l p
er
io
ds
 b
eg
in
ni
ng
 o
n 
or
 a
fte
r 1
 J
an
ua
ry
 2
01
1 
w
ith
 e
ar
ly
 a
do
p-
tio
n 
pe
rm
itt
ed
. 
 
de
ci
de
d 
it 
w
ou
ld
 p
ub
lis
h 
th
e 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 IA
S 
19
 re
la
tin
g 
to
 te
rm
in
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s 
to
ge
th
er
 w
ith
 th
e 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 IF
R
IC
 
14
. 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 in
te
nd
s t
o 
pu
bl
is
h 
fin
al
 a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 IF
R
IC
 1
4 
an
d 
IA
S 
19
 in
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
00
9.
 
17
/1
1/
20
09
 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 
   D
is
cl
os
ur
es
 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
ec
id
ed
 t
o 
pr
op
os
e 
th
at
 p
en
si
on
 r
em
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
co
m
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 i
nc
om
e 
se
ct
io
n 
of
 t
he
 
st
at
em
en
t o
f c
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 in
co
m
e.
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 a
ls
o 
as
ke
d 
th
e 
st
af
f t
o 
br
in
g 
to
 a
 fu
tu
re
 m
ee
tin
g 
pa
pe
rs
 o
n 
tw
o 
as
pe
ct
s 
of
 th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 
of
 re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t: 
ch
an
ge
s i
n 
es
tim
at
es
 o
f t
he
 se
rv
ic
e 
co
st
 a
nd
 in
te
re
st
 in
co
m
e.
 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 r
ea
ff
irm
ed
 th
e 
de
ci
si
on
 in
 it
s 
Ju
ly
 m
ee
tin
g 
to
 r
eq
ui
re
 th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
de
fin
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
ex
cl
ud
in
g 
pr
oj
ec
te
d 
sa
la
ry
 in
cr
ea
se
s i
n 
th
e 
fo
rth
co
m
in
g 
ex
po
su
re
 d
ra
ft.
 
(C
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18
/1
2/
20
09
 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 o
f r
em
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 
In
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
m
ee
tin
gs
, t
he
 B
oa
rd
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
de
ci
de
d 
th
at
 e
nt
iti
es
 s
ho
ul
d 
di
sa
gg
re
ga
te
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 th
e 
ne
t d
ef
in
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
as
se
t o
r l
ia
bi
lit
y 
in
to
 se
rv
ic
e 
co
st
, i
nt
er
es
t c
os
t a
nd
 re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t c
om
po
ne
nt
s, 
an
d 
re
co
gn
is
e 
th
e 
re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t c
om
po
ne
nt
 in
 th
e 
ot
he
r c
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 
in
co
m
e 
se
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
st
at
em
en
t o
f c
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 in
co
m
e.
 A
t t
he
 D
ec
em
be
r m
ee
tin
g,
 th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
is
cu
ss
ed
 tw
o 
as
pe
ct
s 
of
 th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 
of
 th
e 
re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t c
om
po
ne
nt
 a
nd
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
de
ci
de
d 
th
at
 th
e 
re
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t c
om
po
ne
nt
: 
 
in
cl
ud
es
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 th
e 
es
tim
at
e 
of
 se
rv
ic
e 
co
st
s. 
 
ex
cl
ud
es
 n
et
 in
te
re
st
 in
co
m
e 
or
 e
xp
en
se
, d
et
er
m
in
ed
 b
y 
ap
pl
yi
ng
 th
e 
hi
gh
 q
ua
lit
y 
co
rp
or
at
e 
bo
nd
 ra
te
 to
 th
e 
ne
t d
ef
in
ed
 b
en
ef
it 
as
se
t o
r l
ia
bi
lit
y.
 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 w
ill
 c
on
si
de
r a
t t
he
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
m
ee
tin
g 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 to
 b
e 
pr
op
os
ed
 in
 th
e 
ex
po
su
re
 d
ra
ft.
 
21
/0
1/
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10
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
es
 
  Te
rm
in
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
pr
op
os
ed
 d
is
cl
os
ur
es
 to
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 th
e 
fo
rth
co
m
in
g 
ex
po
su
re
 d
ra
ft 
on
 p
os
t-e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t b
en
ef
its
. T
he
 B
oa
rd
 
as
ke
d 
th
e 
st
af
f t
o 
re
du
ce
 a
nd
 st
re
am
lin
e 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s. 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 w
ill
 c
on
si
de
r t
he
 re
vi
se
d 
se
t o
f d
is
cl
os
ur
es
 a
t a
 fu
tu
re
 m
ee
tin
g.
 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 d
is
cu
ss
ed
 te
rm
in
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s a
nd
 te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
de
ci
de
d 
th
at
: 
th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f t
er
m
in
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s s
ho
ul
d 
no
t i
nc
lu
de
 b
en
ef
its
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
fo
r f
ut
ur
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
 se
rv
ic
e;
 a
nd
 
an
 e
nt
ity
 sh
ou
ld
 re
co
gn
is
e 
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s w
he
n 
it 
no
 lo
ng
er
 h
as
 th
e 
ab
ili
ty
 to
 w
ith
dr
aw
 a
n 
of
fe
r o
f t
ho
se
 b
en
ef
its
. 
 Th
e 
B
oa
rd
 e
xp
ec
ts
 to
 p
ub
lis
h 
th
e 
fin
al
 a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 fo
r t
er
m
in
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s i
n 
th
e 
fir
st
 q
ua
rte
r o
f 2
01
0.
 
18
/0
2/
20
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D
is
cl
os
ur
es
 
Th
e 
B
oa
rd
: 
 
te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 a
 re
vi
se
d 
pa
ck
ag
e 
of
 d
is
cl
os
ur
es
 fo
r t
he
 fo
rth
co
m
in
g 
ex
po
su
re
 d
ra
ft 
of
 a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 to
 IA
S 
19
. 
 
te
nt
at
iv
el
y 
de
ci
de
d 
it 
w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 re
qu
ire
 e
nt
iti
es
 to
 a
pp
ly
 to
 p
la
n 
as
se
ts
 th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 p
ro
po
se
d 
in
 th
e 
ex
po
su
re
 
dr
af
t F
ai
r V
al
ue
 M
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
. 
 Th
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Chapter 4 
4  Research on Financial Accounting and 
Reporting of Family Firms: A Review37F37F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fredo, you're my older brother, and I love you.  
But don't ever take sides with anyone against the family again. Ever. 
—Michael Corleone 
From the motion picture 
The Godfather (1972) 
 
                                                 
 A paper version of chapter 4 is available as Klein (2015). 
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4.1 Introduction 
Family firms are of considerable economic importance and a prevailing type of business in 
numerous economies worldwide (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta 
et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Continuous interest in the idiosyncrasies of family 
firms, in particular, within management, organisational, and finance research, has led to the 
emergence of a unique academic field that involves specialised research facilities (e.g., Inter-
national Family Research Academy), related professional organisations (e.g., Family Firm 
Institute), publication outlets (e.g., Family Business Review), conferences, and an evolved 
body of literature. Although family business research is understood to have reached a state of 
adolescence over the past decades (Gedajlovic et al., 2012), accounting research has only re-
cently begun to discover family firms as unique objects of research. Intriguingly, respective 
studies on financial accounting, managerial accounting, and auditing of family firms are not 
older than 15 years. Thus, I expect that accounting research has been, first and foremost, fac-
ing the challenge of meaningfully placing established conceptions of the idiosyncrasies of 
family business, strategies on the (empirical) identification of family firms, and family firm-
specific theoretical frameworks from more “mature” disciplines into an accounting context.  
This chapter illustrates how (financial) accounting research has met this challenge, out-
lines respective findings and provides several suggestions how future research might move 
forward. I explicitly focus on financial accounting and reporting of family firms—the subfield 
with the substantial majority of studies (e.g., Prencipe et al., 2014)—and review 33 journal 
publications and three working papers (published between 2000 and 2015) with respect to 
subject, method, empirical models (if applicable), setting, definition of family firms, theory, 
and main findings. I find that prior research has almost exclusively been quantitative-
empirical and has focussed on a narrow range of subjects (earnings management, disclosures, 
and earnings properties). Most studies have explored single country settings and listed family 
firms rather than private ones. Moreover, I observe that the vast majority of empirical studies 
have employed dichotomous definitions to differentiate family from non-family firms. Opera-
tional definitions usually pertain to the involvement approach and include the definitional 
elements of family ownership and the presence of family members on the management or 
supervisory board. These definitional elements are interpreted and applied differently, howev-
er. Several papers that examine S&P 500 family firms rely on an existing involvement-
oriented classification of BusinessWeek, whereas only two studies employ an essence-oriented 
family firm definition. Regarding theorisation, I find that four of five studies are premised on 
agency theory which corresponds to its widespread use in accounting research in general. A 
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few articles ground in complementary or alternative frameworks such as stewardship theory 
or socioemotional wealth theory, respectively. I contend that financial accounting research on 
family firms has been selective with respect to the choice of theory, method, empirical setting, 
and definition, which I describe as “interlocking effect”. Furthermore, I briefly summarise the 
main findings from the reviewed literature. Although a slight majority of studies show that 
family firms are less likely to manage earnings than non-family firms, evidence on the genu-
ine earnings management behaviour of family firms is mixed. Family control, however, gen-
erally mitigates the effectiveness of certain corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., audit 
committees) in constraining earnings management. Empirical evidence on earnings properties 
suggests that family firms report higher quality earnings than non-family firms. Findings on 
(voluntary) disclosures of family firms are heterogeneous and, due to different focal points 
and settings, hard to reconcile. Finally, I outline several suggestions for future research which 
encourage the broader inclusion of subjects, settings, definitions, theoretical perspectives (in-
volving theorisation from related disciplines) and methods. 
This survey of research on financial accounting and reporting of family firms contrib-
utes to state-of-the-art articles on family business research in general (Bird et al., 2002; 
Chrisman et al., 2010; Debicki et al., 2009; Dyer & Sanchez, 1998; Kraus et al., 2011; Shar-
ma, 2004; Zahra & Sharma, 2004) but also explicitly adds to related reviews on family firm 
accounting research (Cheng, 2014; Prencipe et al., 2014; Salvato & Moores, 2010) in several 
respects. First, through excluding the fields of managerial accounting auditing, this survey 
comes with the benefit of a more standardised and refined review of the prevailing financial 
accounting and reporting literature. Second, the review grounds in a more comprehensive 
literature base. Third, I consider additional properties of the reviewed literature, in particular, 
the study setting, the (left-hand) outcome variables (in case of a quantitative-empirical re-
search model) and add a refined description of the employed family firm-definition (including 
alternative definitions as used in robustness checks). Finally, to present the current state of 
knowledge in more detail, I group the reviewed studies according to their main subjects (earn-
ings management, earnings properties, disclosures, and other findings) and condense respec-
tive findings. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section addresses idiosyn-
cratic characteristics of family firms, respective definitions, and theoretical frameworks that 
have been used in family business research. Section 4.3 reviews the literature on financial 
accounting and reporting of family firms. Here, I first outline properties of the identified liter-
ature (subjects, methods, empirical models, and study settings) and describe how financial 
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accounting studies have adopted family firm-specific theories and definitional approaches 
from the family business literature. Thereon, I summarise their main findings. Section 4.4 
provides a possible explanation for the state of the art (interlocking effect) and outlines sever-
al impulses for future research. The final section of this chapter concludes. 
4.2 Family firms as objects of research 
In this section, I outline idiosyncrasies of family firms (focussing on those features that are 
addressed by family firm-specific theorisation), definitional approaches and the most common 
theoretical frameworks (agency theory, stewardship theory, socioemotional wealth theory, 
resource-based view) that have emerged within family business research in general. Because 
accounting research on family firms is a relatively young subfield of family business research, 
this section shall help to show how accounting studies have drawn from established concepts 
regarding definition and theorisation and, more importantly, to illustrate respective gaps. 
4.2.1 Idiosyncratic features of family firms 
What makes family firms unique? It is commonly understood that idiosyncrasies of family 
firms stem from the specific intertwining of the spheres “family” and “business” that does not 
exist in non-family firms (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Habbershon & Williams, 1999; 
Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). This section briefly sketches several features that are of particular 
interest for family firm-specific theorisation. Because of the pivotal role of the family in fami-
ly firms, a significant role is played by noneconomic factors (Prencipe et al., 2014). One cen-
tral feature of family firms is that family members are emotionally attached to the business 
and, accordingly, strongly identify themselves with the firm and its reputation (e.g., Chrisman 
et al., 2007; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006; Miller et al., 2008). This emotional bond has 
several consequences. First, family owners are inclined to maintain control over the business 
and, thus, hold long-term investments in the family firm. Closely related to this is the family 
owners’ strong desire to ensure the long-term survival of the firm and to pass it on to succeed-
ing family generations (e.g., Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Miller & Le Bre-
ton-Miller, 2005). In this regard, family firm management is more likely to be concerned with 
preserving the firm in the long-run rather than pursuing short-sighted economic goals, which 
impacts business decisions and respective outcomes (e.g., performance). The emphasis on 
intergenerational sustainability further substantiates that choosing a successor is among the 
most critical decisions in family business (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). Another core feature 
is the closer relationship between family owners and managers (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
 Chapter 4: Research on Financial Accounting and Reporting of Family Firms 
103 
2006). Managerial positions are either held by family members or external managers that are 
often carefully selected and, thus, have strong ties with the family. As Prencipe et al. (2014) 
outline, managers strive for a long-term position in the firm (consistent with the long-term 
character of the business) and behave loyally towards the owner family (Miller & Le Breton-
Miller, 2006). The closer relationship between family owners and (family or nonrelated) man-
agers facilitates monitoring of managerial actions—an important trait from the perspective of 
agency theory. Similarly, family firms are understood to establish close and long-term rela-
tionships with their employees in general (e.g., Donnelley, 1964; Mueller & Philippon, 2011). 
4.2.2 Defining family firms 
Studying family businesses, especially if meant to compare them with non-family firms, usu-
ally requires a definition of and, in empirical research, operationalisation of the generic family 
firm. As Handler (1989: 258) notes, “[d]efining the family firm is the most obvious challenge 
facing the family business researcher”. Given that prior literature has not reached consensus 
on a commonly acceptable definition and on the precise characteristics that delineate family 
business, this task remains anything but trivial, however. Representative for a body of family 
firm studies that review definitional approaches, Westhead & Cowling (1998) and Chua et al. 
(1999) count 12 and 21 different family firm-definitions, respectively. Prencipe et al. (2014: 
367) point to not less than 90 definitions as identified in the European research report of the 
Austrian Institute for SME Research (2008). These operational definitions involve different 
elements such as the ownership stake of the (controlling) family, the presence of family mem-
bers in top management or on the supervisory board, intergenerational transfer, behavioural 
aspects, or the self-perception as family business, which complicates reaching a commonly 
accepted definition. 
According to Chrisman et al. (2005), extant family firm-definitions usually belong to 
one of two approaches: the components-of-involvement approach or the essence approach. 
Under the components-of-involvement approach, a family firm is defined as an enterprise in 
which the family is involved in such a way that it is capable of exerting controlling influence 
on business activities. Empirically, family involvement is operationalised considering “hard” 
factors, typically including the percentage of family ownership (often requiring a minimum 
ownership threshold or the family being the largest shareholder), one or more family members 
holding executive or non-executive positions, or the combination of both. The variety, in turn, 
suggests that there may be no uniform family firm but various characteristic types of family 
business, involving family-owned but third-party managed, family-owned and family-run, or 
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family-managed firms in which the family only holds a minority stake (Chua et al., 1999; 
Litz, 1995). Combining operational elements of family involvement, Klein (2000) proposes a 
quantitative definition based on the metric of substantial family influence (SFI). SFI is calcu-
lated as the sum of the share of family ownership, the proportion of family members on the 
management board and the proportion of family members on the supervisory board. In her 
study a firm, is considered a family business if SFI is equal to or greater than one. 
Adding to the mere associative character of the components-of-involvement concept, 
the essence approach considers family involvement a necessary, though not sufficient criteri-
on to identify a family business. Accordingly, defining a family firm by essence further re-
quires family involvement to translate into a unique behaviour of the firm and distinctiveness 
from non-family businesses. In this regard, Chrisman et al. (2005) collect several related 
characteristics, in detail, the family’s (actual) influence on firm strategy (Davis & Tagiuri, 
1989), the intention to maintain control over the company and pass it to the next generation 
(Litz, 1995), the existence of a family vision and the will to purse it, potentially across genera-
tions (Chua et al., 1999), or idiosyncratic resources and capabilities, referred to as firm 
“familiness” (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Habbershon et al., 2003). It should be noted that 
both involvement and essence approach are seen as complementary (Chrisman et al., 2005) 
and operational definitions as non-conflicting. Chua et al. (1999), for instance, show that fam-
ily ownership and/or management (family involvement) overlap with the behavioural aspects 
of family vision and intergenerational sustainability which would reasonably apply to the oth-
er factors as well. Accordingly, a consistent definition should include elements from both 
concepts. 
In a third approach, Astrachan et al. (2002) combine elements of family involvement 
and essence to construct a continuous scale of family influence, the F-PEC scale. It includes 
three distinct dimensions: family power, experience and culture. Whereas power relates to the 
typical operationalisation of family involvement (ownership, governance and management), 
experience takes account of the generational stage of the firm. It is argued that generational 
transfer adds considerable, yet with each succession decreasing, business experience to the 
family and the firm. The culture dimension captures the overlap of family and business values 
as well as the family’s commitment to the business. Accordingly, the F-PEC scale not only 
integrates different theoretical and methodological approaches, but also overcomes the di-
chotomous nature of the aforementioned definitional attempts as it maps a continuum of fami-
ly influence (Holt et al., 2007 with a refined approach). Notably, there has been no dominant 
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definitional attempt in family business research, i.e., studies in the field have involved various 
approaches and definitional elements (e.g., Harms, 2014). 
4.2.3 Theoretical frameworks of studying family business 
4.2.3.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory, which belongs to new institutional economics (Coase, 1937), is the most 
widely used theoretical paradigm in family business research. Basically, agency theory ad-
dresses conflicts of interest that result from the relationship between two parties, a principal 
(e.g., shareholder) who delegates work to an opportunistic utility-maximising agent (e.g., 
manager) under asymmetric distribution of information (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Applying agency theory in family firm research is premised on two different types of 
agency conflicts, in particular, the central agency conflict that arises from the separation of 
ownership and management (Type I agency problem; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and conflicts between controlling family owners and minority shareholders 
(Type II agency problem; Claessens et al., 2002; Morck & Yeung, 2003). It is argued that 
owner-manager agency problems are less prevalent in family firms for two main reasons. 
First, family firms have less dispersed ownership structures in which the family is usually the 
largest shareholder. In this context, Demsetz & Lehn (1985) and Shleifer & Vishny (1997) 
suggest that large shareholdings, or concentrated ownership, are associated with a more effec-
tive monitoring of outside managers by controlling family owners and reduced agency costs, 
accordingly. This notion finds further support in the fact that family owners, due to their long-
term involvement in the firm, have better (less costly) monitoring abilities as well as a sus-
tainable interest in the preservation of the firm and its reputation across generations (Cheng, 
2014). Second, when management and family ownership overlap, managers’ interests are un-
derstood to be aligned with those of other shareholders (“alignment” effect), thus, reducing 
incentives for opportunistic behaviour and Type I agency costs, accordingly (Fama & Jensen, 
1983a, 1983b; Hope, 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Schulze et al., 2002; Schulze et al., 
2001).  
While family firms, compared to non-family businesses, are expected to face less severe 
Type I agency problems they may be more prone to agency conflicts between controlling 
family owners and non-controlling minority shareholders. The latter would arise from the 
powerful position of controlling family owner-managers who have incentives to and are capa-
ble of expropriating wealth to the detriment of other shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983b; 
Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This phenomenon is commonly referred to as 
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managerial “entrenchment” or, simply, the entrenchment effect (Demsetz, 1983; Weisbach, 
1988). In agency theory-based accounting research on family firms, both effects are generally 
understood to be opposing. Wang (2006), for instance, argues that the alignment of interests 
would lead to higher quality earnings because family owner-managers have fewer incentives 
to opportunistically manage accounting earnings, whereas entrenchment would reduce earn-
ings quality because managers dilute earnings to expropriate private benefits. 
4.2.3.2 Stewardship theory 
Another theoretical approach to studying family businesses that is rooted in sociology and 
psychology, is stewardship theory (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2006; Miller et al., 2008). The term stewardship involves human caring, generosity, loyalty 
and responsible devotion towards a social group or institution (Donaldson, 1990; Le Breton-
Miller et al., 2011). Stewardship theory grounds in a more humanistic model of man and un-
derstands agents, in this context referred to as “stewards”, to be intrinsically motivated by 
altruistic motives rather than by purely economic self-interest—as suggested by agency theory 
(e.g., Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). In particular, stewards are char-
acterised by a high level of personal commitment, service to others, a strong orientation to-
wards the principal, and higher order needs such as self-actualisation or achievement (Davis 
et al., 1997; Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). As summarised by Le Breton-
Miller et al. (2011), stewardship would arise among parties that have stable relationships, that 
significantly interdepend and interact, and that share a similar social network (Bordieu, 1986; 
Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Putnam, 2000). These conditions are expected to typically occur 
in family firms in which managers develop a strong identification with and loyalty towards 
both the family and the family business (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Miller et al., 2008). 
Although stewardship theory contradicts the notion of an opportunistic agent, the 
alignment of interests between family principals and managers would typically depend on 
their actual attitude towards the business (self-serving agent vs. altruistic steward). Regarding 
the question whether family managers are agents or stewards, Chrisman et al. (2007) find for 
a sample of 208 US private family firms that family owners monitor family managers and 
compensate them with incentives. The results are supportive of the presence of agency rather 
than stewardship relationships. Le Breton-Miller et al. (2011) argue that the prevalence of 
agency or stewardship behaviour depends on the degree to which the business and its key ex-
ecutives are embedded in the family. Accordingly, stewardship-theorised empirical research 
could either model family embeddedness (e.g., Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011) or consider the 
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“true” nature of the manager. Whereas stewardship theory has been prominently used in vari-
ous disciplines of family firm research (either as an exclusive theoretical framework or in 
combination with agency theory; Madison et al., 2015 with a review), it has been scarcely 
embraced in the financial accounting arena so far. In this regard, family firm accounting stud-
ies more simply associate the status of being a family firm with the general prominence of 
stewardship behaviour (e.g., Prencipe et al., 2011). 
4.2.3.3 Socioemotional wealth theory 
A relatively new theoretical approach in the field of family business research that builds upon 
behavioural agency theory (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2000; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), is 
the concept of socioemotional wealth (SEW) (Berrone et al., 2012; Cennamo et al., 2012; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013; Miller 
& Le Breton-Miller, 2014). The term socioemotional wealth (also referred to as socioemo-
tional endowment) collectively denotes non-financial utilities and affective values that family 
owners derive from the family business. As Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) summarise, these as-
pects involve the capacity to exercise authority, the fulfilment of needs for belonging, affect 
and intimacy, the preservation of family values and of the social capital of the family business 
across generations, as well the ability to behave altruistically towards family members (using 
firm resources). SEW theory suggests that family owners balance decisions against the back-
ground of their impact on socioemotional endowment. Because family owners are highly 
averse to a loss of SEW, this also implies that they are willing to take measures that decrease 
economic value if affective endowment is at risk (Berrone et al., 2012). Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2014) point out that the desire to protect SEW may entail positive externalities such as a pro-
active stakeholder engagement (Cennamo et al., 2012) but may also promote self-serving be-
haviours of family owners to the detriment of other shareholders (Kellermanns et al., 2012). 
Whereas the SEW concept has found use in several studies on strategic decisions of 
family firms, SEW-based theorisation in financial accounting research on family firms is still 
the exception. From the SEW perspective, accounting can be seen as one measure towards 
preserving (or accumulating) socioemotional endowment. In this regard, Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2014) provide an analytical framework that links the financial reporting behaviour of family 
firms (earnings management and voluntary disclosure) to two dimensions of SEW (family 
control and influence, family identity). The authors posit, for instance, that family firms are 
more likely to engage in earnings management and less likely to provide voluntary disclosures 
if the SEW dimension of family control and influence is the main reference point. 
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4.2.3.4 Resource-based view 
The resource-based view (RBV) is a theoretical approach from the field of strategic manage-
ment that has been used to explain differences in firm performance (Barney, 1991, 2001; Pen-
rose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984). In this regard, RBV asserts that competitive 
advantages of firms and, thus, superior performance, stem from their capabilities to create 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable tangible or intangible resources (e.g., Barney, 
1986, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Teece et al., 1997). In the family firm context, Habbershon & Wil-
liams (1999) argue that family involvement originates a unique bundle of resources and capa-
bilities (referred to as “familiness”) that are distinctive to a family firm (also, Habbershon et 
al., 2003). Similarly, Sirmon & Hitt, 2003 (2003) frame five unique resources that may pro-
vide competitive advantages over non-family firms: human capital, social capital, patient fi-
nancial capital, survivability capital, and governance structure and costs. Competitive ad-
vantages of family firms arise from the fact that family managers evaluate, acquire, shed and 
leverage these resources differently. 
As noted before, RBV gives prominence to the impact of (family) firm-specific re-
sources on firm performance. Despite its prominent role in the management literature, it has, 
to the best of my knowledge, not been used as a theoretical framework in financial accounting 
research so far. One reason might be that RBV offers no clear prediction as to whether and 
how specific capabilities would affect financial accounting behaviour. Moreover, most (inter-
nally generated) resources (e.g., human capital) and, in particular, distinctive resource pro-
cessing (e.g., Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) are usually not mapped through financial accounting. Ac-
cordingly, it is not surprising that RBV has played no role in financial accounting research on 
family firms thus far. 
4.3 Financial accounting and reporting of family firms 
4.3.1 Literature collection 
This section provides a state of the art of research on financial accounting and reporting char-
acteristics of family firms. For this purpose, I collect and review 33 journal publications and 
three working papers that explore financial accounting in a family firm setting38F38F36. All identi-
fied studies were published between 2000 and 2015. Unlike prior survey articles on family 
firm accounting research (Prencipe et al., 2014; Salvato & Moores, 2010), I abstain from cov-
                                                 
36 To identify the relevant literature, I screened all peer-reviewed journals that are included in the EBSCO Host, 
JSTOR and ScienceDirect databases. Working papers were collected from the Social Science Research Net-
work (SSRN). 
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ering the domains of managerial accounting and auditing for the benefit of a more standard-
ised and refined review of the prevailing financial accounting literature39F39F37. Consistent with 
Salvato & Moores (2010), I exclude studies on family firm performance (Mazzi, 2011 for a 
review) and studies on tax aggressiveness of family firms (Chen et al., 2010; Steijvers & 
Niskanen, 2014)—although these usually employ financial accounting figures. In line with 
Prencipe et al. (2014), I further exclude accounting studies on privately held firms that do not 
explicitly address financial accounting issues of family firms. TABLE 9 displays the reviewed 
literature. 
My review of the 36 studies on financial accounting and reporting of family firms fo-
cuses on the following aspects: the subject of the study, the theoretical framework applied, the 
main findings, and, explicitly adding to prior literature surveys, a description of the setting, of 
the (left-hand) outcome variables (in case of a quantitative-empirical research design), and a 
refined view on the operational definition of family firms (including alternative approaches in 
terms of robustness checks). In the following two sections, I first outline these properties in 
more detail and then describe the main findings of the reviewed literature, arranged by four 
clusters (earnings management, earnings properties, disclosures, and other findings). 
4.3.2 Properties of the reviewed studies 
4.3.2.1 Subjects, empirical models and settings 
Of all 36 studies on accounting and reporting issues in family firms, 14 (38.9 %) devote to 
earnings management, nine (25.0 %) examine (voluntary) disclosures, and seven (19.4 %) 
relate to earnings properties (or, synonymously, earnings quality) of family firms40F40F38. Three 
articles (8.3 %) combine different subjects, whereas one study each (2.8 %) deals with ac-
counting conservatism, value relevance, and accounting restatements in a family firm context. 
In terms of method, all papers are quantitative empirical-archival studies using uni- and mul-
tivariate analyses, with the exception of Gomez-Mejia et al. (2014) who conduct a verbal-
analytical study on the link between SEW and financial reporting decisions of family firms. 
Khan et al. (2013) empirically examine voluntary disclosures of 14 Fiji listed firms, but do not
                                                 
37  At present, this review has the broadest literature base. Prencipe et al. (2014) identify 22 published articles on 
financial accounting issues, of which 18 were published in or before 2013 (the submission date of their man-
uscript was June 2013) and four were included because they got published in the same special issue of Euro-
pean Accounting Review (September 2014). Of the additional 14 papers that I review, six were published in 
2013 or later, three are working papers, and five were included presumably due to a different screening 
method. 
38 Several earnings quality studies involve empirical metrics that are used to identify earnings management 
behaviour (e.g., income smoothing). Because earnings quality is usually seen as an aggregate phenomenon, I 
do not separate respective findings on single earnings management-metrics from the general earnings quality 
context. 
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draw statistical inferences from their rather small sample. As in prior literature reviews, not a 
single experimental, model-analytical or qualitative study on financial accounting and report-
ing in the family firm context was found. 
The predominant quantitative-empirical and narrow thematic focus of the surveyed lit-
erature suggests that financial accounting research on family firms has been strongly inspired 
by the general “mainstream” in accounting research. Accordingly, the respective empirical 
models ground in concepts that are well-established in the field. In this regard, earnings man-
agement in family firms is usually examined by estimating discretionary accruals (Ball & 
Shivakumar, 2005; Dechow et al., 1995; Givoly & Hayn, 2000; Jones, 1991; Kothari et al., 
2005), or, with respect to real earning management activities (Achleitner et al., 2014), abnor-
mal levels of cash flow from operations and discretionary expenses (Roychowdhury, 2006), 
and earnings smoothness (various measures). Prencipe et al. (2008) focus on one specific ac-
crual component, i.e., research and development cost capitalisation. Studies on the earnings 
properties of family firms further involve a variety of different accounting- and market-based 
proxies, such as accrual quality (Dechow & Dichev, 2002), earnings response coefficients, the 
predictability of future cash flows, earnings persistence or the (asymmetric) timeliness of loss 
recognition (e.g., Dechow et al., 2010; Francis et al., 2004 for overviews). Voluntary disclo-
sures of family firms and their compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements are often 
measured by continuous disclosure indices or checklists, which partially ground in instru-
ments from prior literature (e.g., Chau & Gray, 2010 with reference to Meek et al., 1995). 
Further disclosure studies with different focal points exist: Ali et al. (2007) examine the like-
lihood of management earnings warnings and disclosures on corporate governance practices, 
Weiss (2014) and Bardhan et al. (2015) focus on the disclosure of material weaknesses in the 
control over financial reporting, Chen et al. (2008) use management forecasts as a proxy for 
voluntary disclosures, whereas Wan-Hussin (2009) study the voluntary adoption of the Ma-
laysian reporting standard on segment disclosures as an indicator of corporate transparency. 
Chen et al. (2014), who study the impact of founding family ownership on accounting con-
servatism, use non-operating accruals (Givoly & Hayn, 2000) as the main proxy for conserva-
tism; the metric does not differentiate between conditional and unconditional conservatism, 
however (e.g., Beaver & Ryan, 2005; Gassen et al., 2006). 
Regarding the country and firm settings of the 35 empirical studies, I first observe that 
all except Jara & Lopez (2011) are single country studies. The majority of these are settled in 
Asia (14; 41.2 %; China, Fiji, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan), eleven 
(32.3 %) examine family firms in European countries (Belgium, France Germany, Italy, Nor-
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way, Spain), seven studies (20.6 %) employ a US setting, and two papers (5.9 %) are settled 
in the Middle East (Israel, Jordan). Among the Asian and European cluster, most of the stud-
ies are settled in Hong Kong (seven) and Italy (five), respectively. The only cross-country 
study (Jara & Lopez, 2011) utilises data on family ownership in nine European countries. It is 
understandable that in the relatively young field of family firm accounting research, empirical 
studies would start with exploiting (familiar) single country settings because there is no need 
to control for institutional differences. In addition, the identification of family firms can be 
tailored to the respective setting (see 4.3.2.2). 
Second, I observe that almost all empirical studies exploit data from listed companies 
(32; 91.4 %) with the exceptions of Kvaal et al. (2012), Stockmans et al. (2010) and Stock-
mans et al. (2013) who examine Norwegian, Flemish and Belgian private companies, respec-
tively. The predominant focus on listed firms may stem from reasons of data availability and a 
wider choice of empirical accounting metrics that can be employed. Moreover, a public firm 
setting seems to integrate well with agency theorisation in family firm accounting research. I 
outline these arguments in more detail in section 4.4. 
4.3.2.2 Definitional heterogeneity 
With respect to the employed operational definitions of family firms, financial accounting 
research seems to reflect the general heterogeneity of definitional approaches, although within 
narrower boundaries. First, almost all reviewed accounting studies utilise definitions that 
ground in the components-of-involvement approach. Definitional elements of family in-
volvement typically include (a minimum threshold) of family ownership and/or the presence 
of founders or family members on the management or supervisory board. Notable exceptions 
are Stockmans et al. (2010) and Stockmans et al. (2013) who, in addition to family ownership 
and management, classify a firm as a family business only if understood by the CEO as such. 
More refined, essence-oriented definitions have found no use in the reviewed financial ac-
counting literature, however. Second, 29 studies (80.6 %) rely on dichotomous definitions that 
differentiate family from non-family firms; seven papers (19.4 %) focus on individual ele-
ments of family involvement that are measured continuously (e.g., Yang, 2010, regarding the 
percentage of family members on the board of directors). Third, the majority of articles identi-
fy family firms based on collected ownership data, whereas few rely on available classifica-
tions. With regard to the latter, Ali et al. (2007), Bardhan et al. (2015) and Tong (2007), all 
examining US listed family firms, employ the extant classification of BusinessWeek, accord-
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ing to which approximately a third of the S&P 500 companies (177) are family firms (Weber 
et al., 2003). The respective definition was, in turn, adopted from Anderson & Reeb (2003)41F41F39. 
As stated above, the reviewed literature commonly identifies family involvement on the 
basis of a family ownership threshold and/or the presence of family members on the board of 
directors. Whereas three-quarter (27) of the studies use either one of the two criteria (usually 
family ownership) to identify family firms, six papers (17.1 %) require both criteria be ful-
filled. The identification strategy of Stockmans et al. (2013) involves three different combina-
tions (two of them adding the perception as family firm). Fan et al. (2012) and Gomez-Mejia 
et al. (2014) work in a given family firm context that requires no further definition. Out of the 
36 reviewed studies, only five employ an alternative family firm definition, either by research 
design (Achleitner et al., 2014; Wang, 2006; Weiss, 2014) or as robustness test (Chen et al., 
2008; Prencipe & Bar-Yosef, 2011). 
Notably, the criteria of family ownership and board presence are interpreted (and ap-
plied) quite differently in the reviewed literature. The minimum threshold of family stock 
ownership applied to identify family firms, for instance, varies significantly across studies42F42F40. 
It is usually set at a higher level in (country) settings where ownership structures are less dis-
perse, suggesting that different thresholds are necessary to account for different institutional 
characteristics (similarly, Prencipe et al., 201443F43F41). The second definitional criterion— family 
presence—is also formulated differently. Several studies require at least one family member 
holding a managerial position to identify a family firm (Achleitner et al., 2014; Cascino et al., 
2010; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Ebihara et al., 2012), whereas others refer to family members in 
the plural (e.g., Chen et al., 2008; Leung & Clinch, 2014; Weiss, 2014 and those studies based 
on the BusinessWeek classification). Still others are less specific and speak of family in-
volvement in the top management (Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2013) or the family’s ability to 
control strategic decisions (Prencipe et al., 2008). 
Although research on financial accounting of family firms is almost exclusively prem-
ised on the components-of-involvement approach, it still shows a remarkable heterogeneity in 
the interpretation and operationalisation of respective definitional criteria. In this regard, dif-
                                                 
39 Anderson & Reeb (2003) define a business as family firm if the founder and/or its descendants are positioned 
in the top management or among the board, or are among the company’s largest shareholders. 
40  Bona et al. (2007), for instance, require a threshold of 10 % to differentiate Spanish family firms, whereas 
Cascino et al. (2010) use a minimum level of 50 % in the Italian setting (likewise, Prencipe & Bar-Yosef, 
2011; Prencipe et al., 2011; Prencipe et al., 2008). Intriguingly, Pazzaglia et al. (2013), who also employ a 
sample of Italian listed firms, set a 10 % (ultimate) ownership threshold, which is understood to be consistent 
with international studies on corporate ownership (esp., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Morck & Yeung, 2003). 
41  The authors exemplify that a 5 % ownership threshold (which, in the US context, points to sufficient owner-
ship concentration) would misclassify all Italian listed firms as family firms because the average level of 
ownership of the major shareholder in Italy is around 58 %. 
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ferent minimum thresholds of family ownership may be reasonably useful to account for the 
specific institutional characteristics of the chosen (empirical) setting. By contrast, the subtle-
ties in assessing family influence through the presence of family members among the board—
in conjunction with the, thus far, limited knowledge about the internal validity of different 
definitional approaches and the respective sensitivity of empirical results—impedes the com-
parability and synopsis of research findings.  
4.3.2.3 Adoption of family firm theories 
As TABLE 9 suggests, the by far most commonly used theoretical paradigm to underpin fi-
nancial accounting and reporting behaviour of family firms is agency theory. Out of 36 stud-
ies, 30 (83.3 %) are premised on agency theorisation alone, which corresponds to the wide-
spread use of agency theory in accounting research in general (e.g., Prencipe et al., 2014; Sal-
vato & Moores, 2010). These articles usually address the effect of an alignment between 
family owners’ and managers’ interests (Type I agency problem) and the effect from potential 
conflicts of interest between controlling family and minority shareholders (entrenchment; 
Type II agency problem) on the subject of choice. Because the alignment and the entrench-
ment effects are understood to have an opposing impact on accounting behaviour, agency 
theory-based studies—in particular those that compare family firms to non-family firms—
formulate contrary (e.g., Ali et al., 2007) or non-directional hypotheses (e.g., Cascino et al., 
2010); others hypothesise the prevalence of either one of both effects (e.g.; Ding et al., 2011). 
Usually, the aggregate impact of interest alignment and managerial entrenchment is seen as an 
ultimately empirical issue. 
Notably, alternative theoretical approaches to studying family firm accounting have re-
ceived relatively little attention in the reviewed literature. Stewardship theory, for instance, is 
only addressed in the earnings management studies of Prencipe et al. (2008) and Prencipe et 
al. (2011), however, merely as a supplementary perspective to the (dominating) agency 
framework. Four articles have recently adopted the relatively new theoretical perspective of 
SEW preservation in family firms (Achleitner et al., 2014; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; Paz-
zaglia et al., 2013; Stockmans et al., 2010), which allows a more refined view on accounting 
choices of family firms. Stockmans et al. (2010), for instance, posit and empirically support 
that, conditional on poor firm performance, first-generation family firms engage more in up-
ward earnings management than later-generation family firms because the attachment to SEW 
is expected to be strongest in the founding stage. As family firms are, compared to non-family 
firms, generally more concerned with the preservation of wealth over time, Achleitner et al. 
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(2014) predict that family firms would engage less in earnings management practices that 
negatively affect their firm value. The authors show that, in line with their conjecture, German 
listed family firms exhibit less real earnings management but more earnings-decreasing ac-
crual-based earnings management. 
Two studies provide more pointed theoretical viewpoints that are tailored to the respec-
tive scope. Fan et al. (2012) argue that in the course of family firm successions, specialised 
assets (such as reputation and social or political networks; e.g., Fan et al., 2008) dissipate, 
which will change business procedures, firm contracting and corporate governance. Accord-
ingly, stakeholders are expected to demand (and the successor to adopt) more outsider-based 
financial reporting that translates into higher quality earnings. Exploring family firm succes-
sions in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, Fan et al. are able to support this notion. In their 
working paper, Kvaal et al. (2012) collect a variety of earnings management-related hypothe-
ses from related frameworks and idiosyncratic features of family firms. These involve incen-
tives to keep firm wealth and control in the family, the role relationship lending, interest 
alignment, the impact of independent board members and the generational stage of the firm. 
4.3.3 Summary of main findings 
4.3.3.1 Earnings management 
As the literature review suggests, earnings management is the most widely studied topic in 
financial accounting research on family firms. To outline the respective findings, I arrange 
earnings management studies into three groups, i.e., studies that focus on the original earnings 
management behaviour of family firms, papers that examine as to whether and how family 
firm status impacts the effect of certain corporate governance mechanisms on earnings man-
agement, and studies with other focal points. 
Empirical evidence on the genuine earnings management behaviour of family firms is 
mixed. Several studies suggest that family firms are significantly less likely to manage earn-
ings than non-family firms. Jiraporn & DaDalt (2009) show that S&P 1500 family firms ex-
hibit less discretionary accruals, Prencipe & Bar-Yosef (2011) find lower abnormal working 
capital accruals among Italian family-controlled companies, Prencipe et al. (2011) illustrate 
that Italian family firms have less smooth earnings, and Prencipe et al. (2008) find the nega-
tive association between R&D cost capitalisation and profitability in Italy to be less pro-
nounced for family firms. By contrast, Kamran & Shah (2014) and Yang (2010) provide evi-
dence that in Pakistan and Taiwan, respectively, earnings management increases with the lev-
el of family ownership, which is supportive of the entrenchment argument under agency theo-
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ry. Consistent with their conjecture that private family firms are more eager to understate their 
financial performance than non-family firms, Kvaal et al. (2012) find Norwegian private 
family firms to engage more in downward earnings management unless under financial dis-
tress. Finally, Achleitner et al. (2014) show that German listed family firms engage less in 
real earnings management (REM) but more in accrual-based earnings management activities 
(ABEM) than non-family firms. Moreover, they seem to treat REM and ABEM as substitutes, 
which is understood to be consistent with family firms’ incentives to preserve SEW. 
Studies from the second cluster explore the impact of family control on the relation be-
tween corporate governance characteristics and earnings management. The respective find-
ings suggest that family involvement generally mitigates the effectiveness of certain corporate 
governance mechanisms in constraining earnings management. In particular, Jaggi & Leung 
(2007) find that, among Hong Kong listed firms, the presence of family members on the board 
of directors weakens the effective monitoring of earnings management through audit commit-
tees. In the same setting, Jaggi et al. (2009) demonstrate that, whereas board independence 
generally attenuates earnings management, this effect decreases with increasing family own-
ership. Stockmans et al. (2013) show that, conditional on the presence of agency II conflicts, 
outside directors constrain earnings management of Belgian private firms.  
Further earnings management studies have different focal points. In a European cross-
country setting, Jara & Lopez (2011) demonstrate that in family-owned firms, contestability 
of family control by the second- and third-largest non-family shareholder44F44F42 is negatively asso-
ciated with earnings management. The findings suggest that non-family blockholders are ca-
pable of mitigating opportunistic behaviour of family owners and their respective expropria-
tion of private benefits. By contrast, earnings management increases if the second-or third-
largest shareholder is another family member. Employing the SEW perspective, Stockmans et 
al. (2010) show that founder-generation Flemish private family firms are more likely to en-
gage in upward earnings management than later-generation family firms because their at-
tachment to SEW is presumed to be higher. Leung & Clinch (2014) provide evidence that the 
decrease of earnings smoothness around IFRS adoption of Hong Kong listed firms is less pro-
nounced among family controlled firms. 
4.3.3.2 Earnings properties 
Empirical studies on the properties of accounting earnings employ a variety of accounting-
based and/or market-based metrics (e.g., Dechow et al., 2010). Respective findings are usual-
                                                 
42  Contestability of control is measured as the sum of ownership of the second- and third-largest shareholder 
relative to the ownership stake of the largest shareholder. 
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ly condensed into a summary statement on earnings quality (also referred to as accounting 
quality). Whereas the term quality is, per se, neutral, earnings quality builds upon the basic 
idea that high (low) quality earnings reflect the underlying economics of the business in a 
more (less) faithful and predictable way. 
Empirical evidence suggests that family firms generally report higher quality earnings 
than non-family firms. In particular, Ali et al. (2007) expose higher earnings quality of S&P 
500 family firms on the basis of four earnings attributes (discretionary accruals, predictability 
of cash flows, earnings persistence, and earnings response coefficients). Similarly, Wang 
(2006) finds that, on average, founding family ownership of US firms is associated with high-
er earnings quality (abnormal accruals, earnings informativeness, and persistence of transitory 
loss components). This effect is nonlinear, however. When family ownership exceeds certain 
levels (58–68 %, depending on the metric), family firms report lower quality earnings, which 
may point to either an entrenchment effect on the supply of earnings quality or an alignment 
effect on the demand for earnings quality45F45F43. Bona et al. (2007) observe that Spanish listed 
family firms exhibit less discretionary accruals and a higher predictability of cash flows than 
non-family firms. 
Further studies provide mixed evidence with respect to individual metrics but conclude 
that, in the aggregate, family firms still exhibit higher earnings quality. Cascino et al. (2010), 
for instance, find that Italian listed family firms report less persistent and smoother earnings, 
whereas they exhibit a higher accrual quality, earnings predictability and value relevance. 
There are similar findings for Japanese listed family firms (Ebihara et al., 2012; lower pre-
dictability of cash flows) and S&P 500 family firms (Tong, 2007; no difference in earnings 
smoothing). 
Ding et al. (2011) contrast the previous results and show that Chinese listed family 
firms report less informative and conservative earnings and have higher discretionary accruals 
than non-family firms.  
Finally, Fan et al. (2012) put earnings quality into a transgenerational perspective and 
find that, after a succession, family firms report higher quality earnings (lower unsigned dis-
cretionary accruals and more timely loss recognition), which is understood to result from a 
shift towards more outsider-based financial reporting. 
                                                 
43 Among the reviewed literature, Wang (2006) explicitly differentiates between the supply of and demand for 
accounting information. Wang notes that it is unclear whether higher earnings quality stems from family 
firms’ demand for greater earnings quality or their supply of higher quality earnings. He states that, in this 
regard, his study is limited to identifying a mere empirical association. 
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4.3.3.3 Disclosures 
Studies on the disclosure practices of family firms address various issues such as the extent of 
voluntary disclosures, compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements and particular dis-
closure elements (e.g., disclosures on corporate governance). Because of different focal 
points, institutional settings, and methods, respective findings are hard to reconcile. All dis-
closure studies are unified by being premised on agency theory, however. 
One cautious tenor of the results is that family firms seem to engage in disclosure prac-
tices that are consistent with the prevalence of an alignment of interests between family own-
ers and managers. How the alignment effect translates into voluntary disclosures, is seen dif-
ferently, however. One argument is that, under an alignment of interests, there is less demand 
for voluntary disclosures. In this regard, Al-Akra & Hutchinson (2013), Chen et al. (2008) 
and Khan et al. (2013) find that family firms provide less voluntary disclosures than non-
family firms. By contrast, Ali et al. (2007) observe that US family firms are more likely to 
warn about poor earnings through management forecasts. Wan-Hussin (2009) shows that Ma-
laysian listed family firms are more inclined towards greater reporting transparency through 
the early adoption of the Malaysian Financial Reporting Standard 114 Segment Reporting 
(2001) in full.  
To provide a more refined view on the boundaries between agency I and II conflicts, 
Chau & Gray (2010) examine the association between the extent of voluntary disclosures 
(Meek et al., 1995) and the level of family ownership of Hong Kong listed firms. The results 
show that at moderate levels of family ownership (25 % or less), i.e., under the expected 
prevalence of the alignment effect, the extent of voluntary disclosures is relatively low be-
cause there is less demand for voluntary disclosures. At higher ownership levels (more than 
25 %) family controlled firms provide relatively more voluntary disclosures. This is consistent 
with the conjecture that, under the scenario of managerial entrenchment, family controlled 
firms supply more voluntary disclosures to allow effective monitoring by outside sharehold-
ers. In addition, the impact of family ownership on voluntary disclosures is mitigated by the 
appointment of an independent chairman. By contrast, Ho & Wong (2001) predict and illus-
trate that voluntary disclosures of Hong Kong listed firms are negatively associated with the 
number of family members on the board (a surrogate for family ownership). One possible 
explanation for this contrary result is that family presence is only one of four corporate gov-
ernance attributes that are examined simultaneously; the others involve the proportion of in-
dependent directors, the existence of an audit committee, and CEO duality.  
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Evidence on family firms’ compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements is 
mixed. Al-Akra & Hutchinson (2013) argue that non-compliance may entail reputational loss-
es that especially family firms seek to avoid and show that Jordanian family firms comply 
more comprehensively with mandatory disclosure requirements than non-family firms. More-
over, in response to the enhanced disclosure requirements of the 2002 Jordanian Securities 
Law, the “compliance gap” between family and non-family firms has increased. Chen & Jaggi 
(2000) find that, among Hong Kong listed firms, independent non-executive directors posi-
tively affect the comprehensiveness of disclosures; the association is weaker for family-
controlled firms, however. Consistent with their findings, the authors posit that family control 
may either impede directors’ independence and their respective influence on the comprehen-
siveness of financial information or that controlling family members have a lower demand 
because they direct access to such information. Bardhan et al. (2015) provide evidence that 
S&P 500 family firms are more likely to disclose material weaknesses in their internal control 
over financial reporting (required under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; SOX). These 
findings are understood to be in line with the entrenchment argument, i.e., family owners 
would establish weaker internal controls over financial reporting to expropriate private bene-
fits. By contrast, Weiss (2014) finds that Israeli listed family firms are associated with fewer 
material weaknesses (the Israeli rule is equivalent to SOX), which suggests that the alignment 
effect is, on average, stronger than the entrenchment effect. As few Israeli companies report 
severe weaknesses, the latter may not always be the case, however. 
4.3.3.4 Other findings 
Three of the reviewed financial accounting studies relate to other than the aforementioned 
subjects. Regarding accounting conservatism, Chen et al. (2014) conjecture that family own-
ers prefer conservative financial accounting to reduce litigation and agency costs. In support 
of this prediction, they find that, among S&P 1500 family firms, conservatism is positively 
associated with a non-CEO family ownership. This relation, however, is attenuated by the 
presence of founder CEOs, most likely due to an interest alignment between founder CEOs 
and shareholders. Sue et al. (2013) examine the properties of accounting restatements by Tai-
wanese listed firms and find that family and non-family firms do not significantly differ in the 
propensity to issue accounting restatements. However, the likelihood of financial restatements 
of family firms is positively related to the divergence between controlling shareholders’ con-
trol rights and cash flow rights, and the extent of negative media coverage (a proxy for firm 
integrity). These determinants are insignificant for non-family firms. In addition, accounting 
 Chapter 4: Research on Financial Accounting and Reporting of Family Firms 
125 
restatements of family firms are more extensive. The results suggest that Taiwanese family 
firms are inclined to commit more severe accounting infringements to conceal private control 
benefits. Exploring the information content of book value and earnings, Zhao & Millet-Reyes 
(2007) find that for French family-owned firms, the book value of equity is, compared to 
bank-owned firms, of greater value relevance than reported earnings. This finding is under-
stood to be consistent with the notion that family-controlled firms have fewer incentives to 
report timely and relevant earnings because information asymmetries between family owners 
and managers are resolved through inside communication. 
4.4 Discussion and suggestions for future research 
As the findings from the literature review have shown, prior research on financial accounting 
and reporting of family firms has been dominated by empirical-archival, family involvement-
oriented, and agency theory-based studies with a rather narrow range of subjects (earnings 
management, earnings quality, and disclosures). Whereas the prevalence of quantitative-
empirical studies applies to financial accounting research in general, I contend that financial 
accounting research on family firms reflects a relatively stable “interlocking” of theory, meth-
od, and operational definition of family firms that seems unique in this field. In this section, I 
first outline the interlocking effect from the starting point of theorisation to provide one pos-
sible explanation for the state of the art in family firm accounting research. In the second part 
of this section, I provide several suggestions how future research may broaden our under-
standing of financial accounting and reporting issues in the family firm context. 
From the perspective of agency theory, any study that aims to address the opposing ef-
fects of interest alignment and entrenchment would ideally require sufficient variation in the 
level of family ownership and/or the incidence of family management across firm observa-
tions. In this regard, suitable data is more likely to be found among listed rather than (relative-
ly smaller) private firms with less dispersed ownership structures and, frequently, an identity 
of owners and managers. Exploiting a listed firm setting, in turn, would facilitate the identifi-
cation of a non-family control group if the study is designed to be comparative. More im-
portantly, listed firm settings usually come with the benefit of better data availability which 
simplifies the selection (and computation) of left-hand variables to be examined, including 
capital market-based metrics, such as (asymmetric) earnings timeliness (e.g., Francis et al., 
2004). In addition, more comprehensive data on ownership and board structure fits well with 
employing involvement-based, dichotomous family firm definitions or continuous measures 
(e.g., percentage of family ownership). By contrast, defining family firms by essence would 
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presumably require the collection of additional survey-data, which is not only costly and time-
consuming, but could also come with methodical problems such as low response rates or re-
sponse biases. A good example of the respective complexity is Stockmans et al. (2010). In 
their study on earnings management of Flemish private firms, data on firm characteristics was 
collected through a survey of 8,367 Flemish companies in 2001, of which 896 (10.7 %) re-
sponded; due to further data requirements the final sample was reduced to 132 family firms. 
Taken together, I conclude that one explanation for the, thus far, dominant “type” of 
family firm-study in financial accounting (empirical-archival, involvement-oriented, and 
agency-based) could be the fact that theorisation, method and definition form an interlocked 
and rather stable research framework. In the relatively young field of accounting research on 
family firms, this interrelation seems to make studying family firms more accessible to ac-
counting scholars. It should be noted, however, that a few of the reviewed studies have al-
ready pushed these boundaries by adopting alternative theories (e.g., Achleitner et al., 2014), 
utilising essence-oriented family firm definitions (Stockmans et al., 2010, 2013), exploiting 
private firm settings (idem), or using a different (verbal-analytical) method (Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2014).  
Although much has been achieved, it is evident that research on financial accounting 
and reporting of family firms still faces vast opportunities with regard to the richness of sub-
jects, settings, definitional subtleties, theoretical approaches, and research methods. Eventual-
ly, this gives rise to the question how future research in this field could (and should) move 
forward. Following the aforementioned aspects, I will outline several avenues for future re-
search that make no claim to be exhaustive, however. 
Given that prior empirical research on financial reporting of family firms has provided 
results that are hard to compare due to different settings, metrics, and focal points (e.g., dis-
closures) and that are, to some degree, still conflicting (e.g., earnings management), a natural 
avenue for future research might lie in contributing further evidence on extant subjects. For 
instance, it would be interesting to examine how earnings management activities of family 
firms differ across various institutional settings, to investigate whether different institutional 
properties (e.g., legal protection) affect the observed relation between real and accrual-based 
earnings management of family firms, whether the general tenor of better earnings quality 
remains robust, or to provide further evidence on (voluntary) disclosure practices of family 
firms. In addition, there are various subjects that have received little or no attention so far 
such as accounting choices in family firms. Moreover, Prencipe et al. (2014) and, similarly, 
Salvato & Moores (2010) note that there is a lack of capital market-based research so far that 
 Chapter 4: Research on Financial Accounting and Reporting of Family Firms 
127 
explores how differences in (the quality of) accounting information between family and non-
family firms affect market valuation and, consequently, market liquidity or cost of capital.  
The prevalence of research on listed family firms—that also applies to others field of 
business research (e.g., Carney et al., 2015)—points to another gap, i.e., the lack of evidence 
on accounting and reporting of private family firms. One may argue that listed family firms 
only represent a small subset of the family business universe that, through the choice to go 
public, were willing to accept significant formal changes in corporate governance, first and 
foremost, regarding ownership structure (e.g., Ehrhardt & Nowak, 2003). By contrast, private 
family firms (the majority of family businesses) lack capital market pressures, are understood 
to value secrecy and privacy (Alderson, 2012) and, thus, are subject to different reporting in-
centives than public family firms. In this regard, accounting research on private firms in gen-
eral may provide valuable impulses that could be transferred to the family context (e.g., 
Burgstahler et al., 2006). It should be noted, however, that exploring a private family firm 
setting may have the disadvantage of poor data availability (see above) and complicates the 
identification of non-family control firms. The latter may, in turn, encourage research among 
different types of (private) family firms (Westhead & Howorth, 2007 for a typology of private 
family firms) rather than a comparison to non-family firms based on dichotomous distinc-
tions. 
With respect to the operational definition of family firms, future accounting research 
might take two different directions. One evident avenue lies in the broader application of op-
erational family firm-definitions that involve definitional components of essence (see 4.2.2). 
A near choice, for instance, would be to examine accounting phenomena along the continuous 
F-PEC scale and its subscales, which would require the (costly) collection of supplementary 
survey-data, however. On the other hand, even within the narrower boundaries of the in-
volvement approach, operational family firm-definitions have varied among prior accounting 
studies. In this regard, Prencipe et al. (2014) believe that researches should properly clarify 
and justify the adopted definition and elaborate on the generalisability of their findings to fa-
cilitate the comparability of results. 
Similarly, financial accounting research on family firms could considerably benefit 
from embracing a broader range of theoretical perspectives. As the literature review suggests, 
family firm-specific approaches such as SEW, or the complementary view of stewardship 
theory have provided interesting hypotheses and insights into accounting behaviour of family 
firms but are, by contrast to agency theory, still underrepresented. Moreover, accentuating 
emotional values such as loyalty, affection, love, or sentimentality that stem from kinship, 
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psychology (but also other social science disciplines) may provide further useful theoretical 
impulses to study the idiosyncrasies of family firms. With regard to the former, Nicholson 
(2008: 74), for instance, argues that “[e]volutionary psychology can augment agency theory 
by providing an expanded conception of human nature, giving a more complete account of 
human interests and a more detailed construction of the processes of human rationality”. Ac-
cordingly, he outlines three features that are unique to family firms: genetic identity, intergen-
erational transmission, and wildcard inheritance. Further literature focuses on family firm-
related psychological dimensions such as psychological ownership (e.g., Bernhard & O'Dris-
coll, 2011; Mahto et al., 2014; Pierce et al., 2001) or the psychology of family firm succession 
(e.g., Handler & Kram, 1988; Kaye, 1996; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996 with further references on 
both aspects). In this regard, it would be very interesting to see whether financial accounting 
studies could benefit from implementing respective theoretical impulses and, accordingly, 
from opening up to an interdisciplinary conduct of research. 
The last (and probably most important) suggestion for future research is to consider the 
use of research methods other than quantitative-empirical. As shown before, there has been a 
lack of experimental, formal-analytical, and, in general, qualitative-empirical work in finan-
cial accounting research on family firms so far. It is evident that future research faces mani-
fold opportunities here. Analytical models might provide insightful predictions on various 
accounting phenomena, which, in turn, could be empirically tested. Experimental settings may 
allow to isolate certain treatment effects of interest, for instance, the dichotomy between fami-
ly and non-family firms, the managers’ attitude (agent vs. steward), the generational stage of 
the firm (founder vs. heir), or others (similarly, Prencipe et al., 2014) and could, in turn, fit 
well with psychology-based theorisation46F46F44. Finally, qualitative research might help to attain a 
deeper understanding of the genuine reporting behaviour(s) of family firms, for instance, 
through tailored surveys and/or interviews. In this regard, Salvato & Moores (2010) argue that 
questions focusing on how certain accounting phenomena (e.g., accounting choices, earnings 
management) unfold in family firms, are better addressed through longitudinal case studies 
and field studies of family firms rather than quantitative approaches. Moreover, qualitative 
research might help to move away from the associative (and non-causal) nature of prior quan-
titative-empirical studies towards a more refined understanding of what “really” drives ac-
counting and reporting of family firms. 
                                                 
44  See Libby et al. (2002) for an illustration experimental studies in financial accounting research. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Family firms are of considerable economic importance and a prevalent type of business in 
numerous economies worldwide. Intriguingly, accounting research has only recently begun to 
discover family firms as a unique setting of (empirical) research. 
To condense respective findings and to provide guidance for future research in this rela-
tively young field, this chapter provides a state of the art of the literature on financial account-
ing and reporting of family firms. For this purpose, I review 33 journal publications and three 
working papers with respect to subject, method, empirical models (if applicable), setting, fam-
ily firm-definition, theory, and main findings. For the benefit of an in-depth review, I abstain 
from including studies on managerial accounting and auditing of family firms. The literature 
review suggests that financial accounting research has focussed on a narrow range of subjects 
(earnings management, disclosures, and earnings properties) so far. Prior work has almost 
exclusively been quantitative-empirical and has focused on listed family firms in single coun-
try settings. Operational definitions largely pertain to the involvement approach and include 
the definitional elements of family ownership and family presence on the management or su-
pervisory board. Moreover, the vast majority of studies are premised on agency theory, 
whereas only few employ complementary or alternative approaches such as stewardship theo-
ry or SEW. I contend that the dominant study type and, thus, the state of the art in financial 
accounting research on family firms stems from a relative stable interlocking of theory, meth-
od and empirical operationalisation. Regarding individual subjects, I find that evidence on 
disclosures and earnings management in family firms is heterogeneous. Family control, how-
ever, seems to attenuate the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in constrain-
ing earnings management. Moreover, family firms generally seem to exhibit higher earnings 
quality than non-family firms. 
The literature review concludes with several (non-exhaustive) suggestions for future re-
search which are premised on evident gaps between financial accounting research and family 
business research in general as well as potential avenues from the accounting arena itself. In 
particular, I argue that future research may benefit from a refinement of existing evidence or 
the inclusion of unexplored subjects (e.g., market-based research). From the perspective of 
empirical research, a very natural suggestion relates to exploiting private family firm settings. 
Regarding the identification of family firms, future studies might consider employing es-
sence-oriented definitions and/or elaborating on the validity of prior definitional attempts. I 
further argue that financial accounting research might benefit from opening to alternative the-
oretical perspectives, for instance, from the field of psychology. My final and, presumably, 
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most important suggestion is to consider a broader range of methods in studying accounting 
behaviour of family firms. In this regard, qualitative work in particular might overcome the 
associative nature of prior quantitative-empirical studies and provide a deeper understanding 
of what “really” drives family firm accounting. 
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This doctoral thesis presents three studies on German accounting history, on the internal 
sphere of private accounting standard setting of the IASB, and on the state of art of financial 
accounting and reporting research on family firms. 
Chapter 2 explores the impact of accounting internationalisation on the contracting-
oriented German accounting system from a historical-institutional perspective. Providing an 
in-depth case study, we illustrate how accounting internationalisation has triggered balancing 
acts between a path-dependent preservation of the traditional contracting role and a moderate 
move towards valuation-based international benchmarks. These balancing endeavours are 
accompanied by several contracting implications. We conclude that the continuing (valuation) 
impact of the IFRS will set off further adjustments in the German institutional setting. Be-
cause of the persistent institutional characteristics of the German credit-insider economy, 
these processes will presumably take more time. Notably, institutional persistency and the 
related notion of path-dependent processes cast doubt on the idea that accounting systems will 
globally converge to a uniform accounting and contracting system. However, further research 
is necessary to broaden our understanding of the impact of IFRS on contracting in the code-
law area, of related changes and frictions in the historically developed institutional setting, 
and of evolutionary balancing processes. 
Chapter 3 sheds light on the internal sphere of private accounting standard setting of the 
IASB, in particular, the dynamics of board discussions and (tentative) decisions, the role of 
arguments brought forward in these debates, and the respective contributions of individual 
IASB and staff members. For this purpose, we conduct a content analysis of audio playbacks 
of 14 IASB meetings on the amendment of IAS 19 Employee Benefits (2011) between No-
vember 2008 and February 2010. We identify a set of 205 categories, embodying 1,993 cod-
ings in total, which we arrange into four main categories: project elements, arguments, refer-
ences and governance. At the project element level, we first expose the chronology of IASB 
discussions and decisions and then highlight how individual participants affected board de-
bates and respective decisions. Regarding argumentation, we find that conceptual arguments 
played a relatively greater role than specialised or consistency arguments. Findings from the 
reference main category suggest that agenda papers, involving staff summaries and recom-
mendations, were a dominant source of information for board members. IASB members occa-
sionally argued from the perspectives of particular constituents or examples but only scarcely 
referred to their personal or professional background. Finally, we outline the prominent role 
of the chairman in leading the IASB meetings, on the intermediary role of technical staff and 
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on general observations regarding board-staff relations, language proficiency, and the board 
meetings’ discussion culture. 
It should be emphasised that our findings need to be interpreted cautiously. Above all, 
our observations are restricted to the sphere of board meetings. Accordingly, we fail to identi-
fy opinion making and interactions between board and staff members outside of the IASB 
meetings at hand. Moreover, even within the internal meeting sphere, observability could be 
an issue because participants may feel no need to reveal their position if it has already stated 
by someone else or may involve in discussions at certain points of time only. Even if board 
members remain silent, they still influence decisions through their vote, however. Although 
we believe that exploring board meeting audio playbacks provides novel and valuable insights 
into the black box of IASB standard setting, further research may add to our results. Exploit-
ing complementary sources, particularly surveys and interviews of IASB and staff members, 
seems promising to reappraise our interpretations. Further comparative research based on the 
vast amount of (audio) material provided by the IASB (or other standard setters) may contrib-
ute to our understanding of the role of key players in the due process, group formation, argu-
mentation, and references as well as governance aspects. This could also embrace other di-
mensions of IASB discussions that have not yet been analysed in depth, such as power, the 
style of negotiation and communication, or rhetoric. 
Chapter 4 provides a state of the art of the literature on financial accounting and report-
ing of family firms. For this purpose, I review 33 journal publications and three working pa-
pers with respect to their subject, method, empirical models (if applicable), setting, family 
firm-definition, theoretical framework, and main findings. The literature review suggests that 
financial accounting research on family firms has, in general, been a “non-pluralistic” subfield 
so far. In this regard, I point to several (non-exhaustive) suggestions for future research which 
are premised on evident gaps between financial accounting research and family business re-
search in general as well as potential avenues from the accounting arena itself. First, future 
research may benefit from a refinement of existing evidence or the inclusion of unexplored 
subjects (e.g., market-based research). From the perspective of empirical research, another 
suggestion relates to exploiting private family firm settings. Regarding the identification of 
family firms, future studies might consider employing essence-oriented definitions and/or 
elaborating on the validity of prior definitional attempts. Moreover, financial accounting re-
search might adopt different theoretical perspectives. In line with the general call for method-
ical pluralism in accounting research (see chapter 1), my final suggestions is to consider a 
broader range of methods in studying accounting behaviour of family firms. In particular, 
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qualitative work seems promising to explore the genuine accounting and reporting behaviour 
of family firms in more depth. 
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